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Judicial Federalism and the Future of 
Federal Environmental Regulation 
Jonathan H. Adler' 
ABSTRACT: This article assesses the current and likely impact of the 
Supreme Cowt 's federalism cases on federal envimnmental regulation. As a 
result of this assessment, the article seeks to make four points: ( 1) Thus Jar, 
the Supreme Court's federalism cases have had a limited impact on federal 
regulation, as federal courts have not used these cases as a basis for limiting 
the reach of federal regulatory authority. (2) Notwithstanding this limited 
impact, the underlying logic of the Supreme Court's cases does pose a 
challenge for federal regulation, particularly in the Commerce Clause 
context. (3) The thrust of the federalism cases makes it likely that the 
Supreme Cou1t will revisit the constitutional limitations on the Spending 
Clause, and this could have a substantial impact 01.2 federal envimnmental 
regulation, as some federal environmental provisions exceed even the highly 
deferential Spending Clause standard outlined in South Dakota v. Dole. 
( 4) judicial~'V enforced limitations on federal regulatory authority do not 
necessarily t-ranslate into limitations on envimnmental protection. The 
federal government will retain substantial-although not unlimited-
authority to advance environmental protection. VVhere federal authority· is 
const-rained, state and local governments and non-governmental entities 
will retrain their ability to address many environmental concerns. 
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INTRODUCTION 
From the New Deal through the 1980s the Supreme Court showed little 
interest in policing the division of state and federal power. 1 Beginning in the 
1990s, however, tl1e Court reasserted the importance of state sovereignty and 
enumerated powers, limiting the federal government's power, particularly 
over matters traditionally left in the hands of state and local governments. 
These accumulated federalism decisions put a multiple "whammy on 
congressional authority."2 The federalist revival is arguably the most 
significant constitutional law development of the past fifteen years and may 
become the Rehnquist Court's most controversiallegacy.3 
The expansive reach of federal environmental regulation places it in 
the middle of the federalism debate." Environmental regulation arguably 
represents the most ambitious and far-reaching assertion of federal 
1. For instance, the Supreme Court did not strike down a single federal statute for 
exceeding the scope of Congress's enumerated powers between 1936 and 1995. In 1976, the 
Supreme Court mled 5-4 that Congress could not require state governments to pay state 
employees the minimum wage in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). Within a 
few years, however, the Court began to whittle away at the Natimwl League of Cities holding and 
overtmned it in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Tmnsit Aut./writy, 469 U.S. 528 (1985). Of 
note, Justice Harry Blackmun provided the deciding vote in both cases. 
2. Philip P. FJ;ckey & Steven S. Smith, judicial Review, the Congressional Pmress and the 
}"fderalism Cases: An Intenlisciplinary Critique, Ill YALE LJ. 1707, 1722 (2002). 
3. See, e.g.,.JOHN T. NOONAN,JR., NARROWJNG THE NATION'S POYI'ER: THE SUPREME COURT 
SIDES WlTH THE STATES 1-14 (2002) (desCJ;bing and lamenting the re\~val of federalism); Jack 
M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REv. 1045, 
1052-53 (2001) (characterizing the accumulated federalism decisions as a "constitutional 
revolution"); Erwin Chemerinsky, PTotecting the Spe11ding Power, 4 CHAP. L. REv. 89, 105 (2001) 
(" [T] he five most conservative Justices on the Court have engaged in great judicial acti\~sm in 
limiting Congress's powers, reviving the Tenth Amendment, and expanding sovereign 
immunity."); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Federalism Revolution, 31 N.M. L. REV. 7, 7 (2001) 
("(T]here has been a revolution with regard to the structure nf American goven1ment because 
of the Supreme Court decisions in the last few years regarding federalism.");Jesse H. Choper & 
John C. Yoo, The Scope of the Commerce Clause after Morrison, 25 OKlA. CJ1Y U. L. REV. 843, 854 
(2000) ("(S]hould the current ideological majority of the Court continue, we may be entering 
an era where federal powers will continue to be restricted."); David Freeman Engstrom, Drawing 
Lines Between Chevron and Pennhurst: A Functional Ana9•sis of the Spending Powe1·, Federalism and 
the Administrative State, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1197, 1198 (2004) (noting the Rehnquist Court's 
"revolution in federal-state relations"); Richard W. Gamett, The Nm.v Federalism, the Spending 
Power, and Federal 01iminal Law, 89 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 12 (2003) ("[l]t is a hallmark-and 
perhaps the legacy-of the Rehnquist Court to have brought back to the public-law table the 
notion that the Constitution is a charter for a government of limited and enumerated 
powers."); Linda Greenhouse, For a Supnnne Court GraybeaTd, States' Rights Can Do No Wmng, N.Y. 
TlMES, March 16, 2003, § 4, at 5 ("The court has followed [Rehnquist's] lead in a stunning 
series of federalism decisions that have curbed the power of Congress to bind the states to the 
full reach of federal law."). 
4. AE Professor Percival notes, "AE a result of the Rehnquist Court's 'new federalism,' 
constitutional challenges to federal environmental regulations are now being raised with 
regularity." Robert V. Percival, "Greening" the Constitution-Harmonizing Environmental and 
Constitutional Values, 32 ENVTL. L. 809, 840 (2002). 
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regulatory authority. The very premise of much environmental regulation is 
that ubiquitous ecological interconnections require broad, if not all-
encompassing, federal regulation. 5 This premise is contrary to that of a 
federal government of limited and enumerated powers.6 Due to their 
expansive scope, environmental statutes are particularly vulnerable to 
challenge on f~deralism grounds, a fact noted with great concern by Justice 
Stevens, among others. 7 Even though federal environmental regulation 
adopts a "cooperative federalism" model, the federal government sets most 
environmental pliolities, imposes far-reaching restlictions on potentially 
environmentally destructive behavior, and directs much state effort. Insofar 
as a judicially enforced federalism constrains federal authotity, it could have 
a significant impact on federal environmental regulation. Some even suggest 
that the revival of federalism has "d1e potential to undo the foundation of 
modern environmental law."8 Yet federalist limits on federal regulatory 
authotity need not undermine the cause of environmental protection. 
5. See generally MICHAELS. GREVE, THE DEMISE OF ENVIRONMENTALISM IN AMERICAN LAW 
(1996). 
6. David Orr, The Constitution of Nattwe, 17 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1478, 1481 (2003) 
("Nature is a unified mosaic of ecosystems, functions and processes. Government, on the other 
hand, was conceived by the founders as a limited and fractured enterptise. "). Orr argues that 
there is a fundamental "mismatch between the way nature works in highly connected and 
interactive systems and the fragmentation of powers built into the Constitution." !d. It would be 
a mistake, however, to assume that the Founders were unaware of broad economic and other 
inteiTelationships and did not consider whether such interconnections justified a greater 
centralization of government power. The existence of interstate externalities and 
interrelationships was "an oft-repeated axiom in the constitutional debates." Robert G. 
Natelson, The Enumerated Powers of States, 3 NEV. LJ. 469, 490 (2003) (emphasis omitted). In 
other words, the decision to "fragment" government power hmizontally (through separation of 
powers) and vertically (through federalism) was made despite the existence of such 
inteiTelationships. !d. at 492-93. 
7. See, e.g., Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 175 
(2001) ("Today, however, the Court takes an unfortunate step that needlessly weakens our 
principal safeguard against toxic water.") (Stevens, J., dissenting); Printz v. United States, 521 
U.S. 898, 960-61 (1997) (noting that the majotity opinion ignores the importance of federal 
enactments such as the Clean Water Act, the Occupational Safety and Health Act, and the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Seminole Tribe v. Flotida, 
517 U.S. 44, 77 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority opinion "prevents 
Congress from providing a federal forum for ... environmental law, and the regulation of our 
vast national economy"); Nat'! League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 856 (1976) (Blackmun, 
J., concurring) (noting that the majority decision "does not outlaw federal power in areas such 
as environmental protection, where the federal interest is demonstrably greater and where state 
facility compliance with imposed federal standards would be essential"). 
8. ENVTL. LAW lNST., ENDANGERED ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS PROGRAM BACKGROUND PAPER 
1 (2003), http:/ /www.endangeredlaws.org/downloads/background_paper_final.pdf (on file 
with the Iowa Law Review). The ELI paper characretizes federalism docttines as "arcane legal 
theories, hostile to federal regulation." !d. As constitutional doctrines, they "go to the very 
foundation of environmental and other kinds of laws, and address government's ability to 
enact, implement, and enforce such laws in the first place." !d. at 4. "Taken to the extreme, they 
have the potential to roll federal authotity right back seventy years or more." !d. at 6. 
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Part I provides a brief overview of the federal-state relationship in 
environmental policy, including the dominant regulatory paradigm of 
"cooperative federalism." Part II summa1izes the tlvo central strains in the 
Supreme Court's federalism jurisprudence: enumerated powers and state 
sovereignty. Part III documents the limited impact that federalism 
jurisprudence has had on federal environmental law to date, while noting 
some areas, particularly relating to the Commerce Clause, in which the logic 
of existing precedent suggests limitations on federal environmental 
regulatory authority. Part IV looks to potential federalism limits on the 
spending power and Congress's use of conditional spending to advance 
environmental goals. Whereas it is generally assumed that restrictions on the 
federal government's ability to regulate and fund environmental measures 
will inevitably retard environmental protection, Part V suggests that 
judicially enforced federalism need not have a substantial negative impact 
on environmental protection. To the contrary, there are environmental 
reasons to prefer a more robust federalism. 
I. FEDERALISM AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
P1ior to the late 1960s, most environmental concerns were addressed at 
the state and local level, if they were addressed at all.9 The few federal 
regulatory measures adopted before that time largely focused on the 
conduct of the federal government itself, rather than p1ivate industry, let 
alone consumer behavior. 10 A few laws addressed uniquely federal concerns, 
such as maintaining the navigability of interstate waters. 11 Beyond that, 
federal environmental efforts were non-regulatory and largely consisted of 
federal funding, research assistance, and the like. 12 At the same time, va1ious 
9. See Robert V. Percival, Envimnrnental Federalism: Historical Roots and Contempormy Models, 
54 MD. L. REV. 1141, 1147-60 (1995) (discussing history of environmental protection prior to 
1970). 
10. Id. at 1158 ("To the extent that federal law was regulatory in character prior to 1970, 
the primary targets of environmental regulation were federal agencies rather than private 
industry."). 
11. One of the earliest examples is the federal Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, also known 
as the "Refuse Act." Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act of 1899, ch. 425, 30 Stat. 1151 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.). While this statute could have been 
used to control at least some sources of water pollution, it was rarely invoked for this purpose. 
See Jonathan H. Adler, Fables of the Cuyahoga: Reconstmcting a History of Environmental Protection, 14 
FORDHAM ENVTL. LJ. 89, 133-38 (2002). Indeed, it seems that federal agencies were satisfied so 
long as rivers were sufficiently clear of debris to be suitable for shipping. For instance, in 1957 
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers declared the Cuyahoga River in "exceptionally good" shape 
because none of the local shipping docks were obstructed, even tlwugh the water itself was 
quite polluted. See Cuyahoga River Seen in Good Condition, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, March 28, 
1957, at 19. 
12. See, e.g., N. William Hines, Nor Any Dmp· to D>ink: Public Regulation of Water Quali(w Part 
III: The Federal Eff01t, 52 IOWA L. REV. 799 (1967) (detailing early federal efforts to protect water 
quality). 
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federal programs subsidized widespread environmental despoliation, 
typically in the name of development or economic progress. 13 In the decades 
following the Second World War, environmental protection as it is now 
conceived was simply not a major public policy concern. 14 
Although some environmental measures were improving in the l960s, 15 
there was vvidespread dissatisfaction with environmental progress. 
Throughout the decade, pressure grew for greater federal involvement in 
environmental concerns. As America became more affluent, the demand for 
environmental quality increased dramatically. 16 At the same time, best-selling 
books popularized the notion that modern industrial activity posed a mortal 
environmental threat. 17 A consensus developed in support of greater federal 
involvement in environmental matters. 18 Beginning in 1969, Congress 
13. See infra Part V.A. 
14. This in no way diminishes the significant conservation efforts of the pre-war period. 
Many conservation groups, including the National Audubon Society, Izaak Walton League, 
Boone & Crockett Club, and the Sierra Club, were quite active during that time. See JONATHAN 
H. ADLER, ENVIRONMENTAUSM AT THE CROSSROADS: GREEN ACTIVISTS IN AMERICA l-7 (1995). 
Indeed, the first park ranger to be killed in the line of duty was employed by the National 
Audubon Society, not a government conservation agency. See FRANK GRAI-V\M, THE AUDUBON 
ARJ(: A HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL AUDUBON SOCIETY 52, 56 (1990). For more general 
background on the history of the American environmental movement, see generally AMERICAI\1 
ENVIRONMENTALISM: THE U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT: 1970-1990 (Riley E. Dunlap & 
Angela G. Mertig eds., 1992); PHILIP SHABECO!'F, A FIERCE GREEN FIRE: THE AMERICAN 
ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT (1993); and THEODORE STEINBERG, DOVI'N TO EARTH: NATURE'S 
ROLE IN AMERICAN HISTORY (2002). 
15. See infi'a notes 589-97 and accompanying text. 
16. See RICHARD L. STROUP, ECO-NOMICS: WHAT EVERYONE SHOULD KNOW ABOUT 
ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 13-14 (2003) (summarizing research finding that 
willingness to pay for environmental protection increases with income); Jason Scott Johnston, 
On the Market for Ecosystem Control, 21 VA. EN\I'fL. LJ. 129, 146 (2002) ("There is abundant 
evidence that the demand for outdoor recreation and environmental amenities increases with 
national income."); Matthew E. Kahn & John G. Matsusaka, Demand for Environmental Good~o· 
Evidence from Voting Patterns on California Initiatives, 40 J.L. & ECON. 137, 139 (1997) (noting that 
most environmental goods are normal goods for which demand rises with income); Pauick 
Low, Trade and the Environment: What Worries the Developing Countries?, 23 EN\I'fL. L. 705, 706 
(1993) (noting that "the demand for improved environmental quality tends to rise with 
income"); Kenneth E. McConnell, Income and the Demand for Environmental Quality, 2 ENV'T. & 
DEV. ECON. 383, 385-86 (1997) (reporting on empirical evidence of an environmental Kuznets 
curve); Richard L. Stroup & Roger E. Meiners, Introduction: The Toxic Liability Problem: Why Is It 
Too Large?, in CUTTING GREEN TAPE: TOXIC POLLUTANTS, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION AND 
THE LAW 15 (Richard L. Stroup & Roger E. Meiners eels., 2000) ("Willingness to pay for 
environmental measures ... is highly elastic with respect to income."). 
Charitable giving in general is also elastic \\~th personal income. See RICHARD B. 
MCKENZIE, WHAT WENT RIGHT IN THE 1980s 70 (1994) (noting that "[h]igher incomes lead to 
increased giving"). 
17. E.g., RACHEL CARSON, THE SILENT SPRING (1962); PAUL EHRLICH, THE POPULATION 
BOMB (1968); DONNELLA MEADOWS ET AL., THE LIMITS TO GROWTH (1972); VANISHING AIR: THE 
NADER REPORT ON AIR POLLUTION (John C. Esposito ed., 1970). 
18. Part of this consensus was due to industry support for greater federal em~ronmental 
regulation in order to create uniform national standards and discourage more stringent state 
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enacted a flurry of environmental statutes, including the National 
Environmental Policy Act;19 the Clean Air Act;20 the Clean Water Act; 21 the 
Endangered Species Act;22 the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and 
Rodenticide Act; 23 the Resource Conservation and Recovery Actt1 the Safe 
Drinking Water Act;25 and the Toxic Substances Control Act.26 With the 
enactment of these statutes, the federal government assumed a major role in 
environmental protection. 
Under several of the aforementioned environmental statutes, the 
federal government asserted broad authority to regulate activities that can 
affect environmental quality. For example, under the Clean Water Act, the 
federal government prohibits the addition of any pollutant, defined to 
include most foreign materials,27 to any waters of the United States, 
including wetlands, without a permit.28 The Endangered Species Act bars 
private activities that kill, capture, or otherwise "harm" any animal species 
listed as endangered by the Fish and Wildlife Service, including those 
activities that do no more than modifY existing species habitat on p1ivate 
land.29 Under the Clean Air Act, tl1e Environmental Protection Agency 
regulates the chemical composition of gasoline30 and diesel fuel, 31 the design 
regulation. This was particularly so in the case of air pollution. See E. Donald Elliott et al., 
Towm·d a The01y of Statut01y Evolution: The Federalization of Envimnmental Law, 1 JL. ECON. & ORG. 
313,330-33 (1985). 
19. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (2000). 
20. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-766lf (2000). It is worth noting that the first federal clean air 
legislation was enacted in 1955 (Pub. L. No. 88-206) and amended in 1963, 1965, 1966, and 
1967. With a few exceptions, such as the creation of federal emission standards for· new 
automobiles mandated in 1967, the pre-1970 statutes were largely non-regulatory in nature. 
Although the 1970 Act was itself~ technically, a series of amendments to the prior statutes, it is 
commonly referred to as the Clean Air Act, as it provides the foundation for the contemporary 
regulatory structure. 
21. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1252-1385 (2000). The Clean Water Act is formally knoM1 as the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act. 
22. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000). 
23. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (2000). 
24. 42 u.s.c. §§ 6901-6992k (2000). 
25. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j (2000). 
26. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2671 (2000). 
27. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (2000) (defining "pollutant" to include "dredged spoil, solid 
waste, incinerator residue, sewage, garbage, sewage sludge, munitions, chemical wastes, 
biological materials, radioactive materials, heat, wrecked or discarded equipment, rock, sand, 
cellar dirt and industrial, municipal, and agricultural waste discharged into water"). 
28. !d.§ 1311. 
29. 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (2000) (prohibiting the "take" of an endangered species); see also 
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys., 515 U.S. 687, 690, 708 (1995) (upholding the 
definition of "take" to include "significant habitat modification or degTadation" that "actually 
kills or injures "~ldlife"). 
30. 42 U.S.C. § 7545(a) (2000). 
31. BRUCE YANDLE ET AL., CNTR. FOR FREE MKT. ENVJRONMENTALISM, REGULATING AJR 
QUALm• THROUGH LITIGATION: THE DIESEL ENGINE EPISODE 26 (2002). 
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of vehicle engines,32 and even the contents of some consumer products, 
including paint33 and hairspray.34 
While federal environmental laws grant expansive regulatory authotity 
to federal agencies, most environmental statutes are implemented following 
a "cooperative federalism" model.35 The federal government outlines the 
contours of a given regulatory program, typically through statutory 
mandates elaborated upon by regulatory measures. 36 States are then 
encouraged to implement the program in lieu of the federal government, in 
accordance with federal guidelines. Provided these standards are met, states 
are free to tailor the details of their individual programs to accommodate 
local conditions and concerns. In most cases the federal standards operate 
as a floor-albeit a highly prescriptive one-and states remain free to adopt 
more stringent measures. 37 State programs that meet federal standards are 
typically eligible for federal financial assistance.38 States that fail to adopt 
adequate programs are not only denied the relevant federal funding, they 
can also be subject to various sanctions and federal preemption of their 
programs. 39 That is, if states refuse to regulate in accordance with federal 
guidelines, the federal government may regulate in their place. 
32. 42 U.S.C. § 7521; see also YANDLE ETAL., supra note 31, at34. 
33. 42 U.S.C. § 75llb(e) (1) (B); see also Allied Local & Reg'! Mfrs. Caucus v. EPA, 215 F. 3d 
61, 66 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (upholding federal regulation of paint composition under the Clean Air 
Act). 
34. 42 U.S.C. § 75llb(e) (1) (B); 40 CFR §§ 59.202-.214 (2004). 
35. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992) ("[W]here Congress has the 
authority to regulate private activity under the Commerce Clause, we have recognized 
Congress' power to offer States the choice of regulating that activity according to federal 
standards or having state law pre-empted by federal regulation .... This arrangement ... has 
been termed cooperative federalism." (internal citations and quotations omitted)). Statutes that 
employ the cooperative federalism model include the Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act, portions of the Safe Dtinking Water Act, and the Surface 
Mining Control and Reclamation Act. 
36. See John Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. REv. 1183, 
1184 (1995). See generally DENISE SCHEBERLE, FEDERALISM AND ENVJRONMENTAL POLICY: TRUST 
AND THE POLITICS OF IMPLEMENTATION (1997) (detailing federal-state relations in the 
implementation of environmental policy). 
37. Adam Babich, Our Federalism, Our Hazm"dous Waste, and Our Good Fmtnne, 54 MD. L. 
REV. 1516, 1534 (1995) ("The essence of cooperative federalism is that states take ptimary 
responsibility for implementing federal standards, while retaining the freedom to apply their 
own, more stringent standards."). A notable exception is the case of product standards. As a 
general matter, federal product standards, such as vehicle emission standards, tend to preempt 
more stringent state standards. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (preemption of state automobile 
emission standards); id. § 7545(c) ( 4) (A) (preemption of state fuel standards). 
38. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1256 (2000) (authorizing financial support for state water 
pollution control programs that adopt desired pollution control policies); see also Percival, sujJra 
note 9, at 1173 (noting the use of federal funding to encourage land-use planning and solid 
wa5te management). 
39. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7509 (detailing sanctions for failure to attain the National 
Ambient Air Quality Standards under the Clean Air Act); see also Percival, supra note 9, at 1174 
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In this system, the states are "indispensable," though not "equal 
partners."40 While characte1ized as a "cooperative" structure, the federal-
state relationship in environmental policy is often adversarial and ridden 
with conflict.41 State officials "resent what they believe to be an overly 
presoiptive federal mientation toward state programs, especially in light of 
stable or decreasing grant awards," according to one recent study.42 The 
proliferation of additional requirements without corresponding increases in 
federal financial assistance raises state and local concerns about "unfunded 
federal mandates."43 To some observers, the partnership of cooperative 
federalism is more akin to a feudal relationship between a federal lord and 
state "vassals. "44 
There are three reasons for adopting the cooperative federalism model 
in the context of environmental protection.45 First, the federal government 
does not have the resources or personnel to implement detailed regulatory 
(noting that under most environmental laws, the federal government will adopt and enforce a 
federal regulatory program in the absence of a sufficient state program). 
40. Dwyer, supra note 36, at 1190 ("Although the states are by no means equal partners in 
regulating the environment, they paradoxically remain indispensable partners."). 
41. See Percival, sujJ·ra note 9, at 1144 ("[F]ederal environmental standards have been a 
chronic source of friction for federal-state relations."). States are frequent litigants challenging 
the validity or implementation of federal environmental regulations. See, e.g., West Virginia v. 
EPA, 362 F.3d 861, 865-66 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (challenging federal regulations requiring nitrogen 
oxide emission reductions under state implementation plans); Nebraska v. EPA, 331 F.3d 995, 
997 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (challenging federal drinking water standards for arsenic); Michigan v. 
EPA, 213 F.3d 663, 669 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (challenging federal regulations requiring nitrogen 
oxide emission reductions under state implementation plans); Virginia v. EPA, 116 F.3d 499, 
500-01 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (challenging federal vehicle emission standards). 
42. SCHEBERLE, sujJm note 36, at 186. 
43. See, e.g., Edward A. Zelinsky, Unfunded Mandates, Hidden Taxation, and the Tenth 
Amendment: On Public Choice, Public Interest, and Public Services, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1355, 1356 
(1993) ("Few contemporary issues concern state and local policymakers as intensely as 
unfunded mandates."). Such concerns led to the passage of the Unfunded Mandates Reform 
Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (1995), but this legislation is largely symbolic. See 
U.S. GAO, UNFUNDED MANDATES: REFORM ACT HAs HAD LlTTLE EFFECT ON AGENCIES' 
RULEMAKING ACTIONS (1998); Rena I. Steinzor, Unfunded Environmental Mandates and the "New 
(New) Federalism": Devolution, Regulation, or &fonn?, 81 MINN. L. REV. 97, 100 (1996) (noting that 
UMRA's substantive requirements can be bypassed by a simple majority vote in Congress). 
44. Dwyer, supm note 36, at 1185 ("So much political power has been reallocated to the 
federal government that, at times, the states could be mistaken for vassals of the federal 
government."). Indeed, in 1995 Nebraska Governor E. Ber\_jamin Nelson testified before the 
Senate Judiciary Committee that "[w]hen I was elected Govemor in 1990 and prepared my first 
budget, I honestly wondered if I was actually elected governor or just branch manager of tl1e 
State of Nebraska for tl1e federal government." Hearing Before the Senate Subcommittee on the 
Constitution, Federalism, and Prope11)' Rights, and the Senate Judicimy Comm. ( 1995) (staternen t of 
Governor E. Ber\_jamin Nelson, Governor, State of Nebraska). 
45. For a more detailed discussion of these justifications and tl1e nature of cooperative 
federalism in environmental policy, see Jonathan H. Adler, Comment, The Green Aspects of 
Printz: The Revival of Federalism and Its Implications for Environmental Law, 6 CEO. MASON. L. REv. 
573,578-80 (1998). See also Dwyer, supra note 36, at 1217; Percival, sujJra note 9, at 1174-75. 
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prosoiptions in all fifty states.~ 6 The federal government may set 
environmental priorities through legislation and regulation, but much of 
the actual implementation is dependent upon state agencies and 
personnel.~7 Second, the geographic and economic diversity of the nation 
requires local knowledge and expertise that is often unavailable at the 
federal level.48 Environmental problems, and their solutions, will vary from 
place to place, limiting the federal government's ability to adopt nationwide 
solutions to environmental concerns that are equally applicable to multiple 
parts of the country!9 Third, enlisting state and local cooperation in the 
imposition of potentially costly or intrusive environmental controls can 
blunt local opposition to federal mandates.50 This facilitates the adoption of 
federal environmental standards while simultaneously blurring the lines of 
political accountability.51 For these reasons, most m~or environmental 
46. See Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of SacJ"ifice? Problems of Federalism in iVIandating State 
Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE LJ. 1196, 1201 (1977). 
47. See U.S. GAO, EPA's AND STATES' EFFORTS TO FOCUS STATE ENFORCEMENT PROGRAMS 
ON RESULTS 16 (1998) (noting that states accounted for 85% of enforcement actions in 1996); 
David L. Markell, The Role of Detmrnce-Based Enforcement in a 'Reinvented'" State/Federal 
Relationship: The Divide Between Theory and Reality, 24 IV\.RV. ENVTL. L. REv. 1, 32 (2000) 
(indicating that states are responsible for up to 90% of all facility inspections and 
environmental enforcement actions). 
48. See D\\')'er, sujlra note 36, at 1218 (noting that "[t]he knowledge necessary to 
administer any air pollution control program ... can be found only at the local level'"); see aLm 
HENRY N. BUTLER & JONATHAN R. l'vlACEY, USING FEDERALISM TO IMPROVE ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLICY 27 (1996) ("Federal regulators never have been and never will be able to acquire and 
assimilate the enormous amount of information necessary to make optimal regulatory 
judgments that reflect the technical requirements of particular locations and pollution 
sources."); Alistair Ulph, Harmonization and Optimal Environmental Policy in a Federal Svstem with 
Asymmetric Information, 37 J. EN\'TL. ECON. & l'viGMT. 224, 225-26 (2000) (arguing that regional 
differences in environmental concerns undermine the case for federal harmonization of 
environmental standards where states have informational advantages over the federal 
govemment). This observation is based on the insights of Nobel Laureate economist F.A. 
Hayek, who observed "the knowledge of the circumstances of which we must make use never 
exists in concentrated or integrated form but solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and 
frequently contradictory knowledge which all the separate individuals possess." F. A Hayek, The 
Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 A.M. ECON. REV. 519, 519-20 (1945). For more information on the 
"knowledge problem" in environmental policy, see jonathan H. Adler, Letting Fifty Flowers Bloom: 
Using Federalism to Spur Envimnmental Innovation, in THE jURJSDYNAMICS OF ENVlRONMENTAL 
PROTECTlON: CHANGE AND THE PRAGMATIC VOICE IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 265-66 (Jim Chen 
ed., 2004). 
49. Stewart, sujlm note 46, at 1266 (noting the "sobering fact" that "environmental quality 
involves too many intricate, geographically vatiegated physical and institutional interrelations to 
be dictated from Washington"). 
50. Stewart, sufJra note 46. 
51. See David Schoenbrod, Why States, Not EPA, Should Set Pollution Standards, in 
ENVlRONMENTAL FEDERALISM 259, 264 (Terry Anderson & Peter J. Hill eels., 1997) ("[F]ederal 
mandates give federal legislators and the president the means to take credit for the benefits of 
environmental programs while placing the blame for any ensuing costs on state and local 
officials."). ft is possible that this attenuation of political accountability is one reason 
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statutes adopt some measure of "cooperative federalism," albeit to differing 
51J 
extents.-
Federal environmental regulation arguably represents the most 
expansive assertion of federal authority. Even where federal environmental 
programs are cooperative in nature, environmental regulation calls upon 
the federal government to affect, influence, and regulate a wider range of 
behavior-economic and otherwise-than any other area of federal 
concern. Only federal environmental regulation, for example, could 
purport to regulate local activities ranging from home construction to 
recreational behavior on private land.53 
Despite the ambitious sweep of federal environmental legislation, there 
was little, if any, thought given to the constitutional justification for such 
enactments.54 Congress adopted environmental statutes governing a wide 
range of activities and phenomena never-before subject to federal regulation 
without questioning whether any such legislation might exceed the scope of 
Congress's enumerated powers.55 Nearly all the major environmental 
statutes give a passing nod to the historic state role in addressing pollution 
concerns, yet then proceed to expand the federal government's reach into 
cooperative federalism is popular. See Michael S. Greve, Against Coopemtive Federalism, 70 MISS. 
LJ. 557, 559 (2000). 
52. See, e.g., Bragg v. W.Va. Coal Ass'n, 248 F.3d 275, 294 (4th Cir. 2001) ("The statutory 
federalism of SMCRA is quite unlike the cooperative regime under the Clean Water Act .... "). 
53. See, e.g., 58 Fed. Reg. 45,008, 45,020 (Aug. 25, 1993) (giving the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers authority to regulate "walking, bicycling or driving a vehicle through a wetland" 
because such activities could result in the "discharge of dredged material"). 
54. See Denis Binder, The Spending Clause as a Positive Source of Environmental Protection: A 
Primer, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 14 7, 147 (2001) ("As the number of statutes approach the century mark, 
little tl1ought has been given by Congress to the constitutional basis of the legislation."); id. at 
148 ("[W]hen the statutes were adopted, t11e underlying assumption was tllat tlle Commerce 
Clause grants '~rtually carte blanche authority to legislate for environmental protection."); 
Philip Soper, The Constitutional Fm17U'tuo1·k of Envimnmmtal Law, in FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAw 20, 24 (Erica L. Dolgin & Thomas G. P. Guilbert eds., 1974) (observing that applying 
contemporary Commerce Clause jmispruclence "to the environmental context results in a 
picture of congressional power that appears practically unbounded at least as far as concerns 
control over the typical areas of pollution"). But see id. at 21-22 (citing commentators who 
argued, in the 1960s, tllat some environmental concerns may lie beyond tlle scope of federal 
power). 
55. Insofar as policy makers gave any consideration to constitutional limits on federal 
em~ronmental legislation, they were concerned that some regulations controlling land use 
could result in compensable takings under the Fifth Amendment. See, e.g., FRED BOSSELMAN ET 
AL., THE TAJUNG ISSUE (1973) (detailing the potential constitutional limits on environmental 
regulation posed by the "takings clause" of the Fifth Amendment). Congress considered, and 
rejected, explicit federal controls on land use in 1973. See geneml~v. Robert H. Nelson, Federal 
Zoning: The New Era in Environmental Policy, in LAND R.IGHTS: THE 1990s PROPERTI' R.IGHTS 
REBELLION 295 (Bruce Yandle eel., 1995). Despite the defeat of this proposal, the cumulative 
impact of federal em~ronmental statutes has been the imposition of substantial federal controls 
on private land use. !d. at 297 ("The full land-use consequences of the em~ronmental 
legislation of the early 1970s, as subsequently amended, are only now coming to be more widely 
realized."). 
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such terrain.56 Because federal environmental programs are so expansive, 
environmental regulation may be particularly vulnerable to federalism 
constraints on federal power. Insofar as courts restrict the scope of federal 
regulatory authority due to federalism concerns, this may have a particular 
effect on environmental regulation. 
II. THE SUPREME COURT's FEDERALISM 
Central to the Supreme Court's revived federalism jurisprudence is the 
idea that the structure of the Constitution creates a system of "dual 
sovereignty" in which both the federal government and the states are 
sovereigns.57 Although often characterized as a "States rights" philosophy, 
"dual sovereignty" is supposed to operate for the benefit of citizens, not 
states.58 Much as the horizontal separation of powers prevents any single 
branch of government from accumulating too much power, the division of 
authority between the federal and state governments protects liberty from 
government encroachment.59 "The different governments will control each 
other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself," explained 
James Madison in Federalist No. 51.60 If the limits of federal power are 
respected, and the appropriate balance between the federal and state 
governments is maintained, inteijurisdictional competition restrains state 
governments from imposing unnecessary burdens upon their citizens. 61 The 
beneficiaries of this arrangement are not the state governments, as such, as 
56. See, e.g., Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (c) (2) (2000) ("It is further 
declared to be the policy of Congress that Federal agencies shall cooperate with State and local 
agencies to resolve water resource issues in concert with conservation of endangered species."); 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act), 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (b) (2000) ("It is the 
policy of the Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and 
rights of States .... "); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7402(a) (2000) ("The Administrator shall 
encourage cooperative activities by the States and local governments ... and encourage the 
making of agreements and compacts between States for the prevention and control of air 
pollution."). 
57. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991). 
58. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, lSI (1992) ("The Constitution does not 
protect the sovereignty of States for the benefit of the States or state governments as abstract 
political entities .... To the contrary, the Constitution divides authority between federal and 
state governments for the protection of individuals."); see also John 0. McGinnis & Ilya So min, 
Federalism vs. States' Rights: A Defense of judicial Reviw in a Federal System, Nw. U. L. REv. 
(forthcoming) (arguing that federalism allocates power between the state and federal 
governments for the benefit of the people of the nation and for the benefit of states qua states). 
59. As the Court explained in Gregmy: 'Just as the separation and independence of the 
coordinate branches of Federal Government serve to prevent the accumulation of excessive 
power in any one branch, a healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal 
Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front." 501 U.S. at 458. 
60. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 323 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961 ). 
61. See generally MICHAEL GREVE, REAL FEDERALISM: WHY IT MATTERS, How IT CAN HAPPEN 
(1999). 
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they are forced to compete with one another for the loyalty of their citizens, 
but the people. Maintaining this balance is the purpose of federalism. 
The Supreme Court's recent federalism jmisprudence has two distinct 
strains. The first focuses on the federal government's enumerated powers. 
These cases ask whether a given federal statute represents a proper exercise 
of one of Congress's enumerated powers. In these cases, the Court has held 
that the enumeration of distinct federal powers places affirmative limits on 
Congress's power. Some matters-those not within the bounds of the 
enumerated powers-are simply beyond the reach of federal hands. The 
second centers on protecting state sovereignty. The focus in these cases is 
the extent to which residual state sovereignty immunizes states from federal 
efforts to direct or otherwise influence state resources and policy decisions. 
Together, these two jurisprudential strains limit both what Congress may do 
and how Congress may do it. 
A. ENuMERATED POWERS 
From its inception the federal government has been a government of 
enumerated powers. As the Court declared in Marbury v. Madison, "The 
powers of the legislature are defined and limited; and that those limits may 
not be mistaken or forgotten, the constitution is written."62 Those powers 
not delegated to the federal government are, in the words of the Tenth 
Amendment, "reserved to the States, respectively, or to the people."63 The 
bulk of Congress's powers are enumerated in Article I, section 8 of the 
Constitution, though others are scattered through the document, including 
the enforcement power contained in section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Arnendment.64 To the Court's current majority, it is a matter of "first 
principles" that congressional authority is limited to these powers.55 United 
States v. Lopez66 and City of Boerne v. Florel7 make clear that even Congress's 
broadest powers-to regulate commerce and protect civil liberties under the 
Fourteenth Amendment-have distinct and defined limits beyond which 
Congress's reach may not extend. Several of the Supreme Court's recent 
62. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,176 (1803). 
63. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
64. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (granting Congress the power to determine the effect 
of the Full Faith and Credit Clause); id. § 3, cl. 2 ("The Congress shall have Power to dispose of 
and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property 
belonging to the United States .... ); U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2 (granting Congress the 
power to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment); U.S. CONST. amend. XV,§ 2 (granting Congress 
the power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment); U.S. CONST. amend. XVI (granting Congress 
the power to levy an income tax). 
65. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995). 
66. 514 u.s. 549 (1995). 
67. 521 u.s. 507(1997). 
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federalism cases have sought to define d1e outer limits of federal 
l . th 68 enumeratec powers m ese two areas. 
I. Commerce Clause 
Article I, section 8 of the Constitution grants Congress numerous 
powers, including the power " [ t] o regulate Commerce . . . among the 
several States." 69 As explained by Chief Justice John Marshall, this clause-
the Commerce Clause70-grants Congress "the power to regulate; that is, to 
prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be govemed."71 This, by its own 
terms, is a rather expansive power. It, "like all others vested in Congress, is 
complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges 
no limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitution."72 Yet as broad 
as the commerce power may be, it is not without limits. 73 In Marshall's 
words, there remains an "immense mass of legislation, which embraces every 
thing within the territory of a State, not surrendered to the general 
,7-l government. 
For most of the latter half of the twentieth century, the notion that 
there were justiciable limits on the scope of Congress's Commerce Clause 
power was a dead letter. 75 In the name of regulating commerce, Congress 
68. Explicit in the Court's enumerated powers decisions is the holding that constitutional 
limitations on federal enumerated powers are judicially cognizable and represent appropriate 
subjects of judicial review. This has not always been universal. See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio 
Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 552 (1985) (holding that "political safeguards" for state 
interests are sufficient and obviate the need for judicial enforcement of federalism); see also 
Jesse H. Choper, The Scope of National Power Vis-a-vis the States: The Dispensability of judicial Review, 
86 YALE LJ. 1552, 1557-60 (1977); Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safegum·ds of Federalism: The 
Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Govemment, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 543, 
558-59 (1954); if. John C. Yoo, The judicial Saftguards of Federalism, 70S. CAL. L. REV. 1311, 1321-
57 (1997) (documenting the Court's subsequent rejection of the "political safeguards" 
approach to federalism). 
69. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
70. Although this clause is commonly referred to as the "Commerce Clause," perhaps it 
would be more appropriate to refer to it as the "Interstate Commerce Clause" as it vests 
Congress the power to regulate commerce "among the several states" and not commerce 
generally. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1, 194 (1824) ("Comprehensive as the word 
'among' is, it may very properly be restricted to that commerce which concerns mm·e States 
than one."); see also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 587 n.2 (Thomas,]., concurring) ("Even to speak of 'the 
Commerce Clause' perhaps obscures the actual scope of that Clause."). 
71. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 v\Theat) at 196. 
72. Id. 
73. As stressed in Marbwy v. Madison, the whole purpose of explicitly enumerating 
legislative powers was to provide limits on their scope. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803) ("To 
what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation committed to writing, if 
these limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended to be restrained?"). 
74. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) at 203. 
75. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE-VOL. 1: FOUNDATIONS 105 (!991) (noting 
that after the New Deal "[a) commitment to federalism ... was no longer thought to require a 
constitutional strategy that restrained the national government to a limited number of 
JUDICIAL FEDERAliSM AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 391 
could regulate just about anything. 76 As then:Justice William Rehnquist 
observed in 1981, "[O]ne could easily get the sense from this Court's 
opinions that the federal system exists only at the sufferance of Congress. "77 
Although the Supreme Court had repeatedly reaffirmed the limited scope of 
the Commerce Clause power in its opinions, for decades it only honored 
these limitations in the breach.78 Beginning in 1937, with the Court's 
decision in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. to uphold the regulation of 
intrastate actiVIties that have a "substantial relation to interstate 
commerce,"
79 the Court would not look favorably upon another Commerce 
Clause challenge to federal legislation for almost sixty years. 
In 1995, the Supreme Court reversed the conviction of Alfonso Lopez, 
Jr. for carrying a concealed handgun to school in violation of the federal 
Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 ("GFSZA"). In United States v. Lopez,80 the 
Court held that a federal statute prohibiting the knowing possession of a 
gun within one thousand feet of a school exceeded the scope of the 
commerce power. Stressing that "the Constitution creates a Federal 
Government of enumerated powers,"8I the Lopez majmity rejected the 
argument that Congress could regulate intrastate activities with only a 
tenuous connection to interstate commerce. Five years later, the Supreme 
Court reaffirmed this holding in United States v. Morrison,82 striking down 
provisions of the Violence Against Women Act ("VAWA") that, like the 
GFSZA, had only a hypothesized relationship to interstate commerce. 
Under Lopez, the Constitution grants Congress the power to regulate in 
three areas: (1) "the use of the channels of interstate commerce;" (2) "the 
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate 
commerce;" and (3) "those activities that substantially affect interstate 
commerce."
83 The first two categories are rather unambiguous. If an item is 
used or sold in interstate commerce, it may be regulated, as may the 
channels through which such items flow. Thus, for example, Congress may 
enumerated powers over economic and social life"). This presumption is common within the 
environmental law literature. See, e.g., Holly Doremus, Patching the ATk: Improving Legal Protection 
of Biological Diversity, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 265, 293 (1991) ("As currently interpreted, the 
Commerce Power has a virtually unlimited sweep."). 
76. As one federal judge observed, federal courts treated tl1e commerce clause as the 
"Hey, you-can-clo-whatever-you-feel-like Clause." Alex Kozinski, Introduction to Volume Nineteen, 19 
HARV.j.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 5 (1995). 
77. Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 308 (1981) 
(Rehnquist,J., concurring). 
78. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937) ("That distinction 
between what is national and what is local in the activities of commerce is vital to tl1e 
maintenance of our federal system."). 
79. !d. at 37. 
80. 514 u.s. 549 (1995). 
81. !d. at 552. 
82. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
83. LojJez, 514 U.S. at 558-59. 
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regulate or prohibit the sale of driver's license information and other 
personal data collected by public and private entities because such 
information is a product sold in interstate commerce.84 The contours of tl1e 
"substantial effects" test, on tl1e oilier hand, are less obvious. 
As described and applied in Lopez and Morrison, the "substantial effects" 
test is more qualitative ilian quantitative. It is more concerned with the 
nature of the regulated activity or ilie regulatory scheme in question than 
wiili the aggregate economic impact of the regulated activity alone, or in 
combination with oilier similarly regulated activities. The key question is 
whether the activity subject to federal regulation is itself related to 
'"commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise" or whether the regulation 
is "an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which ilie 
regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were 
regulated."85 Thus, Congress may regulate activities that are "economic in 
"
86 h . d . I . . 87 I l l . 88 A tl . nature, sue as m ustna mtmng or oan-s 1arzmg. t 1e same ttme, 
Congress may reach relatively minor intrastate activities through broad 
economic regulatory schemes, such as a price maintenance regime for 
agricultural products.89 That a given activity-whether domestic violence, 
the possession of a gun near a school, or insomnia90-might have a 
substantial economic impact, even when aggregated with all other instances 
of like conduct, is insufficient. The Court explicitly rejected "the argument 
that Congress may regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based 
l I l d ' fT . ,lJI so e yon t 1at con uct s aggregate e 1ect on mterstate commerce. · 
In Morrison, the Court identified four factors to consider when 
evaluating whetl1er a given activity "substantially affects" interstate 
commerce. The first, and perhaps most important factor, is the economic or 
commercial nature of the activity in question. While the Jl;fonison Court 
84. See Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. liS (2000) (upholding rhe Otiver's Privacy Protection 
Act as a proper exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause power). 
85. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561. 
86. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613. 
87. See generally Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981) 
(holding the Surface Mining and Refonnation Act constitutional under the Commerce Clause). 
88. See generally Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (holding that the loansharking 
portion of the Consumer Credit Protection Act is constitutional under the Commerce Clause). 
89. See generally Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. Ill (1942) (upholding the application of 
agricultural production quotas to production for a fanner's own use because allowing such 
production would undermine the national price control scheme created by the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act of 1938); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556 ("Even if appellee's activity be local and ... not 
be regarded as commerce, it may still ... be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial 
economic effect on interstate commerce, ... irrespective of whether such effect is what might at 
some earlier time have been define? as 'direct' or 'indirect."' (citing vl'ickard, 317 U.S. at 125)). 
90. See Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst., 169 F.3d 820, 839 (4th Cir. 1999) (en bane) 
(citing estimates that insomnia has an estimated $92.5 to .$107.5 billion annual impact on the 
U.S. economy), affd sub nom, United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
91. Monison, 529 U.S. at 617. 
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eschewed adopting a "categorical rule against aggregating the effects of any 
noneconomic intrastate activity," it noted "thus far in our Nation's history 
our cases have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity 
only where the activity is economic in nature."92 It is important to note that 
the Court is using "economic" and "noneconomic" in a generalized, 
colloquial sense.93 "Economic" activities are those that involve the 
production, distribution, or exchange of goods and services, as well as those 
activities undertaken for the purpose of such activities. That economists 
might describe an activity as "economic," insofar as these activities (like all 
human conduct) can be described in economic terms, does not make it 
"economic" for purposes of Commerce Clause analysis under Lopez and 
Morrison.94 
The second factor is whether Congress included a jurisdictional 
element in the challenged statute that can serve to "limit its reach to a 
discrete set" of activities that substantially affect commerce.95 For instance, in 
Jones v. United States, 95 a unanimous court interpreted the federal arson 
statute to cover "only property currently used in commerce or in an activity 
affecting commerce" so as to avoid a potential Commerce Clause issue. By its 
terms, the statute only reached those activities within Congress's Commerce 
Clause authority. Such a jurisdictional element does not ensure a statute's 
constitutionality,97 but it can provide courts with a basis upon which to 
construe a statute so as to keep it within constitutional limits. Specifically, 
where a statute appears to stretch the outer bounds of Congress's 
Commerce Clause authmity, courts can construe the jurisdictional element 
narrowly so as to avoid the constitutional concern.98 
The third factor is whether Congress adopted legislative findings 
regarding the regulated activity's alleged substantial effect on interstate 
commerce.
99 As with a jurisdictional element, the adoption of legislative 
92. Jd. at 613; see also Jim Chen, The Story ofWickard v. Filburn: Agriculture, Aggregation, and 
Congressional Power over Commerce, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 69, 104 (Michael C. Dorf 
ed., 2004) ("The aggregation principle remains nominally good law, but it operates only when 
the actors or activities at issue are commercial."). 
93. See Deborah Jones Merritt, Commerce!, 94 MICH. L. REV. 674, 694-95 (1995); see also 
Jonathan H. Adler, Wetlands, Watmfowl, and the Menace of Mr. Wilson: Commerce Clause 
Jun:spntdence and the Limits of Fede?·al Wetland Regulation, 29 ENVTL. L. 1, 12-14 ( 1999). 
94. But see Allan Ides, Economic Activity as a Proxy for Federalism: Intuition and Reason in 
United States v. Morrison, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 563, 570-73 (2001) (arguing the economic, 
non-economic distinction is analytically incoherent). 
95. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,562 (1995). 
96. 529 U.S. 848 (2000). 
97. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612 (noting the jurisdictional element "may" establish the 
constitutionality of a given statute under the Commerce Clause). 
98. jones, 529 U.S. at 857 (stating that "where a statute is susceptible of two constructions, 
by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of which 
such questions are avoided" a court's "duty is to adopt the latter"). 
99. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612. 
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findings does not ensure a statute's constitutionality. 10° Congress adopted 
legislative findings concerning the alleged effects of gender-motivated 
violence on interstate commerce, but the Supreme Court struck down the 
challenged VAWA provisions in Niorrison nonetheless. 101 But the adoption of 
such findings can assist a court in identifying a given activity's effect on 
interstate commerce, particularly if the effect is nonobvious. 102 Findings 
alone will not protect a statute from Commerce Clause scrutiny, however. 
Jvforrison makes clear that the Court will independently evaluate 
congressional findings that purport to demonstrate that an otherwise non-
commercial, intrastate activity substantially affects interstate commerce. 
The fourth and final factor is the nexus between the regulated activity 
and the alleged substantial effect on interstate commerce. Where the 
relationship between the activity and the effect is "tenuous," a statute will not 
be upheld. 103 That tl1e presence of guns in schools could disrupt the 
education process, thereby reducing the educational system's ability to 
produce a more educated, and presumably more productive, workforce and 
that this could well have a substantial impact on the economic well-being of 
the country, does not establish the sort of connection necessary to uphold a 
statute under the Commerce Clause. This sort of attenuated effect on 
commerce was hypothesized-and explicitly rejected-in Lopez. 104 To accept 
highly attenuated connections of this type between intrastate activities and 
ir1terstate commerce as tl1e basis for Commerce Clause jmisdiction would 
make the courts "hard pressed to posit any activity by an individual that 
Congress is without power to regulate." 105 
To date, the consideration of these factors has not led to the 
invalidation of many federal statutes, environmental or otherwise.106 Indeed, 
federal appellate courts have been extremely reluctant to strike clown any 
C 107 c federal statute on Commerce lause grounds. oncerns about the scope 
100. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 n.2 ("[S]imply because Congress may conclude that a particular 
activity substantially affects interstate commerce does not necessarily make it so." (quoting 
Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264,311 (1981)). 
!OJ. Aforrison, 529 U.S. at 614-15. 
102. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at563. 
103. Id. at 563-64. 
104. Id. at 565; cf id. at 618-20 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that "as long as one views 
the commerce connection, not as a 'technical legal conception,' but as 'a practical one,"' 
Congress had a "rational basis for finding a significant (or substantial) connection between gun-
related school violence and interstate commerce," clue to the "widespread" and "extremely 
serious" problem of guns in schools and the effect of education on interstate commerce). 
105. Id. at 564; see also Michell N. Berman, Guillen and Gullibility: Piercing the Swjace of 
Commerce Clause Doarine, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1487, 1528 (2004) ("If the Rehnquist Court's 
developing Commerce Clause doctrine is driven by a single impulse, it is the insistence that the 
docttine not amount to a blank check."). 
106. The relevant environmental cases are discussed infra Part III.A.l. 
107. See Brannon P. Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Rulings and Resistance: The New 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence Encounters the Lower Cowts, 55 ARK. L. REv. 1253, 1256 (2003); 
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of Commerce Clause authority have prompted some courts to narrow the 
scope of federal statutes containing jurisdictional elements.108 In addition, 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has looked favorably on "as 
applied" challenges, whereby federal statutes are upheld, but nonetheless 
declare<:l unconstitutional as applied to a given plaintiff due to the 
noneconomic, intrastate character of the conduct at issue. 109 Yet while 
application of Lopez and Morrison has divided several circuits, thus far federal 
statutes have remained largely immune from Commerce Clause 
llO 
challenges. 
2. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
While the Commerce Clause cases are the most important enumerated 
powers cases for the future of environmental protection, a second line of 
cases merits a brief discussion. These cases address the reach of federal 
power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. As generally 
recognized, the primary purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to 
provide freed slaves and other Mrican-Americans greater federal protection 
from arbitrary exercises of state power.lll Am'ong other things, the 
Amendment prohibits states from abridging the "privileges or immunities" 
of U.S. citizens, depriving any person of "life, liberty, or property without 
due process of law," and denying "equal protection of the laws" to any 
Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, Lower Cou1t lliadings oJLopez, o1· What if the Supmne 
Cowt Held a Constitutional Rl!Volution and Nobody Came?, 2000 WIS. L. REv. 369, 392-93 (2000). 
108. See, e.g., United States v. Lamont, 330 F.3d 1249, 1254-55 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that 
the defendant's action did not fall within the jmisdictionallimits of the federal arson statute); 
United States v. Perrotta, 313 F.3d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 2002) (same, but under Hobbs Act); United 
States v. Ballinger, 312 F.3d 1264, 1276 (11th Cir. 2002) (same, but under Church Arson 
Prevention Act); United States v. Rea, 300 F.3d 952, 961-62 (8th Cir. 2002) (same, but under 
federal arson statute); United States v. Carr, 271 F.3d 172, 179-80 (4th Cir. 2001) (same); 
United States v.Johnson, 246 F.3d 749, 752 (5th Cir. 2001) (same). 
109. See Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1222 (9th Cir. 2003) (upholding an as-applied 
commerce clause challenge to the application of the federal Controlled Substances Act to 
medical marijuana); United States v. Stuart, 348 F.3d 1132, 1142 (9th Cir. 2003) (upholding a 
commerce clause challenge to federal prohibition of possession of fully-automatic weapons as 
applied to a home-made firearm); United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114, 1140-41 (9th Cir. 
2003) (upholding a commerce clause challenge to federal prohibition on possession of child 
pornography as applied to a family photo). 
110. See GDF Realty v. Norton, 362 F.3d 286, 289 (5th Cir. 2004) (denial of an en bane 
petition); Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1158, 1158 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (denial of an en 
bane petition); United States v. McFarland, 311 F.3d 376, 424 (5th Cir. 2002) (en bane) 
(upholding a Hobbs Act conviction); United States v. Faasse, 265 F.3d 475, 479 (6th Cir. 2001) 
(en bane) (upholding the Child Support Recovery Act of 1992 on Commerce Clause grounds); 
United States v. Hickman, 179 F.3d 230, 231 (5th Cir. 1999) (en bane) (upholding a Hobbs Act 
conviction). 
11 l. See RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, 2 TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 
SUBSTANCE & PROCEDURE§ 15.2 (2d ed. 1999). 
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person within the state.112 Section 5 of the amendment grants Congress the 
"power to enforce" these prohibitions and the remainder of the Fourteenth 
Amendment's guarantees "by appropriate legislation. "113 
Section 5 is an affirmative grant of legislative power to Congress. 114 Yet 
like the powers enumerated in Article I, section 8, this power is subject to 
judicially enforceable limits. Specifically, the Court held in City of Boerne v. 
Flores that Congress's section 5 power "extends only to 'enforcing' the 
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment." 115 The power is "remedial" in 
116 d I b . d I . 117 Wh"l . nature an may on y e exercise to contro state action. I e section 
5 grants Congress the power to proscribe "conduct which is not itself 
unconstitutional" so as to deter or remedy violations of the Fourteenth 
Amendment's substantive guarantees, Congress does not have the "power to 
decree the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment's restrictions on the 
states."118 Thus, in City of Boerne the Court struck down Congress's effort to 
force state and local governments to provide greater accommodations for 
religious practice than are required by the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment. ug 
Where Congress enacts legislation that extends beyond the prohibition 
of actual constitutional violations, the Court requires "congruence and 
proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the 
means adopted to that end." 120 In practice, this means that Congress may 
adopt prophylactic legislation to guard against potential constitutional 
violations. 121 The nature and scope of the proscribed conduct must be 
related to the violation Congress wants to prevent. Under the current 
understanding of section 5, Congress's ability to identify and address state 
violations of Fourteenth Amendment rights independent of judicial findings 
of such violations is fairly limited. 122 
112. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 1. 
113. Id. 
114. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 619 (2000) ("Section 5 is 'a positive grant of 
legislative power."' (quoting Katzen bach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966)) ). 
115. 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend XIV,§ 5). 
116. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301,326 (1966). 
117. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 621 ("[T]he Fourteenth Amendment, by its very terms, prohibits 
only state action."). 
118. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519 (striking down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act for 
exceeding Congress's power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); see also id. 
("Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what the right is. It has been 
given the power 'to enforce,' not the power to determine what constitutes a constitutional 
violation." (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 5)). 
119. Id. at 536 (striking down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act for exceeding 
Congress's power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
120. I d. at 520; see also Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81 (2000). 
121. Nev. Dept. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 728 (2003). 
122. See generally, Evan H. Caminker, ''Appropriate" Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5 Powers, 
53 STAN. L. REV. 1127 (2001) (discussing the Court's narrowing of Congress's ability to regulate 
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B. STATE SOVEREIGNTY 
The enumeration of Congress's delegated powers is not the only limit 
on the scope of federal power. There are constitutional limits on the 
exercise of federal power, both explicit (as in the Bill of Rights) and implicit 
(as in those found in the Constitution's history and structure). The Supreme 
Court has found within the Constitution significant structural limits on the 
exercise of federal power that arise from the residual "sovereign" status of 
state governments. Building on the concept of "dual sovereignty," the Court 
has invalidated federal actions that impede upon, or affront the "dignity" of, 
states qua states.123 In particular, the Court has held that the federal 
government may neither command states to participate in or implement a 
federal regulatory program, 124 nor may the federal government abrogate 
state sovereign immunity from suits for money damages save in limited 
circumstances. 125 These doctrines are not derived from the Constitution's 
text, but rather from structural considerations and unspoken assumptions in 
the document. They are nonetheless key components of the contemporary 
Court's federalism jurisprudence. 
l. Commandeering 
The first structural limitation is the "anti-commandeering" p1inciple. 
Specifically, "the Federal Government may not compel the states to 
implement, by legislation or executive action, federal regulatory 
programs."126 In 1992, New York State challenged portions of the Low-Level 
Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985,127 which threatened to 
require states with inadequate waste disposal capacity to take title to, and 
assume liability for, low-level radioactive waste generated within the state. In 
striking down the measure in New York v. United States, 128 tl1e Court held that 
state conduct under section 5, and arguing that the Court's congruence and proportionality 
test is the wrong test); Samuel Estreicher & Margaret H. Lemos, The Section 5 Mystique, 
Morrison, and the Future of Federal Antidiscrimination Law, 2000 SUP. CT. REv. 109 (2000) (same); 
Marci Hamilton & David Schoenbrod, The Reaffirmation of Proportionality Analysis under Section 5 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, 21 CARDozo L. REv. 469 (1999) (discussing the Court's narrowing of 
Congress's ability to regulate state conduct under section 5, but arguing that the Court's 
congruence and proportionality test is the correct test). 
123. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 749 (1999); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 58 
(1996) (noting sovereign immunity serves, in part, "to avoid 'the indignity of subjecting a State 
to the coercive process of judicial tribunals at the instance of private parties"' (quoting P.R. 
Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993) ). 
124. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) ("The Federal Government may 
neither issue directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor command the 
States' officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal 
regulatory program."). 
125. See, e.g., Alden, 527 U.S. at 706. 
126. Printz, 521 U.S. at 925. 
127. Pub. L. No. 99-240, 99 Stat. 1842. 
128. 505 u.s. 144 (1992). 
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"while Congress has substantial power under the Constitution to encourage 
States to provide for the disposal of the radioactive waste generated within 
their borders, the Constitution does not confer upon Congress the ability 
simply to compel the States to do so."129 Writing for the majmity in New York, 
Justice O'Connor explained, "[T]he Constitution has never been 
understood to confer upon Congress the ability to require the States to 
govern according to Congress's instructions." 130 To hold otherwise, the 
Court explained, would be to reject the idea that the states themselves retain 
substantial sovereignty within the federal system. It would also undermine 
accountability within the federal system. 131 
The Court's holding laid out simple ground rules for federal efforts to 
enlist State assistance in regulatory programs: "The Constitution enables the 
Federal Government to pre-empt state regulation contrary to federal 
interests, and it permits the Federal Government to hold out incentives to 
the States as a means of encouraging them to adopt suggested regulatory 
schemes. It does not, however, authorize Congress simply to direct the 
States" to adopt Congress's policy prescriptions. 132 In simple terms: 
"Whatever the outer limits of [State] sovereignty may be, one thing is clear: 
The Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a 
federal regulatory program."133 
This limitation applies equally to efforts to commandeer a state or local 
0 1 0 1 134 c 0 bl government executtve as a state egts ature. ongress IS no more a e to 
direct the activities of local law enforcement than it is a state senate. To hold 
otherwise would enable Congress to sidestep New York by directly ordering 
state officials to implement federal measures, bypassing the state legislature 
in the process. 135 Such federal power to direct state executive officials would 
infringe upon state legislatures' ability to control state policy. 136 For this 
reason, the Supreme Court in Printz v. United States invalidated portions of a 
federal statute directing state law enforcement officials to perform 
background checks for handgun purchases. That the background-check 
requirement was arguably little more than a ministerial obligation, and did 
129. Id. at 149 (emphasis added). 
130. Id. at 162.Justice O'Connor found support for her opinion in the language of Hodel v. 
Virginia Smface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, concluding that Congress cannot "commandeer[) 
the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal 
regulatory program." 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981). 
131. N= York, 505 U.S. at 168-69 (stating that federal mandates on state governments 
diminish political accountability at both the state and local level). 
132. Id. at 188. 
133. Id. 
134. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898,935 (1997). 
135. Id. at 929-30. 
136. The anti-commandeeting ptinciple does not, however, apply to state judiciaties due to 
the express language of the Supremacy Clause. See generally Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 ( 194 7). 
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not impose a substantial burden on the local law enforcement officers, was 
deemed immaterial. 137 
New York and Printz did not limit Congress's ability to regulate interstate 
commerce or other matters identified in Article I of the Constitution. These 
cases place no limitation on Congress's ability to regulate directly those 
matters within its control. Instead, the anti-commandeering rule proscribes 
the methods that Congress may use to effect such regulation. It is a 
structural banier limiting the federal government's ability to reorient state 
p1i01ities and resources. Of course, Congress is not always interested in 
authorizing direct regulation. Administering programs through state 
governments may obscure tl1e source of regulatory edicts and blunt any 
political backlash over unpopular rules. 138 Much as unbounded delegations 
to regulatory agencies enable Congress to posture about achieving 
important public ends without accounting for the costs entailed by federal 
139 d . . I . f c d I programs, · man atmg state Imp ementatwn o 1e era programs may serve 
Congress's institutional interests by obscuring federal responsibility for given 
regulatory requirements. Thus, in many cases Congress would prefer to 
regulate through the states. 140 
Where Congress is unwilling to instruct tl1e federal executive to regulate 
directly, it may seek to induce voluntary state participation in a federal 
scheme.141 The most obvious means of accomplishing tl1is is to offer funds to 
the states with conditions attached, or to threaten to cut off an existing 
funding stream if specified conditions are not met. 142 Such encouragement 
has significant force, but it also has constitutional limits. Indeed, the 
structural constraints on federal power imposed by New York and Printz imply 
such limits on tl1e use of federal funds. As discussed below, Congress's 
spending power can no more authorize infringements upon state 
governments than can the power to regulate interstate commerce. 143 Both 
must be subject to federalism restraints. While New Ymk and Printz did not 
impose substantive restraints upon Congress's power, they did place 
structural impediments to the enactment of laws that would excessively 
137. Printz, 521 U.S. at 935 ("[N]o case-by-case weighing of the burdens or benefits is 
necessary; such commands are fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional system of 
dual sovereignty."). 
138. In this fashion, commandeering can blur both the line of credit as well as that of 
blame. 
139. See generally DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSJBILIIT: HOW CONGRESS 
ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION ( 1993). 
140. See Greve, supra note 51, at 614-15. 
141. The Court noted that there are "a variety of methods, short of outright coercion, by 
which Congress may urge a State to adopt a legislative program consistent with federal 
interests." New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992). 
142. !d. ("[U]nder Congress's spending power 'Congress may attach conditions on the 
receipt of federal funds."' (quoting South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 ( 1 987)). 
143. See infra Part IV. 
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intrude into the states' sovereign realms and thereby threaten individual 
liberty. 
It is important to note that the contemporary anti-commandeering 
principle stands in contrast to the Court's prior effort to protect state 
sovereignty by preventing federal regulation in National League of Cities v. 
Use~y. 144 In National League of Cities the Court held that generally applicable 
federal regulations did not apply to state governments insofar as they 
infringed upon state sovereignty or impeded "traditional governmental 
functions." 145 On this basis the Court held that the minimum wage and 
overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") did not apply 
to state governments, though the law did apply to private employers. 146 
National League of Cities was explicitly overruled in 1985 by GaTcia v. San 
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, which upheld the application of the 
FLSA to state government employers. 147 Under Garcia, states are subject to 
neutral regulatory measures adopted by Congress to regulate the actions of 
public and private parties alike. 148 Federal statutes that regulate state 
conduct are permissible so long as they do not regulate states as states, but 
rather only regulate states as private actors, such as employers or owners of 
databases. 149 
2. Sovereign Immunity 
Just as the federal government may not commandeer state 
governments, the federal government is generally precluded from 
abrogating state sovereign immunity. In 1996, in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. 
Florida, 150 the Supreme Court held that Congress may not subject a state to 
suit for money damages in federal court pursuant to an otherwise valid 
exercise of the Congress's enumerated powers in Article I, section 8. Three 
years later, in Alden v. Maine, 151 the Court held that Congress was similarly 
barred from abrogating state sovereign immunity in state court. In 2002, in 
144. 426 U.S. 833 ( 1976). For a brief discussion of the historical development of the 
Court's federalism jurisprudence in this area, see Adler, supm note 45, at 582-89. 
145. Nat'! League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 841, 852. 
146. !d. 
147. 469 u.s. 528 (1985). 
148. See also Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 151 (2000) (upholding the application of the 
Driver's Privacy Protection Act to state governments as the owners of commercially valuable 
databases). Note, however, that subsequent cases reject the underlying doctrinal rationale of 
Garcia, namely that states are sufficiently influential in the legislative process to obviate any 
need for judicial resolution of federalism concerns. See Yoo, supra note 68. 
149. See Reno, 528 U.S. at 151 ("(T]he DPPA does not requ:.-e the States in tl1eir sovereign 
capacity to regulate their own citizens. The DPPA regulates the States as the owners of data 
bases."). 
150. 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
151. 527 u.s. 706 (1999). 
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Federal Maritime Commission v. South Camlina State Pmts Authority, 152 the Court 
further held that states are likewise immune to federal administrative 
proceedings initiated by private parties. 
The Court's sovereign immunity cases are typically characterized as 
"Eleventh Amendment" cases, as this amendment is the only potential 
textual basis for state sovereign immunity. Yet this is "something of a 
misnomer. "153 The text of the Amendment reads: "The Judicial power of the 
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, 
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of 
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."154 Enacted to 
overturn Chisholm v. Georgia, 155 the Amendment appears to prohibit only 
those suits against states initiated by citizens of other states, not citizens of the 
state to be sued. 156 Yet since Hans v. Louisiana, 157 in 1890, the Court has held 
that states are also immune from suits by their own citizens. 
In Alden the Court made explicit what had been implicit in its prior 
sovereign immunity holdings: the source of state sovereign immunity is not 
constitutional text, but the Constitution's structure and the states' pre-
existing status as sovereign entities. Drawing upon a heavily contested 
interpretation of miginal intent with regard to state immunity from suit, 158 as 
well as longstanding Court precedent, 159 the Court explained, "The Eleventh 
Amendment confirmed, rather than established, sovereign immunity as a 
constitutional principle."160 State sovereign immunity is presumed to have 
152. 535 U.S. 743 (2002). Other recent cases limiting Congress's ability to abrogate state 
sovereign immunity include Bd. of TTs. of Univ. of Ala. v. GmTett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Kimel v. 
FZa. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Coil. Sav. Ban/1 v. FZa. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense 
Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999). Cf Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978 (2004) (upholding abrogation 
of state sovereign immunity under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act); Nev. Dep't of 
Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (upholding abrogation of sovereign immunity under 
the Family and Medical Leave Act). 
153. Alden, 527 U.S. at 712. 
154. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
155. 2U.S.419(1793). 
156. Note, however, that the actual language of the Amendment reads as a rule of 
construction-the judicial power is not to be "construed" in a particular manner-rather than a 
substantive limitation or guarantee. 
157. 134 U.S. 1 (1890). 
158. See l LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERJCAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 529-30 (3d. ed. 2000) 
(noting that most scholars believe that "the Eleventh Amendment operates only to restrict 
federal jurisdiction"); see also id. at 529 n.70 and sources cited therein. See generally MELVYN 
DURCHSLAG, STATE SOVEREIGN lMMUNI1Y: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION (2002) (surve}~ng history, scholarship, and application of the Eleventh 
Amendment). 
159. See Hans, 134 U.S. at 12 (holding that Chisholm v. Georgia was contrary to tl1e 
Constitutional Framers' intent). 
160. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 728-29 (1999); see also Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State 
Ports, 535 U.S. 743 754 (2002) ("[T]he sovereign immunity enjoyed by the States extends 
beyond the literal text of the Eleventh Amendment."). 
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preexisted the ratification of the Constitution, and individual states "entered 
the Union 'with their sovereignty intact. "'161 This immunity lies "beyond the 
congressional power to abrogate by Article I legislation" 162 and extends to 
both state and federal courts, as well as to administrative proceedings. 163 
State sovereign immunity is not absolute. Under the Court's sovereign 
immunity decisions, citizens retain substantial ability to ensure that states 
comply with applicable federal laws without violating state sovereign 
immunity. First, and perhaps most important, Congress may abrogate state 
sovereign immunity pursuant to a proper exercise of its powers under 
section 5 of the Fourteenth Arnendment. 164 Enacted after the Eleventh 
Amendment, and well after the Founding period, the Fourteenth 
Amendment is presumed to authorize the abrogation of state sovereign 
immunity whereas the congressional powers enumerated in Article I, section 
8 do not. Moreover, the Fourteenth Amendment was expressly adopted to 
vindicate individual rights as against state power, and therefore, may be 
presumed to impinge upon state sovereignty to a far greater degree than the 
provisions of Article 1. 165 Where an abrogation of state sovereign immunity is 
predicated on a proper exercise of Congress's power to "enforce" the 
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment-itself a matter the Court's 
federalism jurisprudence addresses166 -Congress may subject states to such 
suits.-
The Fourteenth Amendment is not the only check on state sovereign 
immunity. Notwithstanding the holdings of Seminole TTibe and Alden, 
individuals may sue state officials directly under the Ex Parte Young167 
doctrine to seek injunctive relief, such as a court order requiting that state 
officials comply with applicable federal laws. The federal government 
further retains the authority to take such actions as are necessary and 
appropriate to directly enforce federal law. 168 Sovereign immunity is no bar 
to such actions, though it does bar private suits to enforce federal law. 169 
State sovereign immunity also does not extend to municipal and other local 
governments. 170 While states, like the federal government, retain sovereign 
161. Fed_ Mar. Comm'n, 535 U.S. at 752 (quoting Blatchford v. Native VilL of Noatak, 501 
U.S. 775,779 (1991))_ 
162. Alden, 527 U.S. at 754. 
163. See Fed. j\IIar. Comm 'n, 535 U.S. at 743. 
164. See, e.g., Nev. Dep'tofHuman Res. v. Hibbs,538 U.S. 721,726 (2003). 
165. !d. at 726-27. 
166. See inji·a Part II.A.2. 
167. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
168. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755-56 (1999). 
169. !d. at 755 ("A suit which is commenced and prosecuted against a State in the name of 
the United States by those who are entrusted with the constitutional duty to 'take Care that the 
Laws be faithfully executed,' differs in kind from the suit of an individual .... " (quoting U.S. 
CONST. art. II, § 3)). 
170. !d. at 756; Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney. 495 U.S. 299, 313 (1990). 
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immunity, this immunity may be waived or otherwise relinquished 
voluntarily.171 Much as the federal government consents to suit in many 
instances, so too can states agree to give up their immunity from certain 
types of suits. 172 Finally, it is important to recognize that good-faith 
compliance with federa) law is the norm in most states most of the time.173 
In summary, under the Court's sovereignty-oriented holdings, the 
federal government may require all employers, public and private, to pay the 
federal minimum wage or otherwise comply with federal labor standards. 174 
It can also create a private right of action so employees can sue p1ivate 
17" 
employers that do not comply. " Such measures would be proper and 
constitutional exercises of the federal power to regulate interstate 
commerce. The federal government may not create a private cause of action 
for public employees to sue states for minimum wage violations, however. 176 
Except where the federal statute in question is enacted pursuant to section 5 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce the Constitution's guarantee of 
fundamental liberties or equal protection, such efforts to subject states to 
suits for money damages without their consent will be unavailing. 
III. jUDICIAL FEDERAliSM & FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 
Some academic and political commentators fear the Supreme Court's 
more aggressive stance toward broad assertions of federal power could 
negatively affect environmental regulation. 177 A federal government of truly 
limited powers may be unable to achieve certain environmental goals, or 
unable to implement certain desired environmental policies. Limited by 
federalism principles, the federal government may be unable to ensure 
adequate levels of environmental protection. 
These fears have a reasonable foundation. There is no doubt that the 
doctrinal logic underpinning some of the federalism decisions challenges 
the traditional environmental paradigm and threatens at least some existing 
environmental programs. Most of these statutes were adopted when there 
was little consideration of constitutional limits on federal power.178 These 
laws are vulnerable to a more restrictive federalism jurisprudence. Despite 
the risks to federal environmental statutes, federal appellate courts have 
171. Alden, 527 U.S. at 755. 
172. Id. ("Many States, on their own initiative, have enacted statutes consenting to a wide 
variety of suits."). 
173. See Steven R. McAllister & Robert L. Glicksman, State Liability for Envimnmental 
Violations: The U.S. Supreme Court's "New" Federalism, 29 ENVTL. L. REP.10,665, 10,669 (1999). 
174. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 555 (1985). 
175. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2000) (providing for a private cause of action for 
violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act). 
176. Alden, 527 U.S. at 712. 
177. See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text; see also infra Part V. 
178. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
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resisted most opportumlles to impose federalism consu·aints on federal 
environmental regulation. While federal power has been clipped on the 
margin, federalism principles have not had a particularly significant impact 
on the scope of federal environmental regulation to date. 
A. ENuMERATED POWERS 
Enumerated powers claims represent the most direct challenge to 
federal environmental regulatory power. Such claims strike not at the 
specific regulatory means employed by the government to reach a particular 
end, but at the federal government's ability to regulate a given subject 
matter at all. As such, insofar as the doctrine of enumerated powers 
affirmatively limits federal environmental regulatory authority, it could 
threaten to limit significantly the federal government's ability to regulate 
environmental concerns directly. 
1. Commerce Clause 
The scope of federal power under the Commerce Clause is of particular 
importance because most federal environmental statutes are premised upon 
C ' l " [ ] h l s ,179 ongress s power to regu ate c ommerce ... among t e severa tates. 
Indeed, when the various environmental statutes were adopted, the 
underlying assumption was that the Commerce Clause "grants virtually carte 
blanche authority to Congress to legislate for environmental protection." 180 
Judicially imposed limits on the scope of the commerce power will constrain 
the federal government's ability to regulate environmental concerns 
directly. Although most activities subject to federal environmental 
regulations can be considered "commercial" or "economic," in some sense, 
it is not clear that all such activities fall within the scope of the commerce 
power. Academic commentators were immediately aware that Lopez and 
Morrison, if applied aggressively to environmental statutes, could shake the 
foundations of federal environmental law. 181 Many environmental laws 
179. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see McAllister & Glicksman, supra note 173, at 10,665 
("[F]ederal environmental laws generally are premised on Congress's Article I power to 
regulate interstate commerce .... "). 
180. Binder, suj>ra note 54, at 148. 
181. See Richard Lazarus, Corps Slij1s on Lopez, FWS Wins, ENVTL. F., Mar.-Apr. 1998, at S 
(noting that the Corps's wetlands regulations were "clearly" constitutional p1ior to Lopez., but 
unconstitutional afterwards); Lori J. Warner, The Potential Impact of United States v. Lopez on 
Environmental Regulation, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'YF. 321,364-65 (1997);]. Blanding Holman 
IV, Note, After United States v. Lopez: Can the Clean Water Act and the Endangered Species Act 
Survive Commerce Clause Attack? 15 VA. ENVTL. LJ. 139, 211 (1995); David A. Linehan, Note, 
Endangered Regttlation: Why the Commerce Clause May No Longer Be Suitable Habitat for Endangered 
Species and Wetlands Regulation, 2 TEX. REv. L. & POL. 365, 426-27 (1998). But see Steven M. 
Johnson, United States v. Lopez: A Misstep, But Hardly Epochal for Federal Enviromnental 
Regulation, 5 N.Y.U. ENYfL. LJ. 33, 67-74 (1996) (arguing that federal wetlands regulation will 
survive the inevitable Commerce Clause challenges); Bradford C. Mank, Protecting Intrastate 
Threatened Species: Does the Endangered Species Act Encroach on Traditional Stale Authority and Exceed 
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regulate intrastate activities irrespective of their economic nature or impact 
on interstate commerce. Few environmental statutes contain jurisdictional 
elements or other provisions to keep their jurisdiction within constituticnal 
limits.182 
Thus far, federal appellate courts have uniformly rejected Commerce 
Clause challenges to the scope of federal environmental regulation. 
Constitutional challenges to the application of the Clean Air Act;183 Clean 
Water Act;184 Endangered Species Act;185 and Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA") 186 to intrastate 
activities have all failed thus far. In many of these cases, federal regulatory 
authority was upheld because the statute or regulations in question 
regulated explicitly industrial or commercial activity. 187 In United States v. 
Ho, 188 for example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fiftl1 Circuit upheld 
provisions of the Clean Air Act establishing work practice standards for 
asbestos removal. Considering the four factors identified in Lopez and 
Morrison, 189 the court held that the rules in question satisfied the Commerce 
Clause requirement as "the regulated intrastate activity, asbestos removal, is 
very much a commercial activity in today's economy."19° For the most part, 
the result in district courts has been the same, upholding federal 
environmental statutes and regulations in the face of Commerce Clause 
the Outer Limits of the Commerce Clause?, 36 GA. L. REv. 723, 723-24 (2002) ("Because federal 
environmental statutes rely on the Commerce Clause as the basis for congressional authority, a 
broad reading of Lopez. and Morrison might call into question the constitutionality of at least 
some environmental statutes or regulations."). 
182. One prominent exception is that the Clean Water Act only applies to "navigable 
waters" of the United States. This provision enabled the Supreme Court to read the scope of 
federal authority under the CWA narrowly so as to avoid potential Commerce Clause concerns. 
Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps ofEng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 166-68 (2001); see infra 
Part III.A.l.b. 
183. See generally Allied Local & Reg'! Mfrs. Caucus v. EPA, 215 F.3d 61 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
184. See generally United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 2003); Solid Waste Agency 
v. U.S. Army Corps ofEng'rs, 191 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 1999). Appellate courts have, on the other 
hand, adopted narrowing constructions of federal environmental statutes so as to avoid 
potential Commerce Clause concerns. See United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251, 254 (4th Cir. 
1997) (finding federal wetland regulations to be "unauthorized by the Clean Water Act as 
limited by the Commerce Clause"). 
185. See generally GDF Realty Invs., Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622 (5tl1 Cir. 2003); Rancho 
Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 
2000); Nat'! Ass'n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
186. See generally Freier v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 303 F.3d 176 (2d Cir. 2002); United 
States v. Olin Corp., 107 F.3d 1506 (11th Cir. 1997). 
187. See Johnson, supra note 181, at 65 ("[M]ost of the central provisions of the major 
federal environmental laws regulate industrial or commercial activity."). 
188. 311 F.3d 589 (5th Cir. 2002). 
189. See supra notes 92-105 and accompanying text. 
190. Ho, 311 F.3d at 602. 
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challenges.191 This phenomenon is not isolated to environmental law. 
Federal courts, generally, have been reluctant to apply Lopez and Morrison so 
as to curtail the reach of federal Commerce Clause authority. 192 
Despite this pattern, it seems likely that some environmental statutes 
exceed the scope of the Commerce Clause power delineated in Lopez and 
Morrison. Most vulnerable are the Endangered Species Act ("ESA") 193 and 
portions of the Clean Water Act ("CWA"). 194 Neither the ESA nor the CWA 
explicitly regulate commercial activities, as such. Under the ESA, any and all 
actlVlt:Ies that harm endangered species, including modest habitat 
modification, are potentially subject to federal regulation. Regulation under 
the CWA is confined to "navigable waters," which the federal government 
has defined to include all waters and wetlands irrespective of their 
navigability or relationship to interstate commerce. 195 In each case, the 
federal government may have asserted regulatory authority beyond that 
autl10rized by the Commerce Clause. 
a. Endangered Species Act 
Several circuit courts have considered Commerce Clause challenges to 
the ESA's prohibition on the "taking" oflisted species on private land.196 The 
Commerce Clause claim has been rejected each time, yet the rationales 
adopted. by the courts have varied a great deal and are fundamentally 
mutually inconsistent-a point noted by dissenting judges in several circuits. 
There is substantial tension between the logic of Lopez and Morrison, on the 
one hand, and the appellate holdings in these cases on the other. 
191. See generally FD&P Enter., Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 239 F. Supp. 2d 
509 (D.NJ. 2003) (upholding federal wetland regulations); United States v. Domenic Lombardi 
Realty, 204 F. Supp. 2d 318 (D.R.I. 2002) (upholding CERCLA); United States v. Red Frame 
Parasail, 160 F. Supp. 2d 1048 (D. Ariz. 2001) (upholding the Airborne Hunting Act); United 
States v. Glidden Co., 3 F. Supp. 2d 823 (N.D. Ohio 1997) (upholding CERCLA); United States 
v. NL Indus., 936 F. Supp. 545 (S.D. Ill. 1996) (upholding CERCLA); Nova Chems., Inc. v. GAF 
Corp., 945 F. Supp. 1098 (E.D. Tenn. 1996) (upholding CERCLA). But see United States v. Olin 
Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1502, 1532-33 (S.D. Ala. 1996) (invalidating CERCLA for inter alia 
exceeding the scope of Congress's Commerce Clause power}, reu'd, 107 F.3d 1506 (llth Cir. 
1997). 
192. See Reynolds & Denning, supra note 107, at 385-89 (observing tl1at federal courts have 
been reluctant to strike down federal statutes on Commerce Clause grounds across the board). 
193. 16 u.s.c. §§ 1531-1544 (2000). 
194. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000). The Clean Water Act is formally known as the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act. 
195. Federal jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act extends to all "navigable waters," 
defined simply as "waters of the United States." Id. § 1362(7). Regulations issued by the U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers and the Environmental Protection Agency define such waters to 
include all interstate waters and wetlands, 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a) (2) (2004), all tributaries and 
impoundments of such waters, id. § 328.3(a)(4}, (5), and all waters and wetlands "the use, 
degradation, or destruction of which could affect interstate or foreign commerce," id. § 
328.3(a) (3) (emphasis added), and wetlands adjacent to such waters, id. § 328.3(a} (7). 
196. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a). 
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The first federal appellate court to address the constitutionality of the 
ESA's prohibition on "taking" endangered species post-Lopez was the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in National Ass'n of Home Builders v. 
Babbitt. 197 A sharply divided court upheld the application of the ESA to the 
Delhi Sands flower-loving fly, an endangered insect of negligible commercial 
value198 found only in a handful of counties in a single state. The first three 
judges to consider the constitutionality of ESA regulations post-Lopez 
adopted three different rationales. The two judges in the majority adopted 
quite different rationales, 199 while the third judge wrote a powerful dissent. 
Judge Wald found that taking the endangered fly substantially affected 
interstate commerce because -the regulation of such activity "prevents the 
destruction of biodiversity and thereby protects the current and future 
interstate commerce that relies upon it" and "controls adverse effects of 
interstate competition."200 SpeCifically; Judge Wald reasoned that while the 
loss of any single species might have a negligible or indeterminate effect on 
interstate commerce, the loss of multiple species, in the aggregate, is certain 
to have some effect on commerce as biodiversity declines and the natural 
resource base that it represents dwindles.201 Additionally, relying upon the 
1981 Hodel cases upholding the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation 
Act,202 Judge Wald found the ESA take prohibition to be a reasonable 
congressional response to concerns that interstate competition for economic 
activity would result in a "race-to-the-bottom" and suboptimal levels of 
environmental protection.203 Such regulation is constitutional, Judge Wald 
found, because "Congress has the power under the Commerce Clause to 
prevent destructive interstate commerce similar to that at issue in this 
case."
204 
Judge Henderson, while concurring in the result in National Ass 'n of 
Home Builders, embraced somewhat different rationales for upholding the 
application of the ESA's take prohibition to activities threatening the Delhi 
fly. Whereas Judge Wald focused on the aggregate impact of species loss on 
.197. 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Prior to the Nat'/ Ass'n of Home Builders case, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the Eagle Protection Act against a Commerce 
Clause challenge. See generally United States v. Bramble, 103 F.3d 14 75 (9th Cir. 1996). 
198. Nat'! Ass'n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 949 F. Supp. 1, 7-8 (D.D.C. 1996). 
199. While Judge Wald claimed to find her "reasoning to be substantially similar" to that of 
Judge Henderson's concurrence, Nat'/ Ass'n of Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1046 n.3, Judge 
Henderson wrote she could not "agree entirely with either of Qudge Wald's] grounds for 
reaching the result· and instead arrive by a different route." Id. at 1057 (Henderson, ]., 
concurring). 
200. I d. at 1052. Judge Wald, alone, also found the regulation was a constitutional exercise 
of Congress's power to regulate the channels of interstate commerce. !d. at 1046. 
201. Id. at 1053, n.14. 
202. Hodel v. Virginia, 452 U.S. 264 (1981); Hodel v.lndiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981). 
203. Nat'lAss'n of Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1054-57. 
204. Id. at 1057. 
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interstate commerce, Judge Henderson stressed that "the loss of biodiversity 
itself has a substantial effect on our ecosystem" and therefore has a 
substantial effect on interstate commerce.205 For Judge Henderson, the key 
factor was not the aggregate impact of species loss so much as it was the 
"interconnectedness of the various species and the ecosystems" and that the 
loss of any one species necessarily has broader ecological impacts that will, in 
turn, have a ripple effect upon "land and objects that are involve,d in 
interstate commerce."206 Judge Henderson also noted that the regulations 
themselves, insofar as they regulate economic activity, have a substantial 
effect on interstate commerce. 207 
Judge Sentelle dissented on the grounds that Congress's power to 
regulate interstate commerce cannot extend to those activities-in this case 
disturbing the habitat of an intrastate species-that are neither interstate 
208 N . th . d" . . h" 11 909 J d nor commerce. ollng e IVIswns among rs co eagues,- u ge 
Sentelle stressed that the actual regulated activities-killing or otherwise 
disturbing flies-was not commercial in nature.210 He further noted that the 
underlying logic of his colleagues' opinions would grant Congress near-
unlimited power to regulate any activity that could potentially affect some 
item that could conceivably affect land or things involved in interstate 
commerce, either alone or in the aggregate, or to adopt any regulation that 
would, ·itself, have a substantial effect on commerce. 2ll This sort of power 
without limits is precisely the sort of commerce power the Supreme Court 
rejected in Lopez. 
Mter Morrison, the D.C. Circuit again upheld the ESA's constitutionality 
against a Commerce Clause challenge in Rancho Viejo v. Norton, a case 
205. ld. at 1058 (Henderson,]., concurring). 
206. !d. at 1059 (Henderson, J., concurring); see also EDWARD 0. WILSON, THE DIVERSITY OF 
LIFE 308 (1992) (noting the interconnectedness of species within ecosystems); Myrl L. Duncan, 
Property as a Public Conversation, Not a Lockean Soliloquy: A Rnle for Intellectual and Legal History in 
Takings Analysis, 26 ENVTL. L. 1095, 1129 (1996) ("[S]cientists have rediscovered that the world 
cannot meaningfully be broken down into isolated parts, that every part is connected to every 
other part."); Johnson, supra note 181, at 81 ("It is a fundamental principle of ecology that 
ecosystems are composed of interdependent parts that play vital roles in preserving the 
ecosystem."). . 
207. Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1058 (Henderson,].: concurring). 
208. ld. at 1061 (Sentelle,J., dissenting). 
209. But see id. at 1065 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (finding Judge Henderson's biodiversity 
rationale "indistinguishable in any meaningful way from that of Judge Wald"). 
210. ld. at 1064 (Sentelle,J., dissenting). 
211. I d. at 1065 (Sentelle, J., dissenting); see also John Copeland Nagle, The Commerce Clause 
Meets the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly, 97 MICH. L. REV. 174, 180 (1998) ("If Congress can treat 
all endangered species alike and thereby regulate every species despite its lack of any 
connection to interstate commerce, then the scope of the Commerce Clause will be truly 
unlimited."); id. at 192 ("[T]he aggregation of all endangered species and the reliance upon 
the Fly's unknown future effect on interstate commerce become problematic because both 
arguments would justifY any federal legislation."). 
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involving the Arroyo toad, a species found in parts of Southern California 
and Mexico. 212 Here the D.C. Circuit settled on the rationale, drawn from 
Judge Henderson's concurrence in National Ass'n of Home Builders, that the 
regulation was constitutional because the protection of the Arroyo toad itself 
"regulates and substantially affects commercial development activity which is 
plainly interstate."213 Specifically, Judge Garland's opinion for the court 
noted that the regulated activity in question-"the construction of a 202 
acre commercial housing development"-was "plainly an economic 
enterprise" and could therefore be regulated despite its intrastate 
character.214 Because the ESA take prohibition, as applied to Rancho Viejo's 
development activities, "regulates and substantially affects commercial 
development activity," the regulation substantially affects commerce, and is 
therefore constitutional. 215 
A fundamental problem with the D.C. Circuit's analysis in Rancho Viejo is 
that it focuses on the economic effect of the government regulation-itself; -
rather than that of the regulated activity. This suggests that any federal 
regulatory statute of broad sweep will be constitutional because of the range 
of activity it regulates; the more activity a regulation covers, the more likely it 
is that the regulation itself will have an economic impact, even if the 
regulated activities are themselves non-economic. In application, this 
holding produces the perverse result that more expansive federal regulatory 
statutes are less constitutionally suspect than those of more modest reach.216 
The Rancho Viejo analysis is also in severe tension with Lopez. Under the 
D.C. Circuit's reasoning, Alfonso Lopez's conviction should have been 
upheld under the Gun Free School Zones Act ("GFSZA") as he had brought 
212. 323 F.3d 1062, 1065 (D.C. Cir. 2003). As Professor Mank notes, "Morrison and [Solid 
Waste Agency v. United States Anny Corps of Engineers] raise[d] additional doubts about whether 
Judge Wald and Judge Henderson's opinions are consistent with the Supreme Court's narrow 
reading of the Commerce Power and protectiveness toward traditional state authority." 
Bradford C. Mank, Protecting Interstate Threatened Species: Does the Endangered Species Act Encroach on 
Traditional State Authority and Exceed the Outer. Limits of the Commerce Clause?, 36 GA. L. REv. 723, 
760-61 (2002). 
213. Rancho Viejo, 323 F.3d. at 1067 (quoting Nat'! Ass'n of Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1058 
(Henderson, J., concurring)). Although adopting this rationale, the Rancho Viejo court sought 
"not to discredit" alternative rationales, including that species regulation is substantially related 
to interstate commerce because the loss of biodiversity, in itself, has a substantial effect on 
commerce. Jd. at 1067 n.2. It is worth noting, however, .that this rationale is drawn almost 
exclusively from Judge Henderson's concurring opinion and is not the basis upon which Judge 
Wald asserted there was substantial agreement in the panel majority. Nat'lAss'n of Home Builders, 
130 F.3d at 1046 n.3 (Wald, J.) (agreeing with Judge Henderson's statements that "the loss of 
biodiversity itself has a substantial effect on our ecosystem and likewise on interstate commerce" 
and that federal regulation of land use under the ESA "has a plain and substantial effect on 
interstate commerce"). 
214. Rancho Viejo, 323 F.3d at 1068. · 
215. ld. (quoting Nat'lAss'n of HomeBuilders, 130 F.3d at 1058 (Henderson,]., concurring)). 
216. See Adrian Vermeule, Does Commerce Clause Review Have Perverse Effects?, 46 VILL. L. REV. 
1325, 1325 (2001). 
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the gun to school as a courier in order to complete a commercial 
• 
917 L ' . . I th S C transactiOn.- opez s possesswn was commerCia, yet e upreme ourt 
struck down the statute because the regulated activity-gun possession-was 
not and had no more than an attenuated connection to interstate 
commerce. As the Court noted, the GFSZA "by its terms has nothing to do 
with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one 
might define those terms,"218 and this was true regardless of whether Lopez 
possessed the gun for commercial purposes. 
Judge Garland's majority opinion in Rancho Viejo noted that the 
undisputed commercial nature of Lopez's gun possession was not 
referenced in the Supreme Court's Lopez opinion; and therefore, "the 
Supreme Court attached no significance to it."219 That is precisely the point. 
The Supreme Court attached no significance to the commercial nature of 
the individual activity in question in Lopez when evaluating whether the 
GFSZA was a valid exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause power. As noted 
in Morrison, the regulated conduct-gun possession in a school zone-was 
not commercial in character.220 This was true regardless of the commercial 
nature of Alfonso Lopez's specific conduct. 
As in Lopez, the actual regulated activities in National Ass'n of Home 
Builder~ or Rancho Viejo-the take of a Delhi Sands flower-loving fly and an 
Arroyo toad-are non-economic in nature, and it is unclear that such 
activities, in themselves, substantially affect commerce. The regulated 
conduct is that identified by the federal prohibition-possession of a gun in 
a school zone, gender-motivated violence, taking an endangered species-
not the specific character of the individual activity subject to government 
sanction in a given case.221 In other words, it was not Rancho Viejo's decision 
to develop property that subjected its actions to the ESA's limitations, but its 
alleged take of the Arroyo toad. Non-development-related activity that 
threatens Arroyo toads would remain within the Act's explicit prohibition on 
unpermitted takes of endangered species. Commercial property 
development on land not occupied by Arroyo toads, no matter how large, 
costly, or connected to interstate commerce, would not. 
The Rancho Viejo court seemed to recognize the nature of the regulated 
activity when characterizing the statutes at issue in Lopez and Morrison, but 
was unable to remain consistent when assessing the constitutionality of the 
217. United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1345 (5th Cir. 1993). 
218. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) (emphasis added). 
219. Rancho Viejo, 323 F.3d at 1072. 
220. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 611 (2000). 
221. See Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1158, 1159 (2003) (Sentelle, J., dissenting 
from denial of rehearing en bane) ("The point of Lopez, as further explained in Morrison, is not 
that Congress can regulate any activity if the act of regulating catches an entity or an action that 
is itself commercial independent of the noncommercial nature of the regulated entity and 
activity."). 
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ESA, where the regulated conduct morphs from that controlled by the ESA, 
endangered species takes, to Rancho Viejo's commercial construction 
project.222 As it is not Rancho Viejo's construction activities that trigger the 
applicability of the ESA, but the take of an endangered species, so it is the 
latter that is the regulated activity, and it is that activity that should form the 
basis of the Commerce Clause analysis.223 As the Rancho Viejo majority 
acknowledged, "The ESA regulates takings, not toads."224 The court could just 
as easily have said, "The ESA regulates takings, not commercial activity as 
such." That is to say that the ESA, by its express terms, regulates any activity 
that results in the take of an endangered species, regardless of whether the 
given activity in a given case can be characterized as "commercial." The Act 
applies equally to a child who catches an Arroyo toad as a pet as it does to 
the commercial developer who wishes to build houses in endangered toad 
habitat. 
The rationale adopted in Rancho Viejo was considered, and explicitly 
rejected, by the Fifth Circuit in GDF Realty Investments, Ltd. v. Norton. 225 The 
court noted that there is no basis in the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence, let alone the Clause itself, for holding that Congress may 
regulate an activity-the taking of an endangered species-"solely because 
non-regulated conduct (here, commercial development) by the actor 
engaged in the regulated activity will have some connection to interstate 
commerce."
226 Such an approach "would allow application of otherwise 
unconstitutional statutes to commercial actors, but not to non-commercial 
actors" and would eviscerate any constitutional limit on Congress's authority 
to regulate intrastate activities, "so long as those subjected to the regulation 
were entities which had an otherwise substantial connection to interstate 
"
227 I 1 . h . th f C ' 1 commerce. t a so m1sc aractenzes e nature o ongress s regu atory 
action. By adopting the ESA, Congress "is not directly regulating commercial 
development" as such, but rather the taking of species.228 And, as already 
222. See Rancho Viejo, 323 F.3d at 1076 (noting that regulated activity under the Violence 
Against Women Act was "gender-motivated violence," and regulated activity in Lopez was 
"possession of a gun in a local school zone," but regulated activity under the ESA for purposes 
of this case was "a commercial construction project" (internal quotations omitted)). 
223. See GDF Realty Invs., Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622, 635 (5th Cir. 2003) ("While the take 
provision may have prevented the hospital renovations in NAHB or the commercial 
developments in the case at hand, ESA does not directly regulate these activities."); see also Stuart 
Buck, Salerno vs. Chevron: What to do About Statutory Challenges, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 427, 454 
(2003); Nathaniel S. Stewart, Note, Turning the Commerce Clause on Its Head: Why Federal Commerce 
Clause Statutes Demand Facial Challenges, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. (forthcoming). 
224. Rancho Viejo, 323 F.3d at l 072. 
225. 326 F.3d 622 (5th Cir. 2003). 
226. I d. at 634. 
"227. ld. 
228. ld. 
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noted, had the Supreme Court adopted such an approach m Lopez, the 
GFSZA would have been upheld.229 
The inconsistency between the D.C. and Fifth Circuits' rationales-and 
their tension with the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause decisions-was 
noted by the dissenters from the denial of rehearing en bane in both Rancho 
Viejo230 and GDF Realty. 231 Lopez and Morrison upheld facial challenges to the 
statutes in question. Under the Supreme Court's test for facial challenges, 
this means there is no set of facts upon which the statutes could have been 
upheld.232 The GFSZA would have been no less unconstitutional if Alfonso 
Lopez had been a part of a vast interstate gun-dealing ring that happened to 
sell guns in schools.233 Yet the Rancho Viejo court implied, and Judge 
Ginsburg's concurrence made explicit, that the holding should be construed 
such that Congress may constitutionally regulate the take of endangered 
species by commercial developers, such as Rancho Viejo itself, but not by a 
solitary homeowner landscaping his own property or a "lone hiker in the 
woods."234 This is flatly inconsistent with the Supreme Court's approach in 
Lopez.235 
The Fifth Circuit's analysis in GDF Realty is not without problems of its 
own, however-a point noted by the six judges who dissented from the 
denial of en bane review. Rejecting the D.C. Circuit's focus on the economic 
impact of the regulation itself and whether the plaintiff itself is engaged in 
economic activity, the Fifth Circuit focused on whether the expressly 
regulated activity-species takes-has a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce, either in isolation or in aggregate.236 Acknowledging that any 
relationship between commerce and the several cave-dwelling species at 
229. See id. at 635 (arguing that under such an approach "regulation of gun possession near 
schools, at issue in Lopez, would arguably pass constitutional muster as applied to a possessor 
who was a significant gun salesman; [and t]herefore, § 922(q)(1)(A) could not have been 
unconstitutional"). 
230. Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1158, 1159 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Sentelle, J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane); see id. at 1160 (Roberts,]., dissenting from denial 
of rehearing en bane) (noting that the panel's approach "seems inconsistent with the Supreme 
Court's holdings" in Lopez and Morrison and "conflicts with the opinion of a sister circuit"). 
231. GDF Realty Invs., Ltd. v. Norton, 362·F.3d 286 (5th Cir.- 2004) (denial of petition for 
rehearing en bane). 
232. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987); see also Buck, supra note 223, at 
454-55. 
233. See Rancho Viejo, 334 F.3d at 1160 (Roberts,]., dissenting from denial of rehearing en 
bane). 
234. Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 2003); id. at 1080 
(Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
235. For this reason, Judge Roberts suggested the court should reconsider sustaining the 
constitutionality of the ESA on alternative grounds, such as those adopted by the Fifth Circuit in 
GDF Realty. Rancho Viejo, 334 F.3d at 1160 (Roberts,]., dissenting from denial of rehearing en 
bane). 
236. GDF Realty Invs., Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622, 633 (5th Cir. 2003). 
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issue in GDF Realty was highly attenuated,237 the Fifth Circuit focused on the 
commercial effect of species takes generally, aggregating the economic 
effect of all species takes as a class.238 The court characterized the regulation 
of cave-dwelling species as "part of a larger regulation of activity"-species 
takes-that Congress could reasonably conclude are economic in nature.239 
Further, the regulation of the cave species is an "essential" part of the overall 
regulatory scheme, insofar as the ESA's purpose-the preservation of species 
diversity-can only be achieved if its protections extend to all endangered 
species.240 On this basis, the Fifth Circuit concluded the "ESA is an economic 
regulatory scheme; the regulation of intrastate takes of the Cave Species is 
an 1=ssential part of it. Tl1erefore, Cave Species takes may be aggregated with 
all other ESA takes."241 
This rationale, while possibly more consistent with Lopez and Morrison 
than Rancho Viejo, nonetheless suggests a near unlimited federal authority to 
regulate environmental concems under the Commerce Clause. Yet it is an 
essential part of Lopez and Morrison that any viable Commerce Clause 
rationale must have a stopping point. 242 The same reasoning relied upon by 
the Rancho Viejo court would justify an omnibus ecosystem protection act 
regulating any and all activity with potentially significant ecological 
impact. 243 It is, after all, a basic ecological postulate, noted by Judge 
Henderson in National Ass'n of Home Building, that all activities have 
ecological impacts and that due to such effects and interconnections, 
everything is connected to everything else.244 The same can be said of 
economic interrelationships. Small changes in economic conditions, no 
matter how small, can ripple through the sea of interrelationships_ and 
237. The six species at issue were the Bee Creek Cave harvestman, the Bone Creek 
harvestman, the Tooth Cave pseudoscorpion, the Tooth Cave spider, the Tooth Cave ground 
beetle, and the Kretschmarr Cave mold beetle. ld. at 625, 638 (noting any relationship between 
the Cave Species and scientific travel or research is "far too attenuated to pass muster"; the 
possibility of such future effects "is simply too hypothetical and attenuated"; and "Cave species 
takes are neither economic nor commerciaL There is no market for them; any future market is 
conjecture"). 
238. I d. at 638. 
239. Jd. at 638--39 ("Aside from the economic effects of species loss, it is obvious that the 
majority of takes would result from economic activity."). As the en bane dissenters noted, 
Congress could have passed a statute prohibiting those engaged in interstate commerce from 
"taking" endangered species, but did not do so. GDF Realty Invs., Ltd. v. Norton, 362 F.3d 286, 
291 n.4 (5th Cir. 2004) (denial of petition for rehearing en bane). That is not the statute 
Congress enacted, however. 
240. GDF Realty, 326 F.3d at 639--40 ("[O]ur analysis of the interdependence of species 
compels the conclusion that regulated takes under ESA do affect interstate commerce."). 
241. ld. at 640. 
242. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995) ("[I]fwe were to accept the 
Government's arguments, we are hard pressed to posit any activity by an individual that 
Congress is without power to regulate."); see also Berman, supra note 105, at 1528. 
243. See Nagle, supra note 211, at 199. 
244. See supra note 206 and accompanying text. 
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exchanges that make up the modern economy. Yet this fact did not justify a 
broader Commerce Clause power under Lopez.245 If some economic 
relationships-such as that between school safety and education, on the one 
hand, and future productivity, on the othel46-are too attenuated to satisfy 
the requirements of the Commerce Clause, similarly attenuated ecological 
connections-such as that between the disturbance or even extinction of a 
marginal, intrastate species and broader economic impacts-are that much 
farther beyond Congress's reach. It is incongruous that threats to nearly 
extinct species have a greater relationship to interstate commerce than 
threats to human life.247 Yet that is the net result of GDF Realty. 
The Commerce Clause does not authorize such an all-encompassing 
regulatory power.248 There is no doubt that ecological conditions can affect 
commerce substantially and that many (if not most) actiVities that have a 
significant ecological impact are motivated by economic considerations. 
Such an all-encompassing statute could be viewed as an "economic 
regulatory scheme" as easily as the ESA. Regulation of even relatively small, 
isolated and intrastate activities would be just as "essential" to the overall 
regulatory scheme as the regulation of isolated, intrastate species is to the 
ESA. Yet the Commerce Clause does not reach that far. 
Although the Fifth Circuit denied the reasoning of its opinion would 
"allow Congress to regulate general land use or wildlife preservation," it 
offered no rationale for why endangered species regulation is somehow 
more commercial or related to interstate commerce.249 Given the substantial 
interstate markets in wildlife and wildlife-related activities,250 it would seem 
245. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557; cf. id. at 616-17 (Breyer,]., dissenting). 
246. See id. at 620 (Breyer,]., dissenting). 
247. This point is made directly in the GDF Realty dissent from denial of rehearing en bane: 
Chief Justice Marshall stated in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 5 L. Ed. 
257 (1821), that Congress has no general right to punish murder or felonies 
generally. Surely, though, there is more force to an "interdependence" analysis 
concerning humans, and thus a more obvious series of links to interstate 
commerce, than there is to "species." Yet the panel's "interdependent web" analysis 
of the Endangered Species Act gives these subterranean bugs federal protection 
that was denied the school children in Lo-pez and the rape victim in Morrison. 
GDF Realty Invs., Ltd. v. Norton, 362 F.3d 286, 287 (5th Cir. 2004) (Jones, J., dissenting from 
denial of rehearing en bane). 
248. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy,]., concurring) ("In a sense any conduct in this 
interdependent world of ours has an ultimate commercial origin or consequence, but we have 
not yet said the commerce power may reach so far."). 
249. GDF Realty Invs., Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622, 640 (5th Cir. 2003). 
250. Justice Stevens noted in Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of Engineers: 
In 1984, the U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment found that, in 1980, 
5.3 million Americans hunted migratory birds, spending $638 million. More than 
100 million Americans spent almost $14.8 billion in 1980 to watch and photograph 
fish and wildlife. Of 17.7 million birdwatchers, 14.3 million took trips in order to 
observe, feed, or photograph waterfowl, and 9.5 million took trips specifically to 
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that regulation of wildlife preservation generally would fit more easily within 
the bounds of the Commerce Clause, post-Lopez, than the regulation of 
species for which such markets do not exist. 251 If "the link between species 
loss and a substantial commercial effect is not attenuated,"252 then neither is 
the link between the taking commercially valuable, but non-endangered, 
wildlife and a substantial commercial effect, nor is the link between 
ecological degradation generally and a substantial commercial effect. As in 
Rancho Viejo, the logic of the court's opinion either obliterates the limited 
nature of Congress's commerce power, or it creates an implicit 
environmental exception for the Clause's otherwise justiciable limits. 
The opinion of the U.S. Courtof Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Gibbs 
v. BabbitC53 can similarly be read to justify an ecological exception to the 
limits of Congress's enumerated power to regulate commerce "among the 
several states." From the outset, Judge Wilkinson's majority opinion framed 
the question as "whether the national govemment can act to conserve scarce 
natural resources of value to our entire country," rather than as whether a 
given regulatory measure-in this case the ESA's take prohibition as applied 
to experimental populations of red wolves reintroduced into North 
Carolina-is authorized by the Commerce Clause.254 Gibbs held that "the 
regulated activity substantially affects interstate commerce and . . . the 
regulation is part of a comprehensive federal program,"255 but the decision 
also repeatedly emphasized the need for federal environmental regulation-
to the point of wrongly suggesting that to invalidate the ESA take 
prohibition would limit federal species-protection efforts to the 
management of federal lands and leave other environmental concerns to 
state tort law. 256 
On the one hand, Gibbs can be read narrowly, standing only for the 
proposition that the prohibition against taking red wolves was within 
Congress's Commerce Clause power because red wolves have a substantial 
view other water-associated birds, such as herons like those residing at petitioner's 
site. 
531 U.S. 159, 195 n.17 (2001) (Stevens,]., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
251. Nat'! Ass'n of Horne Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1064 (D.C. Cir. 1997) 
(Sentelle,J., dissenting). 
252. GDF Realty, 326 F.3d at 640. 
253. 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000). 
254. /d. at 486. 
255. /d. at 487. 
256. /d. at 504, 502. Contrary to Judge Wilkinson's claims, the federal government would 
retain authority to directly fund or otherwise encourage species conservation through the 
spending power and state environmental regulations would be unaffected by judicial limits on 
the federal commerce power. See infra Part V (discussing impact of federalism decisions on 
environmental protection). 
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relationship to interstate commerce.257 Wolves are the subject of substantial 
scientific research and tourism, wolf pelts are a valuable commodity (at least 
when trade in pelts is permitted), and the motivation for taking wolves-the 
protection of livestock-is economic.258 On the other hand, Judge 
Wilkinson's Gibbs opinion repeatedly suggests that environmental regulation 
itself necessarily meets the Commerce Clause requirements259 and that the 
alternative is to sap "the national ability to safeguard natural resources."260 It 
is certainly true that "the conservation of scarce natural resources is an 
appropriate and well-recognized area of federal regulation,"261 but this 
observation does not, by itself, support the conclusion that all such 
regulation rs authorized . by the interstate Commerce Clause. The 
implications of such a doctrine are far-reaching, even if not acknowledged in 
Gibbs. Responding to Judge Luttig's dissent, Judge Wilkinson wrote that the 
regulation in question "applies only to a single limited area-endangered 
species;" and therefore, the opinion should not be read to grant Congress 
near-unlimited regulatory authority.262 This limitation is due to Congress's 
failure to adopt a more expansive statute, however, and not any 
constitutional limit identified in the Gibbs opinion. Like the Fifth Circuit, 
Judge Wilkinson offers no reason why the rationale upon which Gibbs relies 
would not justify more far-reaching federal regulatory measures.263 
While there is no doubt that the conservation of endangered species is 
an important and popular public policy goal, one can reasonably conclude 
that the appellate decisions upholding the ESA's take prohibition as against 
Commerce Clause challenges have shied from a strict application of Lopez 
and Morrison. 264 This problem· is particularly acute in the context of 
257. This is also the approach taken by the en bane dissenters in GDF &alty. See GDF Realty 
Invs., Ltd. v. Norton, 362 F.3d 286, 291 (5th Cir. 2004) (dissent from denial of rehearing en 
bane) (noting "many £SA-prohibited takings of endangered species may be regulated, and even 
aggregated, under Lopez and Morrison because they involve commercial or commercially related 
activities like hunting, tourism and scientific research"). 
258. Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 492-95. 
25.9. See, e.g., id. at 496 ("Congress is entitled to make the judgment that conservation is 
potentially valuable, even if that value cannot be presently ascertained."); id. ("[I]t is for 
Congress to choose between inaction and preservation, not for the courts."); id. at 498 
(" [G]iven that Congress has the ability to enact a broad sche.me for the conservation of 
endangered species, it is not for the courts to invalidate individual regulations."). 
260. !d. at 505. Indeed, Judge Wilkinson specifically criticizes Judge Luttig's dissent for 
failing to consider "the national interest in the development of natural resources" as part of his 
Commerce Clause analysis. Id. · 
261. Id. at 500. 
262. Id. at 503. 
263. In this respect the Gibbs opinion implicitly adopts the "political safeguards" approach 
to federalism that formed the basis for the Garcia opinion, but which has been explicitly 
rejected by the Supreme Court's more recent federalism cases. See Yoo, supra note 68, at 1318-
21. 
264. See, e.g., Nagle, supra note 211, at 191 (noting that there are many ways to affirm 
federal jurisdiction over endangered species habitats, "[b]ut only if one is willing to abandon 
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endangered species because those species that are most endangered are 
more likely to subsist in only one state and are least likely to be the objects of 
commerce.
265 The rationales set forth by the various courts, while appealing, 
are inconsistent with the Supreme Court's stated approach. At a minimum 
they suggest that Commerce Clause limitations should be enforced less 
stringently in the context of environmental protection. For these decisions 
to stand, the Court would either need to identify an additional, and more 
compelling, basis for finding such regulations within the bounds of the 
Commerce Clause, or else retreat from the essential holdings of Lopez and 
Morrison, even if only to create a de facto Commerce Clause exception for 
environmental concerns,. 
There is some reason to believe the Court might just take such a course. 
Justice Kennedy, concurring in Lopez with Justice O'Connor, stressed that 
the Court should be sensitive to how a more stringent application of 
Commerce Clause limitations could upset settled expectations. 266 He further 
paid substantial attention to the potential practical effects of suiking down 
the GFSZA.267 While there is reason to believe that the environmental 
impacts of judicial curtailment of the federal commerce power would be less 
significant than commonly supposed,268 this argument might not be 
sufficient to assuage the concerns of at least some of the justices that have, 
thus far, signed onto a reinvigoration of the Commerce Clause. As it would 
take only one defector from the Lopez majority to limit the environmental 
reach of the Court's current Commerce Clause doctrine, it would be 
premature to predict any broader impact on environmental policy, 
regardless of the doctrine's underlying force. 
b. Clean Water Act jurisdiction 
While the Supreme Court has yet to address the implications of its 
modern Commerce Clause jurisprudence on environmental regulation 
directly, that jurisprudence has caused the court to curtail federal 
jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act by adopting a narrow construction of 
the statute itsel£.269 In Solid Waste Agency '1.!· United States Army Corps of 
the Court's insistence in Lopez that an appropriate test for the Commerce Clause cannot justify 
federal legislation of everything"). 
265. ld. at 205 ("The very fact that a species has become endangered maximizes the 
likelihood that the species lives in only one state and that there is no commerce in the 
species."). Indeed, where species, or products derived therefrom, have substantial commercial 
value, there are incentives to propagate and protect the species. See generally WILDLIFE IN THE 
MARKETPLACE (Terry L. Anderson & P J. Hill eds., 1995). 
266. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 574 (1995) (Kennedy,]., concurring). 
267. ld. at 581 (noting that most states already prohibited guns in schools). 
268. See infra Part V (discussing impact of federalisn decisions on environmental 
protection). 
269. 33 u.s.c. §§ 1252-1385 (2000). 
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Engineers, 270 a regional waste management agency challenged the extension 
of federal regulatory authority over land containing permanent and seasonal 
ponds. Because the waters in question were isolated, and neither adjacent to 
nor hydrologically connected to navigable waters, the Solid Waste Agency of 
Northern Cook County ("SWANCC") contended that the land in question 
lay beyond the reach of federal regulation. The petitioners pressed their 
case on both constitutional and statutory grounds. The Court only reached 
the latter, citing federalism concerns-specifically the concern that a broad 
interpretation of the CWA would "push the limit of congressional authority" 
under the Commerce Clause271-to hold that the Act did not reach isolated, 
intrastate waters. The Court refused to adopt a more expansive 
interpretation of the Act absent a "clear indication that Congress intended 
that result. "272 By resolving the issue on statutory grounds, the Court avoided 
the need to address the extent to which Congress could regulate the use of 
isolated waters were it to adopt legislation explicitly for that purpose.273 
The impact of Solid Waste Ag1mcy on federal regulation is potentially 
significant. 274 At the very least the decision frees isolated, intrastate waters 
from federal jurisdiction, particularly where the only basis for asserting such 
jurisdiction is tl1e actual or potential presence of migratory birds. 
Consequently many prairie potholes and other isolated wetlands and waters 
will no longer be subject to federal permitting requirements under § 404 of 
the Clean Water Act. 275 Yet the precise limits Solid Waste Ag1mcy imposed on 
federaljurisdiction under the CWA are unclear. In January 2003, the Army 
Corps and the EPA issued an advance notice of proposed rulemaking to 
clarify the scope of regulatory jurisdiction under the CWA. 276 They issued a 
270. 531 u.s. 159 (2001). 
271. Id. at 173. 
272. Id. at 172. In so doing, the Court rejected the argument that the Corps of Engineers' 
regulation was due deference under Chevron USA v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 
(1984). Although courts will generally defer to federal agency interpretations of ambiguous 
statutory language, the Solid Waste Agency majority found such deference to be inappropriate 
"where the administrative interpretation alters the federal-state framework by permitting 
federal encroachment upon a traditional state power." 531 U.S. at 173. 
273. The dissent, on the other hand, did address the Commerce Clause issue and found 
the regulations in question to lie well within the outer limits of federal Commerce Clause . 
authority. Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 181-82 (Stevens,]., dissenting). 
274. See Bradford C. Mank, The Murky Future of the Clean Water Act after SWANCC: Using a 
Hydrological Connection Appmach to Saving the Clean Water Act, 30 ECOLOGY L.Q. 811, 884 (2003) 
{noting that Solid Waste Ag11ncy requires a "significant nexus;" and therefore, not just "any" 
hydrological connection will suffice to establish federal jurisdiction under the CWA); Lance D. 
Wood, Don't Be Misled: CWA jurisdiction Extends to All Non-Navigable Tributaries of the Traditional 
Navigable Waters and to Their Adjacent Wetlands, 34 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,187, 10,189, 10,195 (2004) 
(noting "potentially disastrous" and "catastrophic" effects of some potential interpretations of 
Solid Waste Agency). 
275. 33 u.s.c. § 1344 (2000). 
276. Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on the Clean Water Act Regulatory 
Definition of "Waters of the United States," 68 Fed. Reg. 1991 (Jan. 15, 2003). 
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joint memorandum containing advance notice prohibiting the assertion of 
regulatory jurisdiction over isolated waters based upon the presence of 
migratory birds.277 This announcement came under heavy criticism from 
environmental organizations, which asserted that no rulemaking on the 
extent of CWA jurisdiction was necessary.278 In December 2003, the Army 
Corps and EPA announced they would not issue a new rulemaking.279 In the 
meantime, there has been substantial uncertainty as to the current scope of 
federal regulatory jurisdiction under the CWA.280 A study by the General 
Accounting Office found that Army Corps district offices' jurisdictional 
determinations have varied significantly since Solid Waste Agency.281 
Due to Solid, Waste Agency's ambiguous reach, a circuit split over the 
meaning of the case rapidly emerged. Several circuits, including the Fourth, 
282 . 283 284 . SIXth, and Seventh, have read Solzd Waste Agency narrowly to preclude 
only federal regulation of.isolated, intrastate, non-navigable waters. This-is 
also the view adopted by the EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers. 285 The 
277. ld. at 1995 app. A. 
278. U.S. GAO, WATERS AND WETLANDS: CORPS OF ENGINEERS NEEDS TO EVALUATE ITS 
DISTRICT OFFICE PRACTICES IN DETERMINING JURISDICTION 14 (2004) [hereinafter GAO, 
Wetlands]. The GAO further reported that 99% of the comments received by EPA and the Army 
Corps opposed a new rulemaking on CWAjurisdiction. ld. 
279. See Eric Pianin, EPA Scraps Changes To Clean Water Act; Plans Would Have Reduced 
Protection, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 2003, at A20. One reason given by the Army Corps and EPA to 
forego the rulemaking was that federal courts had narrowly interpreted Solid Waste Agency's 
impact. Ironically, on the same day as the Army Corps/EPA announcement, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that such narrow interpretations of Solid Wll.)"te Agenry were 
"unsustainable." Daniel Simmons, Navigating SWANCC: An Examination of the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers' Authority Under the Clean Water Act, 34 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,723, 10,730 (2004) (citing In re 
Needham, 354 F.3d 340, 345 (5th Cir. 2003)). 
280. See, e.g., Federal Authority to Requi-re Wetland Dumping Permits: Hearing on H.R 5194 Before 
the House Comm. on Energy Poliry, Natural Resources and Regulatory Affairs (2002) (statement of 
Patrick Parenteau, Professor of Law, Vermou't Law School) ('The decision has created 
substantial uncertainty regarding the geographic jurisdiction of the Clean Water Act."); PAT 
PARENTEAU, AsS'N OF STATE WETLAND MANAGERS, POSITION PAPER ON CLEAN WATER AG'T 
JURISDICTION DETERMINATIONS PURSUANT TO TI;IE SUPREME COURT'S JAN. 9, 2001 DECISION, 
SOLID WASTE AGENCY OF NORTHERN COOK COUNTY V: U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'R.S (2001) ("The 
section 404 regulatory program has been in turmoil ever since the Supreme Court's SWANCC 
decision."); Wood, supra note 274, at 10,189 (noting that Solid Waste Agenry was "ambiguous" 
and courts have been "inconsistent" in their interpretations of the decision). 
281. GAO, Wetlands, supra note 278, at 3 ("Corps districts differ in how they interpret and 
apply the federal regulations when determining what wetlands and other waters fall within the 
jurisdiction of the federal government."). 
282. See United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698, 709-12 (4th Cir. 2003). 
283. See United States v. Rapanos, 339 F.3d 447, 453 (6th Cir. 2003). 
284. See United States v. Rueth Dev. Co., 335 F.3d 598, 604-05 (7th Cir. 2003). 
285. See Memorandum from Gary S. Guzy, General Counsel, U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency, & Robert M. Andersen, Chief Counsel, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, to the Assistant 
Administrator for Water and Others, Supreme Court Ruling Concerning CWAJurisdiction over 
Isolated Waters Qan. 19, 2001) (on file with the Iowa Law Review); see also Wood, supra note 
274. 
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Fifth Circuit, on the other hand, has read Solid Waste Agency more broadly to 
exclude waters that are neither navigable themselves nor adjacent to 
navigable waters.286 Specifically, in the Fifth Circuit, federal jurisdiction 
under the CWA does not extend to wetlands, "puddles, sewers, roadside 
ditches and the like," if such waters are not truly adjacent to navigable 
waters.287 According to the Fifth Circuit, the interpretation adopted by the 
other circuits "is unsustainable under [Solid Waste Agency]" as the CWA is 
"not so broad as to permit the federal government to impose regulations 
over 'tributaries' that are neither themselves navigable nor truly adjacent to 
. bl ,288 naVIga e waters. 
While it is too early to evaluate the full impact of Solid Waste Agency on 
federal regulatory jurisdiction, some things are clear. Solid Waste Agency 
reaffirms the principle that "where a statute is susceptible of two 
constructions, by one of which· grave and doubtful constitutional questions 
arise," such as whether Congress can regulate a given activity under the 
Commerce Clause, "and by the other of which such questions are avoided," 
a court's "duty is to adopt the latter."289 Whereas courts once adopted 
expansive interpretations offederaljurisdiction so as to effectuate the broad 
purposes of federal environmental statutes, now such laws are to be 
construed in a narrower fashion. Applying Solid Waste Agency to statutes that 
contain a jurisdictional element-such as a requirement that the specific 
activity to be regulated substantially affect interstate commerce-should 
result in narrowing the scope of such statutes without questioning their 
constitutionality. An explicit jurisdictional requirement can expressly limit a 
statute's reach to those activities clearly within Congress's authority, thereby 
insulating a statute from a potential Commerce Clause challenge. 
c. Summary 
Congress retains substantial Commerce Clause authority to regulate 
economic activities and their environmental impacts. Recent precedents do 
not undermine federal statutes that explicitly regulate commercial or 
iiJ.dustrial activity, such as mining or asbestos removal, as such. While the 
logic of Lopez and Morrison suggests limitations on Congress's ability to 
authorize the regulation of non-economic activity an~ the environmental 
impacts of such activity, lower courts have not been eager to enforce such 
286. See In re Needham, 354 F.3d 340, 345-46 (5th Cir. 2003); Rice v. Harken Exploration 
Co., 250 F.3d 264, 272 (5th Cir. 2001). Although Needham and Rice specifically address the scope 
of federal regulation over "waters of the United States" under the Oil Pollution Act, both 
decisions note that federal jurisdiction und~r the OPA was intended to be coextensive with that 
under the Clean Water Act Needham, 354 F.3d at 344; Rice, 250 F.3d at 267. 
287. Needham, 354 F.3d at 345. 
288. Id. Some government officials and commentators dismiss this language as dicta. See, 
e.g., Wood, supra note 274, at 10,188. 
289. Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 858 (2000). 
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limits. There is no indication that the Commerce Clause opinions will be 
read to curtail federal ability to regulate documented interstate 
environmental impacts, such as pollution spillovers. The Commerce Clause 
opinions have resulted in a narrowing of Clean Water Act jurisdiction, 
however, and may result in similar narrowing interpretations of other 
federal statutes with commerce-based jurisdictional requirements-though 
few environmental statutes fall into this category. This would result in the 
exclusion of some non·economic, intrastate activity from congressional 
regulation, but is unlikely to impact efforts to directly regulate the 
environmental impacts of industrial and commercial activity, as such. 
2. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
Judicial limits on the scope of Congress's power under section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment have had no impact on existing environmental 
regulation and should not have much impact in the future. To date, 
Congress has not relied upon section 5 as the constitutional basis for any 
significant environmental legislation. Environmental laws are generally not 
conceived as efforts to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment's equal 
protection and due process guarantees. Yet even if Congress was to adopt 
environmental laws predicated on the section 5 power, the substantive 
limitations on this power articulated in Boerne and subsequent cases could 
well constrain future efforts to enact federal environmental legislation 
pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, including efforts to abrogate state 
sovereign immunity. Boerne and its progeny make the Fourteenth 
Amendment an unsuitable home for existing environmental measures. 290 
Perhaps the greatest potential impact of the narrowing of Congress's 
section 5 power is that Congress could be less able to adopt legislation to 
address "environmental justice" concerns, such as allegations that pollution 
and environmentally damaging actiVIties disproportionately affect 
communities of color.291 No private plaintiff has brought a successful 
290. It is possible that section 5 power could 'be used to authorize federal legislation 
prohibiting state.created nuisances, as such actions could be conceived as either a deprivation 
of property without due process or a taking of private property without just compensation. See 
McAllister & Glicksman, supra note 173, at 10,675. While the .latter prohibition is found in the 
Fifth Amendment, it is enforceable against the states via the Fourteenth. Chicago, Burlington & 
Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 238-39 (1896). 
291. See generally UNEQUAL PROTECTION: ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND COMMUNITIES OF 
COLOR (Robert D. Bullard ed., 1994); Regina Austin & Michael Schill, Black, Brown, Poor and 
Poisoned: Minority Grassroots Environmentalism and the Quest for Eco-]ustice, 1 KAN.J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y, 
69 (1991); Robert D. Bullard, The Legacy of American Apartheid and Environmental Rncism, 9 ST. 
JOHN'S]. LEGAL COMMENT. 445 (1994); Robert D. Bullard, The Threat of Environmental Rncism, 7 
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 23 (1993); Luke W. Cole, Empowerment as the Key to Environmental 
Protection: The Need for Environmental Poverty Law, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 619 (1992). Note that the 
claims are hotly contested. Vicki Been, What:r Fairness Got to Do With It?: Environmental justice and 
the Siting of Locally Undesirable Land Uses, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1001, 1009-15 (1993); Vicki Been 
& Francis Gupta, Coming to the Nuisance or Going to the Barrios? A Longitudinal Analysis of 
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environmental justice claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, as it is 
exceedingly difficult to demonstrate discriminatory intent.292 Prior to the 
Supreme Court's recent federalism cases-and parallel cases limiting private 
causes of action under Title VI of the Civil Rights Ace93-it was conceivable 
that Congress, or perhaps even a federal agency, could adopt environmental 
justice measures under the Fourteenth Amendment. For example, Congress 
could have prohibited state facility siting and environmental permitting 
decisions that have a disproportionate harm on minority communities or 
that exacerbate existing imbalances in the environmental burden of 
industrial development. The Supreme Court does not recognize the 
disparate impact of a government action on minority communities, in itself, 
as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection guarantee, 
however.294 For this reason, the Court would likely strike down such 
legislation as in excess of Congress's section 5 power. 
Insofar as section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides the only 
enumerated power authorizing Congress to abrogate state sovereign 
immunity, judicially enforced limits on the section 5 power will curtail 
·Congress's ability to subject states to suits for environmental violations.295 It 
is possible that only those environmental violations, or actions taken on 
environmentally related matters, that could themselves be construed as 
violatiol).s of tights protected by the Fourteentl1 Amendment itself could be 
subject to such suits. Although Congress may adopt prophylactic legislation 
to prevent potential Fourteenili Amendment violations by state actors, 
under Boerne such measures must be proportional and congruent. 
B. STATE SOVEREIGNTY 
Whereas limits on Congress's enumerated powers constrain Congress's 
ability to regulate certain types of environmental harms, the Supreme 
Court's state sovereignty decisions largely affect the means Congress may use 
to address specific environmental concerns. At one level, iliese restrictions 
are significant in that they represent strict prohibitions against the adoption 
of certain types of environmental measures. On the other hand, the formal · 
nature of these rules makes it easier for Congress to adopt alternative means 
of addressing a given environmental concern. Whereas a Supreme Court 
decision substantially curtailing Congress's commerce· power could leave 
Environmental justice Claims, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 34-35 (1997); Thomas Lambert & Christopher 
Boerner, Environmental Inequity: Economic Causes, Economic Solutions, 14 YAL,Ej. ON REG. 195, 195-
212 (1997). 
292. See Craig Anthony Arnold, Planning Milagros: Environmental Justice & Land-Use 
Regulation, 76 DENV. U. L. REv. 1, 51 (1998). 
293. See generally Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (200 I). 
294. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-39 (1976); Hernandez v. New York, 500 
u.s. 352,360 (1991). 
295. See infra notes 363-64 and accompanying text. 
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certain activities completely beyond Congress's regulatory reach, there are 
relatively few environmental programs that are threatened by the Court's 
recent efforts to protect state sovereignty against federal encroachment. 
1. Commandeering 
The potential commandeering of state government officials by federal 
environmental regulation is not new. In the 1970s, the EPA directed states to 
adopt specific air pollution control measures under the Clean Air Act.295 The 
EPA maintained that it could obtain ll1JUnctive relief ordering 
uncooperative state officials to adopt a particular type of vehicle emission 
inspection program and other emission control measures.297 This claim was 
. generally rejected in the ~ourts of appeals, however.298 The courts ultimately 
relied on statvtory language to reject the EPA's claims, but noted the serious 
constitutional questioo.s about the EPA's position.299 In particular, the courts 
separated federal efforts to control pollution from industrial sources that 
impact state-run facilities from federal efforts to directly conscript state 
officers in the administration of a federal program. As the D.C. Circuit 
noted, the EPA was "attempting to commandeer the regulatory powers of 
tl1e states, along with their personnel and resources, for use in administering 
and enforcing a federal regulatory program against the owners of motor 
vehicles. "300 Upholding such an assertion of federal regulatory authority, the 
Ninth Circuit noted, would have endorsed "[a] Commerce Clause power so 
expanded [that it] would reduce the states to puppets of a ventriloquist 
Congress."301 Such a power "would enable Congress to control ever 
increasing portions of the states' budgets. The pattern of expenditl.lres 
would increasingly become a congressional responsibility."302 
296. See, e.g., Maryland v. EPA, 530 F.2d 215, 218 (4th Cir. 1975), vacated sub nom. EPA v. 
Brown, 431 U.S. 99 (1977); District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971, 977 (D.C. Cir. 1975), 
vacated sub nom. EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99 (1977); Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827, 829 (9th Cir. 
1975), vacated, 431 U.S. 99 (1977). 
297. Brown, 521 F.2d at 831. 
298. Maryland, 530 F.2d 2-15; Train, 521 F.2d at 971; Brown, 521 F.2d at 827. A fourth federal 
appellate court found in favor of the EPA Pennsylvania v. EPA, 500 F.2d 246, 246-47 (3d Cir. 
1974). 
299. Brown, 431 U.S. at 102 ("AJI of the courts rested on statutory interpretation, but noted 
also that serious constitutional questions might be raised if the statute were read as the United 
States argued it should be."). 
300. Train, 521 F.2d at 993. 
301. Brown, 521 F.2d at 839. 
302. Id. at 840. The Ninth Circuit further made clear that its holding clid not limit the 
federal government's ability to induce state cooperation, such as through the spending power, 
or to preempt state pollution control Jaws with more stringent federally enforced requirements. 
Id.; see also Maryland, 530 F.2d at 228 ("Inviting Maryland to administer the regulations, and 
compelling her to do so under threat of injunctive and criminal sanctions, are two entirely 
different propositions."); Train, 521 F.2d at 989 (reaffirming federal power to preempt 
inconsistent state regulations). 
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The Supreme Court accepted petitions for certiorari to consider 
whether the EPA could constitutionally commandeer state regulatory 
officials pursuant to the Clean Air Act. Yet before the Court ruled on the 
question, the federal government acknowledged that its regulations were 
invalid and the decisions were vacated.303 There is little doubt that if the 
cases were litigated today, the EPA's effort to conscript state and local 
officials would constitute unconstitutional commandeering. 
The Supreme Court next considered · the constitutional limits on 
commandeering in New York v. United States, 304 a challenge to the Low Level 
Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act in which the Court dearly 
articulated the anti-commandeering principle. Since New York, state and 
local governments have raised Tenth Amendment claims with some 
frequency. Although New York is the principal commandeering case, and it 
.concerned environmental matters, the anti-commandeering principle it r 
announced has had a minimal effect on federal environmental regulation. 
The federal government rarely issues direct commands requiring state and 
local government officials to implement federal regulatory programs. 
Rather, state cooperation with and participation in federal regulatory efforts 
is induced through promises of funding and threats of preemption-
measures that the Court explicitly endorsed in New York. Such measures may 
place substantial pressure on state and local officials to follow the federal 
government's lead in environmental policy, but they are not, in themselves, 
commandeering.305 For this reason, most commandeering-based challenges 
to environmental regulations have failed. 
Since New York, there have been only two successful commandeering 
claims brought against federal environmental regulations, both involving _ 
exceedingly peripheral federal regu1ations. 306 In 1993, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit invalidated provisions of the Forest Resources 
Conservation and Shortage Relief Act ("FRCSRA").307 This law sought to 
limit the export of unprocessed logs from forests in the western United 
. States.308 Yet rather than impose direct restrictions on timber exports, the 
FRCSRA ordered states to adopt their own regulations restricting exports. In 
303. Brown, 431 U.S. at 103-04. 
304. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). During the intervening years, the Court considered Tenth 
Amendment-based challenges to several federal statutes, but it did not directly address the 
commandeering question. See, e.g., Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 
743 (1982); Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Recreation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 265 (1981); see also 
supra Part II.B. 
305. But see infra Part IV. 
306. See Ass'n of Cmty. Orgs. for Reform Now v. Edwards, 81 F.3d 1387, 1387 (5th Cir. 
1996); Bd. of Natural Res. v. Brown, 992 F.2d 937, 938 (9th Cir. 1993). These decisions are 
discussed in greater detail in Adler, supra note 45, at 609-12. 
307. Brown, 992 F.2d at 938. 
308. The FRCSRA's export restrictions only applied to government lands in the continental 
United States west of the lOOth meridian. 16 U.S.C. § 620c (2000); see Brown, 992 F.2d at 941. 
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Board of Natural Resources v. Bmwn, the Ninth Circuit held that these 
provisions were "direct commands to the states to regulate according to 
Congress's instructions" and thus constituted unconstitutional 
commandeering under New York. 309 
Brown did not have a significant impact, environmental or otherwise. 
Following the Ninth Circuit's decision, Congress amended the FRCSRA to 
require the Secretary of Commerce to issue federal regulations directly 
limiting the export of unprocessed logs.310 Even if Congress had not 
responded to Brown in this manner, the environmental effect would have 
been minimal. While styled as a "conservation" measure, it is doubtful that 
Congress enacted FRCSRA to conserve western state forests. 311 Rather, the 
FRCSRA's export provisions appear designed to protect domestic lumber 
mills from foreign competition. By restricting the export of unprocessed 
logs, the FRCSRA effectively mandated that local timber be processed in 
local mills, even if the timber were bound for foreign markets and overseas 
mills were more efficient.312 
In 1996, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit invalidated 
another rather minor federal environmental provision on anti-
commandeering grounds.313 The Lead Contamination Control Act 
("LCCA") 314 required each state to "establish a program ... to assist local 
educational agencies in testing for, and remedying, lead contamination in 
· drinking water. "315 The Fifth Circuit held that this provision fell "squarely 
within the ambit of New York" and was therefore unconstitutional.316 If 
Congress sought to ensure the regulation of potential lead contamination in 
school water coolers, it would have to adopt legislation implementing such a 
309. See Brown, 992 F.2d at 947. At the same time, the Ninth Circuit rejected claims that the 
FRCSRA '~alated the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment and federal obligations to 
srate land grant trusts. ld. at 942-46. 
310. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 620c-620d. 
311. For this reason, some may object to the characterization of Brown as an en~ronmental 
case. See Percival, supra note 4, at 841 (stating that only one federal en~ronmental statute has 
been successfully challenged on commandeering grounds). 
312. The FRCSRA may be a particularly ob~ous example of ostensibly "en~ronmental" 
legislation adopted primarily for the benefit of economic interests, but it is hardly unique. See 
generally Jonathan H. Adler, Clean Politics, Dirty Profits: Rent-Seeking Behind the Green Curtain, in 
POLITICAL ENVIRONMENTALISM: GOING BEHIND THE GREEN CURTAIN (Terry L. Anderson ed., 
2000) ; Todd J. Zywicki, Environmental Exte-rnalities and Political Externalities: The Political Economy of 
Environmental Regulation and Reform, 73 TUL. L. REV. 845 ( 1999). 
313. Ass'n ofCmty. Orgs. for Reform Nowv. Edwards, 81 F.3d 1387,1387 (5th Cir.1996). 
314. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300j-21 to -26 (2000). 
315. ld. § 300j-24(d). 
316. Ass'n of Omty. Orgs. for Reform Now, 81 F.3d at 1394 ("Because § 300j-24(d) deprives 
States of the option to decline regulating non-lead free drinking water coolers, we ... conclude 
that § 300j-24(d) is an unconstitutional intrusion upon the States' sovereign prerogative to 
legislate as it sees fit."). 
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program at the federal level, or else provide states with a financial or other 
. . d h th I 317 mcent:J.ve to a opt sue programs emse ves. 
All other commandeering challenges to federal environmental laws 
have failed. 318 In 1997, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
questioned the constitUtionality of a CERCLA provision setting a "federally 
required commencement date" ("FRCD") for the running of the applicable 
state statute of limitations goveming personal injury claims arising from the 
improper storage or disposal of hazardous wastes.319 Although not deciding 
the question, in dicta, the court observed that the CERCLA provision was of 
"questionable constitutionality" because it "appears to purport to change 
state law" and might therefore violate anti-commandeering principles.320 In a 
subsequent case, however, this claim was raised and rejected.321 The FRCD 
does not conscript the state legislature or executive officials to implement a 
federal regulatory program.322 Rather, it simply requires state courts to 
recognize that state-law toxic tort claims do not accrue before a plaintiff 
knows, or reasonably should know, of her injury.323 This is a "modest 
requirement that is squarely within Congress's long established powers 
under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. "324 
While the FRCSRA and the LCCA are the only federal environmental 
statutes to be successfully challenged on commandeering grounds since New 
317. The Ass'n of Cmty. Orgs. for Reform Now decision also addressed an LCCA provision 
requiring states to disseminate information about potential lead contamination in water 
coolers. 81 F.3d at 1390-92; 42 U.S.C. § 300j-24(c). The court did not assess the 
constitutionality of this provision, however, as it determined that the state had effectively 
complied with this provision. Ass'n of Cmty. Orgs. for Reform Now, 81 F.3d at 1392. Even though 
the requirement of this provision was largely ministerial, it would likely have been judged 
equally unconstitutional had the court had cause to reach the issue. 
318. See, e.g., City of Abilene v. EPA, 325 F.3d 657, 657-58 (5th Cir. 2003) (rejecting a 
Tenth Amendment challenge to conditions placed on storm water discharge permits); Envtl. 
Def. Ctr. v. EPA, 319 F.3d 398, 409 (9th Cir. 2003) (rejecting a Tenth Amendment challenge to 
permitting requirements of small municipal storm sewer discharges); Virginia v. Browner, 80 
F. 3d 869, 882-91 (4th Cir. 1996) (rejecting a Tenth Amendment challenge to Clean Air Act 
.!:I'!.Qu.irements for state implementation plans); Sweat v. Hull, 200 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 177-80 (D. 
Ariz. 2001) (rejecting a Tenth Amendment defense of a state's unilateral decision to terminate 
pollution controls provided for in state implementation plans under the Clean Air Act); 
Missouri v. United States, 918 F. Supp. 1320, 1337 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (rejecting a Tenth 
Amendment challenge to Clean Air Act requirements for state implementation plans); see also 
Percival, supra note 4, at 841 ("[C]ourts have had little difficulty rejecting state claims of 
commandeering when federal regulatory programs are challenged."). 
319. ABB Indus. Sys., Inc. v. Prime Tech., Inc., 120 F.3d 351, 360 n.S (2d Cir. 1997). 
320. !d. 
321. Freier v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 303 F.3d 176, 178 (2d Cir. 2002). 
322. !d. at 204. 
323. !d. 
324. !d. The anti-commandeering principle generally does not apply to state judiciaries. 
Rather, as the Supreme Court held in New York, "tl1is sort of federal 'direction' of state judges is 
mandated by the text of the Supremacy Clause." New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 178-
79 (1992); see also Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 394 (1947). 
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York, there are a handful of other environmental provisions that appear to 
be quite vulnerable to similar challenges. Dissenting in Printz, Justice Stevens 
identified sections of two environmental laws that mandate state 
participation in federal regulatory schemes.325 In addition, the interpretation 
of federal environmental statutes to impose affirmative regulatory 
obligations on states could also raise commandeering concerris.326 
In this context, the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know 
Act ("EPCRA") 327 is perhaps the most vulnerable federal environmental 
statute.32~,This law is designed to inform local communities about the use, 
storage, and disposal of various chemical substances and potentially 
hazardous materials! as well as to ensure that local governments engage in 
emergency planning to reduce the environmental risks that such materials 
and industrial facilities may pose to local communities. Unlike most federal 
environmental statutes that enlist state and local governments, however, 
EPCRA does not follow the cooperative federalism model. Rather, it 
explicitly commands each state's governor to create a "state emergency 
response commission" and then imposes a series of duties upon such 
comm1sswns, including the creation of local emergency planning 
committees and the development of emergency response plans.329 These 
requirements contravene the principle that "[t]he Federal Government may 
neither issue directives requiring the States to address particular problems, 
nor command the States' officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to 
d . . £ £ d 1 1 ,330 a mm1ster or en orce a e era regu atory program. 
In 1986, Congress added provisions to the underground storage tank 
("UST") provisions of the federal Resource Conservation and Recoyery Act 
of 1976 ("RCRA").331 These provisions are also vulnerable to challenge. 
Whereas most of the RCRA, including the bulk of the UST provisions, adopt 
a traditional cooperative federalism model, the 1986 amendments dictate to 
the states. Specifically, they include a provision requiring every state to 
develop inventories "of all underground storage tanks. . . containing 
regulated substances"332 and to submit these inventories to the federal 
EPA.333 Unlike the other requirements, of state UST programs, these 
325. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 955 (1997) (Stevens,]., dissenting). 
326. See infra notes 337-46 and accompanying text. 
327. 42 u.s.c. § 11001 (2000). 
328. See generally Nicholas J. Johnson, EPCRA s Collision with Federalism, 27 IND. L. REV. 549 
(1994). 
329. See42 U.S.C. §§ 11001(a)-(c), 11003 (e), 11022(a), 11022(e)(3). 
330. Printz, 521 U.S. at 935. See also Johnson, supra note 328, at 563 ("It is difficult to avoid 
the conclusion that the commission and the committees are state regulatory agencies."). 
331. 42 u.s.c. §§ 6901-6902 (2000). 
332. Id. § 6991a(c). 
333. ld. Owners of USTs are further required to submit information to the state or local 
agencies designated by the state's governor to receive such information. See id. § 6991a(a) (1), 
(b) (1). 
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provisions are not discretionary.334 Because they commandeer state officials 
to implement federal regulatory requirements, they are unconstitutional. 
Without a doubt, the relevant EPCRA provisions and RCRA's UST 
inventory requirement impose no more than an incidental burden upon 
state governments-and therefore it is unlikely mat a state will challenge 
either provision in federal court.335 Yet the relative unobtrusiveness of a 
federal requirement does not insulate a federal provision from the anti-
commandeering principle. The Printz majority held that "no case-by-case 
weighing of the burdens or benefits is necessary" when adjudging the 
constitutionality of a federal command to a state government as it struck 
down the background check provisions of the Brady Act. 336 This does not bar 
Congress from pursuing these policy objectives, however. As with the 
provisions struck down in Ass 'n of Community Organizations for Reform Now and 
Brown, it would be relatively easy for Congress to amend the relevant statutes 
to achieve the same objectives, either by mandating direct federal regulation 
or providing incentives for state cooperation. 
In some circumstances, the application of the Endangered Species Act 
("ESA") to state regulatory programs may also be vulnerable to challenge on 
commandeering grounds, particularly insofar as the ESA is read to impose 
affirmative regulatory obligations on state agencies. In Stmhan v. Coxe, a 
federal · district court issued an injunction requiring the State of 
Massachusetts to regulate gillnet and lobster pot fishing in state waters so as 
to prevent the incidental taking of an endangered species.337 The court 
accepted the plaintiff's claim that the state's licensing of gillnet and lobster 
pot fishing resulted in illegal "takes" of Northem Right whales in violation of 
the ESA. According to the court, insofar as the state exercised "control over 
the use of gillnets and lobster gear in Massachusetts waters," it could be 
liable for the taking of whales by private fishers with state-issued licenses. 338 
334: See id. § 6991c. The elements of an authorized state UST program are listed in § 
6991c(a). ·If a state does not adopt its own UST program in accordance with federal 
requirements, the EPA will regulate USTs within the state directly under § 6991b. The 
notification requirement, however, is in§ 6991a(c). 
335. Indeed, there have been no challenges to these provision,s in the years since Justice 
Stevens and some academic commentators commented upon the constitutional vulnerability of 
these provisions. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 955 (Stevens,]., dissenting); see also Adler, supra note 45, 
at 613-16; Johnson, supra note 328, at 55. The burden fmposed by the background-check 
requirement at issue in Printz was also relatively minimal, but was nonetheless subject to 
numerous challenges prior to the Printz decision, perhaps because the underlying subject 
matter-gun control-is more controversial than certain forms of environmental regulation. 
336. Printz, 521 U.S. at 935. But see id. at 936 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("(T]he Court 
appropriately refrains from deciding whether other purely ministerial reporting requirements 
imposed by Congress on state and local authorities pursuant to its Commerce Clause powers are 
similarly invalid."). 
337. 939 F. Supp. 963, 992 (D. Mass. 1996). 
338. Id. at 980. 
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On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit upheld the 
injunction against a federalism challenge.339 Although this order could be 
viewed as requiring state regulatory officials to enforce a federal 
regulation-the prohibition on taking endangered species-the lower 
court's ruling did "not impose positive obligations on the [state] by 
converting its regulation of commercial fishing operations into a tool of the 
federal ESA regulatory scheme."340 Rather, the court was merely preventing 
the state from allegedly taking endangered whales-albeit indirectly-by 
licensing fishing activities that entail an inevitable risk of such taking. 
The First Circuit's ruling is only plausible insofar as a state can be held 
liable for taking an endangered species because it licenses (or refuses to 
prohibit) activity that could result in a take of endangered species-activity 
which is itself illegal under the ESA insofar as it results in the take of listed 
species. 341 In effect, Strahan holds that states have an obligation. to. administer 
state regulatory programs so as to implement the federal ESA, even though 
the activities to be regulated are 'themselves already illegal under federal law. 
This seems to contravene the holding of New York that "even where Congress 
has the authority under the Constitution to pass laws requiring or 
prohibiting certain acts, it lacks the power directly to compel the States to 
. h"b" th ,342 reqmre or pro 1 1t ose acts. · 
The First Circuit characterized the state's decision to issue licenses as a 
cause of illegal takes because the state licenses allowed the fishing to occur. 
Yet this presumes that absent a state-licensing scheme there would be no 
illegal takes from gillnet and lobster pot fishing. Precisely the opposite is the 
case. Were there no state licensing regime for gillnet and lobsterpot fishing, 
such activities could occur, at least within state waters. Therefore, the 
licensing of such activities should not be viewed as even a "but for" cause of 
the endangered species takes. Insofar as fishing activities threaten Northern 
Right whales, those activities are themselves illegal under the ESA and 
subject to federal enforcement. It is not clear upon what basis the legal 
obligation to enforce such a prohibition can be transposed onto a state 
merely because it elects to adopt a licensing scheme for state waters. If the 
state refrained from regulating gillnet and lobsterpot fishing altogether, the 
only way to mandate state enforcement of an anti-take prohibition would be 
to commandeer state officials. 
The First Circuit rejected these federalism concerns on several grounds, 
none of which are particularly convincing .. First, as noted above, the court 
maintained that the state itself violated the take prohibition by issuing 
licenses to activities that posted an inherent risk of taking endangered 
339. Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155, 166, 171 (1st Cir. 1997). 
340. Id. at 164. 
341. See 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a) (2000). 
342. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992). 
430 90 IOWA LAW REVIEW [2005] 
species. Second, the court suggested that the holding was justified by the 
Supremacy Clause and the undisputed federal power to preempt conflicting 
state laws.343 Yet in this case state law was not preempted-that is, federal law 
did not displace state law by imposing different standards upon the 
regulated entities. Rather it acted directly upon the state entity itself in its 
sovereign capacity as the regulator of state waters. The court correctly noted 
that Congress may offer states the choice of regulating a given activity in 
conformity with federal wishes or preempt state regulation with federal 
rules.344 Yet here the state was given no such choice. The district court 
injunction specifically required Massachusetts to bring its state regulations 
into conformity with federal law, and the federal take prohibition remains 
applicable to gillnet and lobsterpot fishers irrespective of what actions the 
state opts to take. 
Acknowledging that New · York and Printz prohibit the federal 
government from directing state officials to adopt a given regulatory regime, 
the court nonetheless concluded that ordering revisions in the state-
licensing regime was permissible because the court did not "direct[] the 
state to enact a particular regulatory regime that enforces and furthers a 
federal policy."345 Yet the fact that the state has an array of options to comply 
with the federal requirement does not lessen the constitutional problem if 
each option, standing alone, could not be imposed.346 
Strahan violates the commandeering prohibition announced in New York 
and augmented in Printz. A federal requirement that a state must revise its 
method of regulating private activities seems to be precisely the sort of 
dictate that New York and Printz are meant to prohibit. Applying this 
principle in the ESA context would not result in significant changes in ESA 
enforcement. The take prohibition at issue in Strahan V\;'ould continue to 
apply to private and state actors alike. The only limitationcwould be on using 
this prohibition as a justification for requiring states to alter or reform 
preexisting state regulatory regimes to make them more consonant with the 
ESA's requirements. 
2. Sovereign Immunity 
The Supreme Court's decisions upholding state sovereign immunity will 
have an identifiable impact on the scope of federal environmental 
regulation. Virtually every major environmental law contains citizen suit 
provisions authorizing private actors to seek enforcement of environmental 
343. Strahan, 127 F.3d at 167, 170. 
344. !d. at 170 (citing New York, 505 U.S. at 167). 
345. !d. at 169. It is worth noting that the Printz decision, while addressed by the court, was 
decided after the briefing and oral argument in this case, but before the decision was issued. !d. 
at 169. 
346. New York, 505 U.S. at 176. 
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regulations in federal court. 347 Other statutes contain provisions authmizing 
the payment of damages for environmental harms or penalties for other 
offenses, such as violations of whistleblower protection laws. Insofar as the 
Court's sovereign immunity holdings prevent the initiation of suits against 
states for money damages, p1ivate citizens will be unable to invoke tl1ese 
provisions against state entities. 
One immediate effect of the Court's sovereign immunity holdings is 
that state governments are no longer liable to p1ivate parties for response 
and cleanup costs under federal environmental statutes such as the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act348 or Superfund. 349 This protection 
from liability does not extend to local governments, however, which may be 
more likely defendants in a Superfund cont1ibution action because they own 
the majmity of public waste disposal sites.350 Indeed, to date, suits against 
local governments under tl1e Superfund statute have been "legion."351 
Where states implement environmental regulations in lieu of the 
federal government, sovereign immunity also bars private suits in federal 
court seeking to enforce the state regulatory provisions. 352 Under the 
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act ("SMCRA"),353 for example, 
states are given the choice of regulating in accordance 1"lith federal 
guidelines or accepting tl1e imposition of federal regulations within the 
state. Once a state opts to regulate under SMCRA, 'and the state's regulatory 
scheme is approved by the federal government, the relevant federal 
regulations '"drop out' as operative Jaw" in favor of the relevant state 
regulations, and private citizens may no longer sue states pursuant to 
SMCRA's citizen suit provisions in federal court.354 Even .. lf a citizen plaintiff 
only seeks injunctive relief, sovereign immunit-y bars such a suit as "[a] 
State's sovereign dignity reserves to its own institutions the task of keeping 
its officers in line with tl1at Jaw."355 This restriction is potentially significant, 
though it vrill rarely arise. 356 
347. The one exception is the Federal1nsecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act. 7 U.S.C. 
§§ 136-l36y (2000). 
348. See generally Grine v. Coombs, 189 F.3d 464 (3d Cir. 1999) (upholding dismissal on 
sovereign immunity grounds of a citizen suit seeking monetary damages from a state agency 
under the RCRA). · 
349. See generall;' Burnette v. Carothers, 192 F.3d 52 (2d Cir. 1999) (dimissing on sovereign 
immunity grounds a citizen suit seeking monetary damages from the state under the 
Supeifund); see also Percival, supm. note 4, at 844. 
350. See Percival, supra note 4, at 844. 
351. McAllister & Glicksman, sujJm note 173, at 10,676. 
352. See Bragg v. W.Va. Coal Ass'n, 248 F.3d 275, 297-98 (4th Cir. 2001). 
353. 30 u.s.c. §§ 1201-1211, 1231-1328 (2000). 
354. Bragg, 248 F.3d at 295. 
355. Id. at 297. 
356. SMCRA, unlike many othe1· cooperati\'e federalism statutes, expressly prm~des for 
exclusive regulation by the state or federal govemment. See id. at 289; see also Mark Squillace, 
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Several major environmental statutes have "whistleblower" provisions 
that prevent an employer from fiting or otherwise taking an adverse 
employment action against an employee for reporting or disclosing 
environmental violations.357 These provisions authmize an employee to file a 
complaint with the Secretary of Labor alleging retaliation for whistleblower 
activity and provide for various forms of relief, including reinstatement. Yet 
insofar as whistleblower actions against state agencies seek monetary 
compensation, such as back pay, they are precluded by sovereign 
immunity. 358 Under Federal Nfaritime Commissi01~ v. South Carolina Parts 
Authority,359 it makes no difference that the initial complaint is addressed in a 
federal administrative proceeding prior to potential review by a federal 
court. 360 
Sovereign immunity does not bar whistleblower actions that seek purely 
prospective, injunctive relief from specific state officials instead of monetary 
• 
361 N d . . . th c d l compensatiOn. or oes soveretgn tmmuntty prevent e ~e era 
government from initiating its own suit against state agencies for violating 
whistleblower protections, even if the suit is based upon a private complaint 
and seeks monetary relief for the sanctioned employee.362 It is also possible 
that Congress could reenact the various whistleblower provisions pursuant to 
its autl1ority under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment on the grounds 
that whistleblower protections are necessary to safeguard state employees' 
First Amendment rights against state action. 353 Yet the existing whistle blower 
provisions cannot be defended on iliis ground as there is no language in the 
relevant statutes suggesting that this was Congress's intent, and such intent 
Cooperative Fede:ralism Under the Swface Mining Control and Reclamation Act: Is This Any Wa)• to Run a 
Govrmunent?, 15 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,039, 10,039 (1985) (noting SMCRA's "unparalleled" 
delegation of regulatory authority to state governments). 
357. E.g., Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2622 (2000); Clean Water Act, 33 
U.S.C. § 1367 (2000); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-9(i) (2000); Solid Waste 
Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6971 (2000); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7622 (2000); Superfund Act, 
42 u.s.c. § 9610 (2000). 
358. See general(y R.I. Dep't of Envtl. Mgmt. v. United States, 304 F.3d 31 (1st Cir. 2002); 
Conn. Dep't of Envt'l Prot. v. OSHA, 138 F. Supp. 2d 285 (D. Conn. 2001); Florida v. United 
States, 133 F. Supp. 2d 1280 (N.D. Fla. 2001); Ohio EPA v. United States Dep't of Labor, 121 F. 
Supp. 2d 1155 (S.D. Ohio 2000). 
359. 535 U.S. 7'13 (2002). 
360. RI. Dep't of Envtl. Mgmt., 304 F.3d at 45 (noting that the Federal Jlifaritime Commission v. 
South Carolina State P01ts Authority decision "disposes of any argument ... that, as a general 
proposition, a S[ate's traditional immunity from suit does not extend to administrative 
proceedings initiated and prosecuted by private citizens). 
361. See Florida, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 1291-92 (stating that administrative proceedings may 
continue insofar as it seeks prospective relief from state employees). 
362. R.I. Dep't oJEnvtl. MgiiLt., 304 F.3d at 53; Ohio EPil, 121 F. Supp. 2d at 1167. 
363. See RI. Dep't oJEnvtl. Mgi!Lt., 304 F.3d at 51 (noting such a possibility}. 
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to abrogate sovereign immunity will be found only if Congress "mak[es] its 
intention unmistakably clear in the language of the statute."354 
While the above impacts may be significant, it is important not to 
overstate the effect of sovereign immunity on federal environmental law. As 
Professors McAllister and Glicksman note, predictions of "dire 
consequences" from these rulings "may be overstated and tend to ignore the 
many other facets of federal law that effectively permit redress against the 
states or ensure state compliance 1"lith federallaw."355 As noted above, there 
are several alternative means of enforcing federal ·environmental 
requirements on state actors, ranging from Ex parte Young suits for injunctive 
relief against state actors to direct federal enforcement of federal rules.356 
INhere private plaintiffs seek injunctive or declaratory relief, such as a court 
order requiring a state official's compliance with an applicable federal 
environmental law, sovereign immunity is not an obstacle. Thus, Seminole 
Tribe noted that citizen suits against state officials seeking Clean Water Act 
enforcement are viable under Ex pmte Young. 361 Similarly, sovereigr1 
immunity does not prevent a citizen from suing state officials to stop alleged 
ongoing violations of the Endangered Species Act.~.~~ 
IV. THE NEXT FEDERALISM BATTLEGROUND? 
To date, the Supreme Court's federalism jmisprudence has had 
relatively little impact on federal environmental regulation, let alone a 
multiple "whammy."369 Even where federalism principles would counsel 
curtailing federal regulatory authority, as with the Commerce Clause,370 
federal appellate courts have been reluctant to travel down this patl1, and 
364. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000) (citation and quotation omitted); 
see also R.I. Dep 't of Envtl. Mgmt., 304 F.3d at 51 (quoting same); Florida, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 1291 
(assuming, without deciding, that Congress could abrogate state sovereign immunity from 
whistleblower claims under section 5); Ohio EPA, 121 F. Supp. 2d at 1162 (same). 
365. McAllister & Glicksman, supra note 173, at 10,669. 
366. See su.jJm Part ILB.2 (discussing state sovereign immunity). 
367. Seminole Tlibe ofFlolida v. Flmida, 517 U.S. 44, 75 (1996). 
368. See, e.g., Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155, 166 (lst Cir. 1997) (noting sovereign immunity 
does not preclude "suits against state officials seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against 
the state officials in tl1eir individual capacities who act in violation of federal law"); see also Waste 
Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore, 252 F.3d 316, 349 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that sovereign 
immunity did not bar action against state officials seeking injunctive relief against enforcement 
of statutes limiting disposal of waste); cJ. Burnette v. Carothers, 192 F.3d 52, 60 (2d Cir. 1999) 
(holding that environmental citizen suit provisions do not abrogate state sovereign immunity, 
and plaintiffs waived claim of Ex parte Young exception). 
369. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
370. See supra Part liLA (discussing the limitation of federal regulatory authority due to 
enumerated powers). 
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the Supreme Court, thus far, has rejected opportunities to lead the way.371 
vVhere the Court's federalism holdings do constrain existing environmental 
laws, by and large the limitations have been minor, and Congress is able to 
circumvent most such restrictions should it choose to do so. 
That the revival of federalism has not yet transformed federal 
environmental policy does not ensure that it will not do so in the future. 
Looming on the legal horizon is at least one question of federalism that 
could cause substantial change in federal environmental law-constitutional 
limits on Congress's spending power, particularly Congress's authority to 
induce state action through the use of conditional spending.372 Because 
conditional spending is used in many environmental laws to encourage, or 
otherwise induce, state cooperation with federal regulatory efforts, the scope 
of the spending power is important for federal environmental law. As the 
spending power is used to supplement, or extend, existing federal authmity 
over state governments, legal challenges to such use of the spending power 
become more likely. 
By limiting federal regulatory authority, the Court increased the 
pressure on Congress to use the spending power to achieve desired 
regulatory ends. The federal government can neither direct state legislatures 
nor commandeer state executive officials, but it can induce state 
cooperation with the promise of federal funds or the threat of direct federal 
action. Pressure and encouragement are constitutional; direct commands 
are not.37g The dGtinction between the two is not always clear, however. Even 
the use of conditional spending can, at some point, become "so coercive as 
to pass the point at which pressure turns into compulsion."374 Under existing 
precedent, it nonethel~ss appears Congress has ample authority to 
circumvent the Court's federalism holdings through the use of conditional 
spending. 375 I\ldeed, some commentators have encouraged Congress to do 
just that. 37li 
371. For instance, the Supreme Court has repeatedly denied certiora1i in cases raising 
direct Commerce Clause challenges to environmental legislation. See, e.g., Cargill, Inc., v. 
United States, 516 U.S. 955 (1995) (denial of certiorati). 
372. See Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 105 ("The next frontier of [federalism] litigation is 
sure to be the Spending Clause."). 
373. See supra Part II.B (discussing the impact of state sovereign immunity). 
374. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987). 
375. Professors Baker & Berman note "easy to imagine" congressional responses to each of 
the Court's recent federalism decisions. L;'lm A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting Off the 
Dole: Hll1y the Cotut Should Abandon Its Spending Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever Cougress Cotdd 
Provoke It to Do So, 78 IND. LJ. 459, 502-04 (2003); see also Choper & Yoo, supra note 3, 857 
("Given the broad sweep of the spending power as currently construed, the federal government 
would quite clearly have the ability to evade the direct limits on its Commerce Clause powers."); 
Engstrom, supra note 3, at 1199 (" [F]oreclosure of federal regulation of states through 
Congress's otl1er enumerated powers has made the spending power a much more attractive 
source of federal authmity. "). Professor Zietlow goes further to suggest that the Court "virnially 
has invited Congress to use its Spending Power to circumvent Tenth Amendment limitations." 
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Insofar as Congress's spending pow·er is not subject to constitutional 
constraints, it threatens to swallow the state sovereignty protected by the 
Court's sovereignty decisions and could be used to emasculate the 
limitations on federal power established by the enumerated powers 
decisions.377 Indeed, to Professor Baker, the spending power "is, and has 
long been" the "greatest threat to state autonomy" of all Congress's 
powers.378 Vlhereas states may have substantial incentive to resist 
commandeering or regulatory intrusions into areas of traditional state 
concern, states may be more accepting of federal requirements 
accompanied by federal funds. 379 
There is no particular reason to believe that coercive use of conditional 
spending is any less justiciable than other intrusions upon federalist norms. 
As the Court noted in Lopez, "the federal balance is too essential a part of 
our constitutional structure and plays too vital a role in securing freedom for 
[judges] to admit inability to intervene when one or the other level of 
Government has tipped the scales too far."380 Much as it reiterated the need 
for constitutional limits while upholding broad assertions of the commerce 
power, the Court's most recent statement on tlt~ scope of the spending 
power, South Dakota v. Dole,381 upheld the use o('i::onditional spending to 
induce state cooperation while reiterating that the spending power, however 
broad, has some limit.382 If the Court revisits the scope of the Spending 
Rebecca E. Zietlow, Federalism's Paradox: The Spending Power and the Waiver of Sovereign Immunity, 
37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 141, 190-91 (2002). 
376. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Alannism vs. Moderation in Responding to the Rehnquist Cow1, 78 
IND. LJ. 47, 51-52 (2003). Other commentators suggest that such a strategy could backfire and 
encourage the Supreme Court to adopt a more restrictive conditional spencling nde. See 
gmwmlly Baker & Berman, supra note 375. 
377. Celestine Richards McConville, Federal Funding Conditions: BuT.Sting Through the Dole 
Loopholes, 4 CHAP. L. REv. 163, 164-65 (2001) ("[T]he current broad scope of the spending 
power undermines the Court's recent federalism decisions because it permits an end-run 
around the federalism limits imposed on other enumerated powers."). See generally Lynn A. 
Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1911 (1 995). 
378. Lynn A. Baker, The Spending Power and the Federalist Reviva~ 4 CHAP. L. REv. 195, 195 
(2001). Insofar as the "cooperative federalism" model and the use of conditional spending 
foster greater federal-state interdependency, it undermines the principle of federal-state 
independence that was central to the underl)~ng constitutional scheme. See generally Robert G. 
Natelson, A Reminder: The Constitutional Values of SJ'mpathy and Independence, 91 KY. LJ. 353 
(2003). 
379. Ilya Somin, Closing Pandora. 's Box of Federalism: The Case for judicial Rest>iction of Federal 
Subsidies to State Govemments, 90 GEO. LJ. 461, 484 (2002) ("vVhile state governments have 
strong political incentives to resist ordinary federal legislation that inhibits their authmity, they 
have incentives to accept and even lobby for conditional federal grants."). 
380. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 578 (1995) (Kennedy,]., concurring). 
381. 483 U.S. 203 (1987). 
382. See Earl lvl. Maltz, Sovereignty, Autonomy and Conditional Spending, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 107, 
108 (2001) ("[T]he Court clearly left open the possibility that it might look Jess favorably on 
other attempts to use the mechanism of conditional spending to induce state compliance "~tl1 
congressional "~shes."). 
436 90 IOWA L1 W REVIEW [2005] 
Clause, and delineates the federalism limitations on Congress's conditional 
spending power, the impacts on environmental law could be substantial. 
Much of federal environmental law is implemented and enforced by 
state governments in accordance with federal guidelines and restrictions. 
States are not commandeered to implement federal environmental 
regulatory programs. Rather, under the cooperative federalism model, 
Congress induces state cooperation by offering funding-and threatening 
. f . al 383 I h preemption-a state enVIronment programs. n some cases, owever, 
the spending power is not used so much to fund qualifying state 
environmental programs, as it is to threaten states with the loss of substantial 
federal assistance if states do not fall into line. Under the Clean Air Act, for 
example, states risk losing highway funds if they fail to adopt air pollution 
control plans that meet with Congress's and the Environmental Protection 
Agency's requirements. This is effective because highway moneys are an 
"irresistible lure to the states, even with substantial conditions attached. "384 
Yet as the federal government imposes increasingly stringent air 
pollution control requirements on states, it is increasingly likely that states 
will rebel. Two states challenged the use of conditional spending under the 
Clean Air Act in the 1990s. 385 In 1997, the EPA tightened federal air quality 
standards, triggering an additional round of air pollution controls by state 
and local governments, including many areas that were not previously 
required to adopt federally mandated measures. 386 The required controls 
will be· even more expensive, and controversial, than existing air pollution 
control measures. 387 According to EPA Administrator Michael Leavitt, 
Indeed, one could conclude that a majority of the current justices have already 
indicated their willingness to enforce limitations on the spending power to prevent Congress 
from "obliterat[ing] distinctions between national and local spheres of interest and power by 
permitting the Federal Government to set policy in the most sensitive areas of traditional state 
concern, areas which otherwise would lie outside its reach." Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of 
Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 654-55 (1999) (Kennedy, J., dissenting, joined by the Chief Justice and 
Justices Scalia and Thomas). Justice O'Connor, while not joining the passage above, clearly 
expressed her concerns about the use of conditional spending in her Dole dissent. Dole, 483 U.S. 
at 212-13 (O'Connor,]., dissenting). 
383. See infra Part I. 
384. Binder, supra note 54, at 160. 
385. See infra Part IV.B (discussing Spending Clause challenges to the Clean Air Act). 
386. Jennifer 8. Lee, Clear Skies No More for Millions as Pollution Rule Expands, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 13, 2004, at A22 (noting that "more than double" the number of counties fail to meet the 
revised National Ambient Air Quality Standards for ozone than failed to meet the previous 
standard). 
387. Several states resisted the imposition of some requirements for state implementation 
plans under the Clean Air Act in the 1990s, even though they had relatively little legal recourse. 
See, e.g., Lynn Scarlett, Smogged Down-California Residents' Complaints Against the State's Smog 
Check Procedures, REASON, Dec. 1996 (detailing California's objections to vehicle emission 
inspection and maintenance requirements), available at http:/ /reason.com/9612/col.lynn 
.shtml; EPA's Big Road Test, WALL ST. J., Apr. 6, 1995, at Al6 (noting some Clean Air Act 
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"There are counties that could take all their cars off the roads, close their 
fact01ies and clean up their power plants and still not be in attainment."388 
For this reason, litigation challenging the loss of highway funds would seem 
likely. 
The Clean Air Act sanction regime could be vulnerable even under 
existing spending power doctrine. Should the Court tighten enforcement of 
constitutional limits on conditional spending, perhaps along the lines 
suggested by some commentators, the impact on environmental law could 
be quite far-reaching. 389 A more rigorous conditional spending doctrine 
could both restrict existing environmental laws and limit Congress's ability 
to get around other federalism limitations on federal regulatory authority. 
A. THE SPENDING POWER 
Article I, section 8 of the Constitution empowers Congress to "lay and 
collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises to pay the Debts and provide for 
the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States."390 At the 
time of the founding, there was substantial debate as to the breadth of the 
power authorized by this clause. As with other enumerated powers, leading 
founders disagreed as to its precise scope. James Madison, for example, 
argued that the clause only empowered Congress '"to pursue those ends 
specifically identified in Article I. To Madison, the phrase "general welfare" 
did not license Congress to pursue any end it thought in the public 
interest. 391 The alternative interpretation would grant Congress a "general 
power of legislation, instead of the defined and limited· one hitherto 
understood to belong to them."392 Alexander Hamilton, on the other hand, 
contended that there were few, if any, substantive limitations on the 
spending power.393 The power to raise money was "plenary, and indefinite" 
and the range of purposes for which money could be spent "no less 
1 . " 1 . . " [ ] l d l L "394 compre 1ens1Ve, so ong as appropnatwns were g enem an not oca 
In Hamilton's view, the clause conferred an independent and distinct power 
requirements created a "flash point" between the EPA and some states); Texas joins States Fighting 
CAA, EPA Emission Testing Mandates, AIR WATER POLLUTION REP., Mar. 6, 1995. 
388. Lee, supra note 386. 
389. See infra notes 455-68 and accompan)~ng text. 
390. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8. 
391. John C. Eastman, Restoring the "General" to the General We/faTe Clause, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 63, 
67 (2001). 
392. 30ANNALSOFCONG.212 (1817). 
393. See ALEXANDER HAMILTON, REPORT ON MANUFACTURES (1791), nprinted in 2 THE 
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 446-47 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987). Hamilton 
acknowledged that the Constitution required that duties be uniform and direct taxes 
apportioned by population. Jd. at 446-47; see U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 2, amended by U.S. CONST. 
amend. XN, § 2. 
394. Hamilton, supra note 393, at 446. 
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not limited by the other affirmative grants of power enumerated in Article I, 
section 8.395 
There are reasons to suspect Madison's interpretation of the spending 
power was more representative of the miginal understanding of the 
clause. 396 Among other things, federal grants to the states are a modern 
development. There were few such programs ptior to the Progressive Era 
and the New Deal.397 Nonetheless, the Hamiltonian view is dominant 
today. 398 Since United States v. Butle?99 in 1936, the Supreme Court has 
explicitly embraced a Hamiltonian interpretation of the spending power as 
"the correct one. "400 According to the Butler Court, "[T] he power of 
Congress to authorize expenditure of public moneys for public purposes is 
not limited by the direct grants of legislative power found in the 
Constitution."401 Similarly, in Helvering v. Davis,402 the Court held that 
Congress has broad discretion to determine whether a given incident of 
taxation or spending is within the "general welfare."403 Madison's definition, 
h th h d . d . B l " l "40-1 on t eo er an , was rejecte In ut eras a mere tauto ogy. 
The spending power is not merely the power to approptiate federal 
money for federal purposes. As interpreted by the courts, it is also the power 
to induce private or state action by attaching conditions to the expenditure 
of federal money. As the Court noted in Fullilove v. Klutznick,.J05 the clause 
empowers Congress to impose conditions on the use of federal funds "to 
further broad policy objectives by conditioning receipt of federal moneys 
upon compliance by the recipient with federal statutory and administrative 
directives.''.J06 In ButleT, the Court struck down portions of the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act that imposed a tax on processors of agticultural 
commodities in order to subsidize reductions in farm production. The Court 
invalidated this use of the spending power because it sought "to regulate 
395. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936) (noting "Hamilton ... maintained 
that the clause confers a power separate and distinct from those later enumerated, [and] is not 
restricted in meaning by the grant of them"). 
396. See Eastman, supra note 391, at 64-87. See genera.l~y Robert G. Natelson, The General 
Welfa-re Clause and the Public Trust: An Essay in Original Understanding, 52 U. KAN. L. RE\'. I (2003). 
397. Somin, supra note 379, at 492. 
398. See David E. Engdahl, The Spending Power, 44 DUKE LJ. I, 5 (1994) (''No one today 
candidly denies that Hamilton's view of tl1e spending power was correct."). 
399. 297 u.s. 1 (1936). 
400. !d. at 66. The Court also rejected the view that the Spending Clause grants an 
independent power to pursue the "general welfare" apart from t<Lxing and spending. Id. at 65-
66. 
401. !d. at 66. 
402. 301 U.S. 619 (1937). 
403. I d. at 640-'11. 
404. Butler, 297 U.S. at 65. 
405. 448 u.s. 448 (1980). 
406. !d. at 474. 
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and control agricultural production, a matter beyond the powers delegated 
to the federal government."407 The spending power, while broad and far-
reaching, could not be used to regulate matters beyond Congress's regulato'IJ' 
authmity. Assuming this part of Butler's holding remains good law, it does 
not substantially limit congressional authmity insofar as the scope of 
Congress's regulatory powers under the Commerce Clause has expanded 
dramatically since the 1930s, Lopez and Mon-ison notwithstanding.408 At the 
very least, Congress may use the spending power to regulate or influence any 
activity that is within the scope of Congress's other enumerated powers. 
The spending power is unquestionably broad, but it is not unlimited. In 
1987, in South Dahota v. Dole,409 the Supreme Court identified five restraints 
upon Congress's use of conditional federal spending. First, the 
approp1iation of funds must be for the "general welfare" and not for a 
narrow special interest. 410 In making this determination, however, courts are 
"to defer substantially to the judgment of Congress. "411 Second, there can be 
no independent constitutional bar to the condition imposed upon the 
federal spending.412 In other words, Congress may not seek to use the 
spending power to induce states to engage in con<;Iuct that would otherwise 
be unconstitutional. Third, any conditions imposed upon the receipt of 
federal funds must be clear and unambiguous.413 Recipients of federal funds 
must have notice of any conditions with which they must comply and the 
scope of their obligation.414 As the Court noted in fennhurst, "[T] he 
legitimacy of Congress' power to legislate under the spending power ... 
rests on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the 
'contract. "'415 Fourth, and most significant, the conditions themselves must 
be related to the federal interest that the exercise of the spending power is 
itself supposed to advance. In the Court's words, "[T]he condition imposed 
by Congress is directly related to one of the main purposes for which .. . 
funds are expended."416 As reaffirmed in New Yorh, the "conditions must .. . 
407. Butler, 297 U.S. at 68. 
408. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203,216 (1987) (O'Connor,]., dissenting) ("The 
erro1· in Butler was not the Court's conclusion that the Act was essentially regulatory, but rather 
its crabbed \~ew of the extent of Congress' regulatory power under the Commerce Clause."). 
409. 483 U.S. 203 (1987). 




414. Engdahl, supra note 398, at 78 (noting that "sufficient clarity is required not only as to 
the fact that an obligation is being assumed, but also as to the scope or scale of that 
obligation"). 
415. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hasp. v. Haldennan, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981). The interpretive 
rule urged in Penn!mTSt is arguably in tension with Chevron deference for agency interpretations 
of ambiguous statutory language. See Engstrom, supra note 3, at 1209-16. 
416. Dole, 483 U.S. at 208. 
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bear some relationship to the purpose of the federal spending, ... 
otherwise, of course, the spending power could render academic the 
Constitution's other grants and limits of federal authority."417 
Dole also suggested a fifth limitation on the use of conditional 
spending-"coercion." Specifically, the Court noted that "in some 
circumstances the financial inducement offered by Congress might be so 
coercive as to pass the point at which 'pressure turns into compulsion. "'418 
This point has been reiterated in subsequent cases.419 While not explaining 
what amount or degree of financial inducement would be necessary for an 
exercise of the spending power to become coercive, the Dole majority noted 
that here Congress only conditioned "a relatively small percentage of certain 
federal highway funds" 420 -specifically five percent of the funds from 
specific highway grant programs. Such an imposition represents "relatively 
mild encouragement to the States," thereby leaving states with the ultimate 
decision as to whether to conform to federal dictates and is therefore not 
coercive.421 Alternatively, the coercion inquiry could turn not on the amount 
of money at stake, but on whether the manner in which the conditions were 
imposed "interferes with a state's sovereign accountability."422 
The Court has long recognized that "the Federal Government may 
establish and impose reasonable conditions relevant to federal interest in 
the project and to the over-all objectives thereof."m The problem occurs 
when Congress adopts "unreasonable" conditions. One could imagine a 
situation in which every payment from the federal government to states is 
conditioned upon acquiescence to every jot and tittle of every mandate 
contained in every federal statute. Well before the Supreme Court's 
reinvigoration of federalism principles, Professor Richard Stewart warned 
that "such a broad reading of congressional power would afford Congress a 
way to exercise the spending power where it is not spending, by drafting 
grant conditions that reach areas .in which the state has accepted no 
417. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992) (citations omitted). 
418. Dole, 483 U.S. at 211 (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937) ). 
419. See, e.g., Coli. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bel., 527 U.S. 666, 
687 (1999) (noting that, in some instances, "the financial inducement offered by Congress 
might be so coercive as to pass the point at which pressure turns into compulsion" (quoting 
Dole, 483 U.S. at 211) ); see also New York, 505 U.S. at 167 (noting the limits of federal spending 
power). 
420. Dole, 483 U.S. at 211. 
421. !d. 
422. McConville, supra note 377, at 173 ("Coercion implicates a state's ability to act as a 
representative of its people, not the state's level of temptation in choosing among 
alternatives."). 
423. Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 295 (1958). As the Court has 
noted more recently, "Congress has no obligation to use its Spending Clause power to disburse 
funds to the States; such funds are gifts." Coli. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 686---87. 
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funds."~24 If Congress is not limited in this manner, "the spending power 
could render academic the Constitution's other grants and limits of federal 
authority."425 At such an extreme, the spending power would eliminate the 
judicial safeguards of federalism embodied in the Court's federalism 
jurisprudence. 
Although the Dole Court clearly stated that Congress's power to impose 
conditions on the receipt of federal funds is limited, federal appellate courts 
have been extremely reluctant to strike down federal programs for 
exceeding the scope of the spending power.426 The "general welfare" prong 
is treated as a "complete throw away,"427 and most of the other prongs have 
49 8 
not fared much better. - Perhaps the relatedness prong of the Dole test has 
the greatest potential for constraining the use of conditional spending. It is 
repeatedly referenced by the lower courts, but rarely examined in any 
detail. 429 The concept of "coercive" uses of federal spending has attracted 
some attention as well, but "the coercion theory is somewhat amorphous 
and cannot easily be reduced to a neat set of black-letter rules of 
application."430 
The doctrinal limits on the spending power are admittedly unclear. Yet 
in their rush to dismiss Spending Clause claims, some federal courts have 
almost certainly gone too far. In Nevada v. Skinner, 431 for example, the Ninth 
Circuit held that Congress could make ninety-five percent of a state's 
highway funds conditional upon that state's setting of a fifty-five miles-per-
hour highway speed limit. According to Judge Reinhardt's opin.ion for the 
panel, the conditional grant of funds did not amount to "coercion" that 
would "leave the state with no practical alternative but to comply with 
federal restrictions."432 Key to the holding was the court's determination that 
"Congress has the authmity" under the Commerce Clause "to compel the 
424. Stewart, supm note 46, at 1261. 
425. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992). 
426. See Kansas v. United States, 214 F.3d 1196, 1201-02 (lOth Cir. 2000) ("The Court has 
never employed the [coercion] theory to invalidate a funding condition, and federal courts 
have been similarly reluctant to use it."); Nevada v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 445, 448 (9th Cir. 1989) 
('The coercion theory has been much discussed but infrequently applied in federal case law, 
and never in favor oftl1e challenging party."). 
427. Baker & Berman, supra note 375, at 464. 
428. !d. ("[T]he lower courts, quite predictably, have found little use for three of the five 
elements of the test."); id. at 466 (noting that the other two elements have not fared much 
better, as most lower courts have read them "to be toothless, even nonjusticiable, en route to 
sustaining a "~de range of conditional federal spending legislation"). 
429. I d. at 466-67. But see Barbour v. Wash. Metro. Area Trans. Auth., 374 F. 3d 1161, 1168-
69 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (discussing the relatedness prong); infra notes 446-54 and accompanying 
text (same). 
430. West Virginia v. United States Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 289 F.3d 281, 288 (4th 
Cir. 2002). 
431. 884 F.2d 445 (9tl1 Cir. 1989). 
432. !d. at 448. 
442 90 IOWA LAW REVIEW [2005] 
States through direct regulation to change its practices."433 As Skinner was 
decided in 1989, years prior to New York and Printz, this may have been a 
reasonable conclusion for the court to draw at the time.434 In the wake of the 
anti-commandeering decisions, however, this rationale is unsustainable. 
There is little doubt that Congress could directly impose a fifty-five mile-
per-hour speed limit on federal highways under the Commerce Clause. Such 
a law would require federal enforcement, however. This makes such a law 
unlikely, as Congress would only enact such a law if it concluded that the 
benefits of a uniform federal speed limit were greater than the costs of 
creating a federal highway patrol or otherwise diverting federal law 
enforcement resources to policing the nation's highways. The Skinner court, 
however, found that Congress could compel the states to impose a federal 
speed limit to be enforced by state officials.435 Unlike a true federal speed 
limit, such a law would lie beyond the scope of federal power. Under New 
York and Printz, Congress has power neither to compel a state legislature to 
adopt such a rule nor to commandeer state law enforcement officials to 
implement the federal rule. Insofar as Skinner stands for the proposition that 
there is no coercion if Congress is using conditional spending to encourage 
tl1e adoption and enforcement of state laws that Congress could impose on 
the states directly, it can no longer be good law after New York and Printz. 
Not every federal appellate court has dismissed arguments for limiting 
the scope of Congress's spending power. In 1997, an en bane panel of the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held, in Virginia Depmtment of 
Education v. Riley, that the Department of Education could not condition 
state receipt oL federal funds under the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act ("IDEA") on compliance with terms not explicit in the statute 
itself.435 The Department of Education had sought to withhold all of 
Virginia's IDEA grants for two fiscal years-some $60 million-because 
Virginia did not provide free education to disabled students who were 
expelled or suspended for behavior unrelated to their disabilities. 437 
According to tl1e Department, this policy contravened the statutory 
requirement that state recipients of IDEA funds must, among other things, 
"assure[] all children with disabilities the right to a free appropriate public 
education. "438 
The en bane Fourth Circuit rejected, by a vote of 11-2, the Department's 
position on the ground that the language of the IDEA did not clearly 
433. Id. at 449. 
434. But see note 296 and cases cited therein. 
435. Skinner, 884 F.2d at 449 (stating that "if Congress has the authority under the 
Commerce Clause to order a state directZv to comply with a particular standard such as a 55-mile-
per-hour speed law," Congress may condition the receipt of federal funds on such a condition). 
436. 106 F.3d 559,579 (4th Cir. 1997) (en bane). 
437. Id. at 560. 
438. 20 u.s.c. § 1412(1) (2000). 
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manifest Congress's intention to prohibit a state recipient from adopting the 
policy at issue. According to the court's majority,439 "Language which, at 
best, only implicitly conditions the receipt of federal funding on the 
fulfillment of certain conditions is insufficient to impose on the state the 
condition sought."440 Since, "at most," the IDEA "only implicitly conditions 
the States' receipt of funds upon the continued provision of educational 
senices to students expelled for misconduct unrelated to their handicaps," 
the condition could not be imposed on an unconsenting state.441 Particularly 
in an area of traditional state concern, such as education, courts must insist 
on "a clear, unambiguous statutory expression of congressional intent to 
condition the States' receipt of federal funds in a particular manner. "442 
While the en bane court rested its decision on Congress's failure to 
impose an unambiguous condition on the receipt ofiDEA money, six judges 
went further, noting a "substantial ... question" whether the Department's 
policy would have constituted unconstitutional "coercion" under Dole even if 
explicitly authorized by Congress.443 For the federal government to witl1hold 
$60 million in IDEA funds because of Virginia',~. failure to provide a free 
education to 126 of the 128,000 handicapped sthdents for whose benefit 
Virginia was to receive IDEA funds would be "considerably more pernicious 
tl1an the 'relatively mild encouragement' at issue in Dole."444 Whereas in Dole 
states only risked losing a small portion of federal fun,ding for failing to 
adopt a higher drinking age, in Riley the Department sought to witl1hold 
"the entirety of a substantial federal grant" because Virginia refused "to 
fulfill their federal obligation in some insubstantial respect rather tl1an 
submit to the policy dictates of Washington in a matter peculiarly within 
their powers as sovereign states."445 Six judges suggested that if anything 
could be considered unduly coercive under Dole, the Department's policy at 
issue in Riley would be it. To date, however, no federal appellate court has so 
held. 
439. It is worth noting that while eleven judges concurred in the judgment, only nine 
explicitly adopted the rationale articulated by Judge Luttig. AI; one commentator noted, "Riley 
was a messy affair." Engstrom, supra note 3, at 1213. 
440. Riley, 106 F.3d at 561 (per curiam). 
441. I d. at 563 (opinion ofLuttig,J.). 
442. ld. at 566 (opinion of Luttig, ].). Like the Supreme Court in Solid Waste Agency, the 
Riley majority explicitly rejected the government's contention that the Department's position 
was due Chevmn deference. Id. at 567 ("It is <Ddomatic that statutory ambiguity defeats 
altogether a claim by the Federal Government that Congress has unambiguously conditioned 
the States' receipt of federal monies in the manner asserted."); see also supra note 267. For a 
broader discussion of the Riley court's rejection of Chevron deference in the spending clause 
context, see Engstrom, supra note 3, at 1212-16. 
443. Riley, 106 F.3d at 561. 
444. Id. at 569 (opinion ofLuttig,J.). 
445. Jd. at 570 (opinion ofLuttig,J.). 
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The scope of the relatedness inquiry has also recently divided a federal 
appellate court. In Barbour v. Washington lvietropolitan Area Transit Authority,H5 
a divided panel of the D.C. Circuit found that Congress could condition a 
state transit agency's receipt of federal funds on the waiver of sovereign 
immunity under tl1e Rehabilitation Act, a federal statute that prohibits 
disability discrimination. The panel majority joined several other circuits447 
in finding that Congress could impose such a condition to ensure that 
federal funds were not "used to facilitate disability discrimination" and to 
ensure "that federal money is used for the provision of public 
transportation, and nothing else."448 Just as Congress has authmity, pursuant 
to the Necessary and Proper Clause, "to see to it that taxpayer dollars 
appropriated under [the spending] power are in fact spent for the general 
welfare and not frittered away in graft," as the Supreme Court recently held 
in United States v. Sabri,449 the maj01ity in Barbour reasoned that Congress 
could ensure tl1at federal monies do not subsidize disability 
discrimination. -150 
Judge Sentelle, in his dissent, denied that the conditions at issue m 
Barbour complied with Dole.451 While preventing discrimination may be a 
valid federal interest, it is not the purpose of federal support for state transit 
agencies."t5~ Congress can impose conditions to prevent the likelihood of 
corruption because such cmTUption could prevent the expenditure of 
federal funds for the congressionally determined purpose. Money "frittered 
away in graft" is not available to fund mass transit. Yet whether or not transit 
agencies discriminate against the disabled has no bearing on the availability 
of funds for mass transit services.453 According to the dissent, "tl1e proper 
test under Dole and New York is whether the condition is germane to the 
interest in the 'particular national project[] or program[]," not whether 
Congress has a generalized 'interest' in imposing the condition."454 This 
division in the D.C. Circuit highlights the tension between the Supreme 
446. 374 F.3cl. 1161 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
447. SeeNieves-Marquez v. Puerto Rico, 353 F.3d 108, 128 (1st Cir. 2003); A.W. v.Jersey City 
Pub. Sch., 341 F.3cl 234, 239 (3d Cir. 2003); Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3cl 1039, 1051 (9th Cir. 
2002). 
448. Barbour, 374 F.3d at 1168. 
449. 124 S.Ct. 1941, 1946 (2004). 
450. Barbow; 374 F.3d at 1169-70. 
451. The dissent also rejected the argument that Congress could impose such conditions 
under section 5 of the 14th Amendment. !d. at 1170-77 (Sentelle,J., dissenting). 
452. Id. at 1172 ("The purpose of the federal funds wrviATA receives is to subsidize the 
mass-transit services WMATA provides. They are transportation funds."). 
453. Id. (rejecting the argument that "the legislature can identifY something a state does 
that it does not like-in the case, discriminate on the basis of disability-and condition any 
grant of funds on a state's not doing that act any more, assuming the condition is otherwise 
constitutionally valid"). 
454. I d. at 1173 (quoting South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987)). 
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Court's federalism holdings and an unconstrained power to impose 
conditions on federal grants. It additionally illustrates that a broad spending 
power could nonetheless be subject to significant, judicially enforceable 
limits. 
Commentators have noted several ways in which the Supreme Court 
could police the limits of the spending power. For starters, the Court could 
simply apply the existing elements of the Dole test with more 1igor.455 For 
instance, the relatedness prong could be read to require that the federal 
spending and the imposed condition both directly advance the same 
interest.456 The conditional spending in Dole might pass this test depending 
on how directly the interest must be advanced. One could argue that federal 
highway funding and a reduced drinking age botl1 improve highway 
safety.457 Other conditions, however, such as that a state adopt regulations 
for coal-fired power plants as a condition of receiving federal highway 
money, would not. The Court could also define precisely what it means for 
the federal government to "coerce" state action through conditional 
spending. 458 Through eiilier approach, the Gpurt "could maintain at least 
nominal fidelity to the Dole test," even as it applied the test in a manner 
suggesting the precise outcome in Dole was incorrect. 459 
Professor Baker proposes that those conditions on the receipt of federal 
funds tl1at seek to regulate tl1e states in a manner in which the federal 
government could not directly regulate state activity should be presumed 
invalid. 460 The federal government could overcome this presumption only 
by demonstrating that tl1e funding constitutes "reimbursement spending," as 
opposed to "regulatory spending."461 Under Professor Baker's formulation, 
the federal government may specify how a given state is to spend federal 
grants and may condition receipt of the federal money on meeting such 
conditions, so long as the money to which tl1e conditions are attached is 
only that money which is to be used to implement the program in 
question.462 Such "reimbursement spending" is permissible under Professor 
Baker's test. Spending conditions which otl1erwise seek to regulate the states 
455. Baker & Berman, supra note 375, at 512. 
456. I d. at 517. 
457. But see id. at 516 (noting that such a test "dictates a different result on the very facts of 
Dole"). 
458. ld. at 520-21. 
459. I d. at 521. 
460. See generally Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending after Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 
1911(1985). 
461. Jd. at 1962-63. 
462. ld. 
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in a manner otherwise beyond the scope of Congress's powers would be 
. . 'bl 463 ImpermiSSI e. 
Professor Berman proposes an alternative test, focusing on the 
"coercion" element of the Dole test. Specifically, Professor Berman proposes 
that a conditional offer of federal funds should be deemed unconstitutional 
if withholding some or all of the federal funds at issue would be 
unconstitutional.464 Whereas Congress may opt, in isolation, to provide states 
with federal funds or not, Professor Berman suggests that Congress cannot 
withhold money from the states for an impermissible or "improper" reason 
if doing so would effectively penalize a state for failing to concede its 
sovereign authority to set a given policy.465 Where the withholding of federal 
funds can be justified on the grounds that it serves a legitimate federal 
purpose, perhaps that withholding the funds in itself will advance the 
purpose of the federal program, the state is not being penalized, and the 
condition may be imposed.466 In effect, Berman hinges the coercion inquiry 
on the congressional purpose behind withholding the federal funds and not 
on the magnitude of the funds at issue or the "pressure" that the funding 
condition appears to impose on the states. 
Either of the tests put forward by Professors Baker and Berman would 
be more restrictive than the Dole test, particularly as it is currently applied in 
the lower courts. So, too, would proposals to reinvigorate the "general 
welfare" requirement so as to limit the sorts of projects for which Congress 
could appropriate funds, 467 or to otherwise limit federal grants to states 
across the board. 468 If the Court is less aggressive in its initial efforts to reign 
in the spending power, as seems most likely, it would simply tighten the test 
articulated in Dole, much as in Lopez it tightened the limitations on the 
commerce power within the framework laid out in prior cases. While 
simultaneously upholding ever-broader assertions of federal authority under 
tl1e Commerce Clause; the Court nonetheless reiterated that the power was 
limited, providing the doctrinal hook for the Court to use in Lopez. 469 The 
limiting language in Dole could well be used to tl1e same effect, and this may 
463. But see Call. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 
687 (1999) ("Congress may, in the exercise of its spending power, condition its grant of funds 
to the States upon their taking certain actions that Congress could not require them to 
take ... ."). 
464. See generally Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion Without Baselines: Unconstitutional Conditions in 
Three Dimensions, 90 CEO. LJ. l (200 1). 
465. Id. at 37. 
466. Id. 
467. See John C. Eastman, Restoring the "General" to the General Welfare Clause, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 
63, 64-65 (2001). 
468. See generalfy Somin, supra note 379. 
469. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. l, 30 (1937) ("That distinction 
between what is national and what is local in the activities of commerce is vital to the 
maintenance of our federal system."). 
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well yet occur as the Court's federalism cases would suggest that some 
tightening of the Congress's conditional spending power is in order. 
Left unrestrained, Congress may use the conditional grant of federal 
funds to achieve those ends that would otherwise be barred by the holdings 
of New York, Lopez, and Printz. States receive federal grants for welfare, 
environmental programs, highways, police, and many other purposes, and 
are therefore quite reliant upon the national fisc. A federal 
recommendation that states implement a desired program or risk losing 
federal support could be quite coercive. Thus, the ultimate import of the 
Court's recent federalism cases may depend upon whether it opts to limit 
Congress's ability to use conditional spending to bribe and compel state 
actions. 
B. CONDITIONAL SPENDING IN ENviRONMENTAL LAW 
Among all federal environmental statutes, the Clean Air Act ("CAA") is 
the source of the greatest state-federal conflict. 470 It also represents 
Congress's most aggressive effort to induce state regulation through the use 
of conditional spending and is therefore the ~ost vulnerable to spending 
power challenge. V\Thereas many federal envi:i-onmental statutes attach 
conditions on the use of federal funding of state environmental programs, 
the CAA relies upon the threat of withholding federal highway funds to 
ensure state cooperation. _, 
Under the CAA, the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") sets 
National Ambient Air Quality Standards ("NAAQS") for criteria air 
pollutants, such as ozone ("smog") and particulate matter ("soot"). States 
with metropolitan areas that fail to attain NAAQS are required to draft State 
Implementation Plans ("SIPs"), which they submit to the EPA for its 
approval. Among other things, an adequate SIP must include "enforceable 
emission limitations . . . as well as schedules and timetables for 
l. ,471 . . 472 c b d . . fi comp 1ance, mon1tonng systems, a 1ee- ase perrmttmg system ·or 
. 473 c 474 d . d c ffi . statiOnary sources, an eniorcement program, an proVI e 10r su 1oent 
public participation in the SIP process.475 The 1990 Clean Air Act 
amendments added additional requirements for state-permitting programs 
c . 
476 Th SIP . th "h " f h CAA 477 10r statwnary sources. e process IS e eart o t e . 
470. See generally Dwyer, supm note 36. 
471. 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (a) (2) (A) (2000). 
472. I d. § 7410 (a) (2) (B). 
473. I d.§ 7410 (a) (2) (L). 
474. I d. § 7410 (a) (2) (C) (a) (2), (E). 
475. States must provide "reasonable notice" and public hearings on SIPs and consult with 
affected local entities. Id. § 7410 (a) (2), (a) (2) (M). 
476. 42 U.S.C. § 7651o. 
477. Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 249 (1976). 
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Failure to submit a fully adequate SIP by the appropriate deadlines 
results in the imposition of one or more federal sanctions, including the loss 
of federal highway funds, increased offset requirements fOt- new 
development, and the imposition of a Federal Implementation Plan ("FIP") 
that the EPA will enforce.478 The imposition of such sanctions is not solely, 
or even primarily, within the EPA's discretion, as individual citizens and 
activist groups may force the EPA's hands through citizen suits seeking to 
enforce the express requirements of the CAA and regulations promulgated 
pursuant to it.479 Thus, short of legislation, states have little political ability to 
seek compromise over the CAA's enforcement.480 Moreover, local 
transportation projects cannot receive federal funding unless they confonn 
d 481 to an EPA-approve SIP. 
In 1995, two states, Missouri and Virginia, challenged the imposition of 
sanctions under the CAA.482 Each alleged that the EPA's decision, if not the 
statutory provisions authorizing sanctions themselves, were unconstitutional 
infringements upon state sovereignty. According to the states, the CAA 
impermissibly authOtized the EPA to impose severe sanctions upon those 
states failing to comply with the EPA's interpretation of the Act.-183 Both 
claimed that the highway fund sanction was an unconstitutional use of the 
federal spending power. Neither state was successful. 
According to the Fourth Circuit, the CAA's provisions passed 
constitutional muster "because although its sanctions provisions potentially 
burden the states, those sanctions amount to inducement rather than 
'outright coercion. ,,-18-1 The district court in Missouri reached a similar 
conclusion, relying upon dicta in New York that "conditions [on receipt of 
federal funds] must ... bear some relationship to the purpose of federal 
spending. ,-1ss For the Missouri court, "the appropriate focus is not on the 
alleged impact of a statute on a particular state program but whether 
Congress has 'directly compel[led]' the state 'to enact a federal regulatory 
program. ,,-186 ·while the Missouri court only addressed the question of 
478. 42 u.s.c. § 7509. 
479. Id. § 7604. 
480. See MichaelS. Greve, Friends of the Emth, Foes of Federalism, 12 DUKE EN\I"fL. L. & POL'Y F. 
167,176 (2001). 
481. 42 u.s.c. § 7506. 
482. Virginia v. Browner, 80 F.3d 869, 873 (4th Cir. 1996); Missouri v. United States, 918 F. 
Supp. 1320, 1323-25 (E.D. Mo. 1996), vacated, 109 F.3d 440 (8th Cir. 1997). 
483. Virginia also argued that the EPA was wrong to conclude that its stationary source 
penn it program failed to comply with Title V of the Clean Air Act. B-rowner, 80 F.3d at 872. 
484. I d. at 881. 
485. Missouri, 918 F. Supp. at 1333 (citing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 
( 1992)) (emphasis in Missouri opinion). 
486. Id. at 1328 {quoting New York, 505 U.S. at 161). 
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whether such sanctions were unconstitutional on their face, it implied that 
an as-applied challenge would not fare any better.487 
Both courts based their decisions on Dole.488 This reliance may be 
misplaced, however. It is not clear that threatening federal highway moneys 
falls squarely 1¥ithin Dol.e's holding.489 Highway funds are raised from a 
dedicated revenue source in gasoline taxes and placed in the Highway Trust 
Fund. 49° For many states, federal highway funds represent the lion's share of 
their transportation budget.491 These moneys are explicitly earmarked for 
transportation projects.492 Conditioning the receipt of such funds on 
compliance 1'Vith myliad federal environmental requirements seems to strain 
the Dole test, particularly when viewed against tl1e background of the Court's 
broader federalism jurisprudence. 
Federal highway legislation suggests many reasons why federal funding 
of highway construction supports the "general welfare," but environmental 
protection is not one of tl1em. On the other hand, both the highway 
legislation and the dlinking age increase at issue .. in Dole were explicitly 
enacted to improve highway safety. 493 The connection between tl1e CAA's 
purpose and transportation is also ambiguous, as states can lose their 
highway funding for failing to meet any of the CAA's myliad SIP 
requirements.494 Nothing in tl1e CAA requires any connecti_on to highways, 
mobile sources, or even the specific pollutants most associated I'Vitl1 
vehicular traffic. Failure to adopt a sufficiently rigorous stationary source 
permit scheme, sufficiently stringent emission regulations on dry cleaners, 
bakeries and other "area" sources, or even failure to provide adequate 
487. Id. at 1329. Missomi had sought to challenge the provisions on both grounds, but the 
District Court detennined that an as-applied claim was not yet ripe. Id. 
488. Browner, 80 F.3d at 881-82; Missowi, 918 F. Supp. at 1330, 1332-34. 
489. However, it is certain that they would fall outside the test articulated by Justice 
O'Connor in her dissent. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 216 (1987) (O'Connor, J., 
dissenting). 
490. For a brief overview of the history and financing of the Highway Trust Fund, see 
Salvatore Massa, Surface Freight Transp01tation: Accounting for Subsidies in a "Fl-ee Marhet ", 4 N .Y.U. 
J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL\' 285, 318-19 {2000-2001). 
491. Binder, supra note 54, at 160 (noting that federal funding can account for ninety-five 
percent of a state's transportation budget). 
492. Massa, supm note 490, at 318. Some argue that the "trust fund" system within the 
federal budget is simply an accounting gimmick and that there is not, in fact, a separate "fund" 
of highway monies. See, e.g., Thomas G. Donlan, Selling America Short, BARRON'S, Aug. 10, 1998, 
at 34 (suggesting federal "trust funds" are "budgetary gimmicks"). vVhether this is true when the 
issue is deficit reduction, a strong argument can be made that the federal government has a 
moral, if not legal, obligation to expend money from the trust fund for road purposes and 
nothing else, as this is the express basis upon which the relevant monies are raised. 
493. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 208-09. v\lhether improving highway safety by, respectively, 
imprm~ng road construction or reducing drunk dri\~ng was the actual motivating purpose 
behind either of these enactments is another matter. 
494. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(k) (2000) (stating that an SIP is inadequate if an EPA Administrator 
finds, inte-r alia, SIP fails to comply "with any requirement of this chapter" (emphasis added)). 
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citizen suit access to state courts can provide the basis for rejecting an SIP 
and imposing sanctions.495 
Congress has sought to connect highway constmction to environmental 
protection, but it has still stopped short of claiming highway constmction 
serves the purpose of environmental protection. The Federal-Aid Highway Act 
of 1970 instructed the Secretary of Transportation to ensure that federal 
highway programs were "consistent with any approved plan for the 
implementation of any ambient air quality standard for any air quality 
control region designated pursuant to the Clean Air Act."496 Similarly, in 
1991 Congress sought to create an environmentally sound interstate highway 
system with the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 
("ISTEA").497 In 1998, Congress reauthorized ISTEA with the Transportation 
Equity Act for the 21" Century ("TEA-21"),498 again reiterating its intent to 
"minimize transportation-related fuel consumption and air pollution."499 
While Congress repeatedly noted the potential environmental impacts 
of highway construction, none of these statutes establishes that a pu·rpose of 
the federal highway programs is environmental protection. Yet it is the 
purpose of federal funding that controls whether a given condition is 
sufficiently related for purposes of Dole.500 These statutory provisions provide 
an indication of the sort of highways Congress sought to fund; they do not 
establish environmental protection as a purpose of highway funding. In 
contrast, the federal statute calling upon states to raise the drinking age 
echoed the explicit purposes of tl1e federal highway programs-safe 
h . h 501 tg ways. 
The conditions on receipt of federal highway funds imposed by the 
CAA are more expansive than the conditions upheld in either Sabri or 
Barbour. In Sabri, the Court based its holding on the conclusion that 
Congress could impose conditions on the receipt of federal money that 
would prevent the'ftmds from being diverted to other purposes.502 Requiring 
states to adopt various pollution control measures, however, does not 
prevent the diversion of highway monies to other purposes. In Barbour, the 
D.C. Circuit joined other circuits in holding that Congress could prevent the 
use of federal funds for injurious purposes. 503 This reasoning supports 
495. !d. 
496. Pub. L. No. 91-605, 84 Stat. 1713 (codified as amended at 23 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) ). 
497. Pub. L. No. 102-240, 105 Stat. 1914 (codified as amended at 23 U.S.C. § 103). 
498. Pub. L. No. 105-178, 112 Stat. 107 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
23 U.S.C.). 
499. 49 U.S.C. § 5301 (a) (2000). 
500. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987). 
501. See id. at 208-09. 
502. Sabri v. United States, 124 S. Ct. 1941, 1947 (2004) ("Congress was within its 
prerogative to protect spending objects from the menace of local administrators on the take."). 
503. Barbour v. Wash. Metro. Area TransitAuth., 374 F.3cl1161, 1170 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
JUDICIAL FEDERAliSM AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 451 
imposing conditions on the receipt of highway funds under the CAA to 
prevent the use of highway funds on projects that could increase air pollution. 
Yet, as noted above, the relevant provisions of the CAA are far more 
expansive. Not only must states refrain from spending federal money on 
projects that could increase air pollution, they must also comply with 
numerous conditions that have absolutely nothing to do with transportation, 
let alone those projects and programs funded with federal highway monies. 
Another important distinction is the severity of the financial penalty to 
which states would be subjected for failing to abide by congressional 
dictates. Dole involved a modest loss of highway funds, only five percent. Yet 
under the CAA, virtually all highway funds are at risk, with only minor 
exceptions for special purposes.504 In this respect, the CAA creates a 
situation more like SkinneT or Riley than Dole. Thus, even if the CAA's 
sanctions are not facially suspect, the imposition of sanctions could 
nonetheless cross the line from inducement to coercion if enough unrelated 
funds were at stake.505 
Finally, there is some reason to question whether the imposition of 
sanctions under the CAA satisfies the notice profig of the Dole test. ·while the 
CAA itself outlines broad requirements for state implementation plans, 
many of the details are left to the regulatory process. The text of the CAA 
may place a given state on notice that a given air quality determination will 
require the adoption of an "enhanced" vehicle inspection and maintenance 
program, but the precise contours and costs of such a program are left to 
the EPA.506 Whether a given metropolitan area must adopt pollution control 
measures at all is, in part, a function of subsequent agency decisions. Under 
the CAA, the EPA is authorized-indeed, required-to reconsider the 
national ambient air quality standards periodically.507 In recent years, tl1e 
EPA has tightened air quality standards, thereby requiring states to adopt 
more stringent air pollution control measures tl1an they may have 
anticipated.508 At the same time, the EPA has adjusted SIP requirements 
504. 42 U.S.C. § 7509 (b) (l) (2000). The EPA may not cut off highway funds for projects 
necessary to "resolve a demonstrated safety problem," mass transit, car pooling programs, 
construction of high-occupancy vehicle ("HOV") lanes, "programs to limit or restrict vehicle 
use in downtown areas," and other programs that will "improve air quality and would not 
encourage single occupancy vehicle capacity." I d.§ 7509 (b) (l) (A), (B) (vi), (B) (vii). 
505. According to Stewart, "Such a condition, accompanying funds which the state cannot 
afford to forgo, intensifies federal interference with local mechanisms of political accountability 
by compelling states to enforce against their constituencies restrictions that the constituencies 
oppose." Stewart, supra note 46, at 1255. 
506. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 75lla(a) (2) (B), (b) (4), (c) (3); 40 C.F.R. pt. 51, subt. S (2004). 
507. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a), (d). 
508. See, e.g., National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter, 62 Fed. Reg. 
38,652 (July 18, 1997) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 50); National Ambient Air Quality 
Standards for Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. 38,861 (July 18, 1997) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 50). See 
generally Am. Tmcking Ass'ns v. EPA, 283 F.3d 355 (D.C. Cir. 2002), modifying 175 F.3d 1027 
(D.C. Cir. 1999) (reviewing the constitutionality of the tightened standards). 
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midstream to account for changes in atmospheric modeling or revised 
estimates of upwind state contributions to downwind state pollution 
problems. In combination, this level of fluidity in SIP requirements, and 
therefore the conditions imposed on the receipt of state highway funds, 
could make the highway fund sanction particularly suspect under Dole. 
The Second Circuit concluded that "Pennhurst cannot be read as 
broadly prohibiting amendments which add retroactive conditions to 
funding statutes: at most, Pennhurst simply requires a clear indication of 
congressional intent to impose such conditions."509 Yet subsequent changes 
made by Congress may be substantively different than such changes made by a 
regulatory agency. Particularly, if it is assumed that the states are protected 
by the "political safeguards of federalism" in the legislative process510-at 
least as concerns the imposition of conditions on the receipt of federal 
funds-it would follow that unambiguous statutory amendments to existing 
conditions would be more acceptable than the imposition of new conditions 
-n 
through the regulatory process." 
If the CAA sanction regime is potentially suspect under Dole, it would be 
even more so under the va1ious alternative tests for conditional spending 
proposed by some commentators, such as Professors Baker and Berman. 
Conditional spending under other federal environmental statutes would be 
far less vulnerable, however. At the present time, most other federal 
environmental statutes impose conditions on the use of funds for specific 
programs. Thus, the Clean Water Act and Safe Drinking Water Act provide 
funds for state water quality and drinking water programs, respectively, that 
are to be used in support of related programs that meet specific federal 
requirements.512 This sort. of "reimbursement" spending does not raise the 
same constitutional questions as does the use of other monies to induce 
cooperation in an environmental program. 
V. jUDICIAL FEDERALISM AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
The conventional wisdom holds that constricting federal regulatory 
authority necessarily sacrifices environmental protection. According to some 
environmental groups, the revival of federalism represents a "grave 
509. Counsel v. Dow, 849 F.2d 731, 735-36 (2d Cir. 1988). 
510. Nevada v. Skinner, 884 F.2d. 445, 452 (9th Cir. 1989). 
511. Professor Somin notes, however, that the political safeguards argument is actually at its 
weakest in the comext of spending power, for whereas state govemments will often have strong 
incentive to resist the assertion of federal power in areas traditionally left to state control, state 
govemments "have incentives to accept and even lobby for conditional federal grants." Somin, 
sufJm note 379, at 484. For this reason, Somin argues that "there is a greater need for judicial 
intervention" in the Spending Clause comext. !d. 
512. See33 U.S.C. § 1252 (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 300j-2. 
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challenge" that is "threatening the very core of environmental law."513 
Recent Commerce Clause decisions, for example, could provide "the 
groundwork for pulling the rug out from under federal environmental 
protections."514 This presumption is dominant both in the environmental 
literature and in the language of judicial opinions. Dissenting in Solid Waste 
Agenc:v, Justice Stevens suggested that the impact of the Court's opinion 
could well be a return to burning rivers, excessive water pollution and "the 
destruction of the aquatic environment."515 Though widespread, this view 
overstates the environmental impact of judicially enforced limits on federal 
regulatory authority. 
Judicial reluctance to enforce federalism limits on federal 
environmental regulation may well stem, at least in part, from concerns that 
such limits could hamper environmental protection. In Gibbs v. Babbitt, for 
example, Judge Wilkinson suggests that to st1ike down the ESA take 
prohibition on Commerce Clause grounds would necessarily limit federal 
species protection efforts "to only federaJ lands"516 and would "call into 
question the historic power of the federal government to preserve scarce 
resources in one locality for the future benefit ofall Ame1ica."517 If extended 
to other statutes, Judge Wilkinson wrote, the holding would leave "many 
environmental harms to be dealt with through state tort Jaw."518 Such 
concerns are misplaced, and their premises are largely unfounded. The 
federal government's inability to prohibit the take of enaangered species, at 
least without the inclusion of a jurisdictional requirement to ensure that the 
given instance was sufficiently tied to commerce, would not affect the federal 
government's ability to protect endangered species via the spending power 
through direct subsidization of conservation efforts, funding of state 
regulatory programs, and support for programs to increase the awareness of 
biodiversity concerns and their importance.519 Limiting the use of, or even 
513. SHARON BUCCINO ET AL., NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, HOSTILE EN\'lRONMENT: HOW 
ACTMST JUDGES THREATEN OUR AlR, WATER, AND LAND-AN EN\'lRONMENTAL REPORT ON 
JUDICIAL SELECTION v (2001); see also supra notes 4---8 and accompanying text. 
514. BUCCINO ET AL., supra note 513, at 4. 
515. Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 175 (2001) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (accusing the majority opinion of "needlessly weaken[ing] our 
principal safeguard against toxic water"). 
It is worth noting that while both the Environmental Law Institute and Justice 
Stevens's Solid Waster Agency dissent make reference to the 1969 Cuyahoga River fire as evidence 
that water quality was in decline prior to the adoption of federal regulation, by the time of the 
1969 fire, water quality on most major watenvays was improved during the 1960s with respect to 
some key indices. See infra note 589 and accompanying text. 
516. Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 504 (4th Cir. 2000). 
517. ld. at 492. 
518. I d. at 502. 
519. It is worth noting that none of these measures implicate the limits on Congress's 
ability to adopt conditional spending programs discussed supra Part IV. 
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eliminating, some tools in Congress's environmental policy toolbox is hardly 
tantamount to proscribing all federal environmental protection. 
As discussed above,520 the application of Commerce Clause restrictions 
to other environmental statutes would not result in the same curtailment of 
federal regulatory authority insofar as such statutes, like the Surface Mining 
Control and Reclamation Act521 or Clean Air Act,522 target economic activity. 
Yet even if the Court's federalism doctrines were to disembowel much of the 
existing federal regulatory structure, it is simply not true that this would 
leave "many environmental harms to be dealt with by state tort law."523 The 
federal government is hardly the nation's sole environmental regulator. To 
the contrary, most environmental monitoring and enforcement occur at the 
state and local level,524 and there is no a priori reason to assume that states 
would be unable or unwilling to increase their environmental efforts were 
federal regulation not already in place.525 Judge Wilkinson's concern is even 
more misplaced because those environmental concerns most likely to be 
520. See supra Part IIIA. 
521. Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 277-81 (1981). 
522. United States v. Ho, 311 F.3d 589, 598 (5th Cir. 2002). 
523. It is worth noting, however, that there is growing environmental literature suggesting 
that greater reliance on state tort law, or at least upon tort law principles, would improve 
environmental protection. See generally THE COMMON LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT: RETHINKING 
THE STATUTORY BASIS FOR MODERN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (Roger E. Meiners & Andrew P. 
Morris eds., 2000); BRUCE YANDLE, COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW FOR THE ENVIRONMENT 
(1997); Keith N': Hylton, vVhen Should We Prefer Tort Law to Environmental Regulation?, 41 
WASHBURN LJ. 515 (2002); Roger Meiners & Bruce Yandle, Common Law and the Conceit of 
Modern Envimnmental Policy, 7 CEO. !VIASON L. REV. 923 ( 1999); Roger Meiners & Bruce Yandle, 
Common Law Environmentalism, 94 PuB. CHOICE 49 (1998); Todd ]. Zywicki, A Unanimity-
Reinforcing Model of Efficiency in the Common Law: An Institutional Comparison of Common Law and 
Legislative Solutions to Large"Number Externality Proble1ns, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 961 (1996). For a 
discussion of how tort law principles, if not tort law itself, might enhance environmental 
protection, see David Schoen brad, Protecting the Envimnment in the Spirit of the Common Law, in 
THE COMMON LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra, at 3. At the same time, there is significant 
academic literature suggesting that this ne"found emphasis on tort law is misplaced. See, e.g., 
Frank B. Cross, Common Law Conceits: A Comment on iVIeiners & Yandle, 7 CEO. MASON L. REV. 965, 
977 (I 999); PeterS. Me nell, The Limitations of Legal Institutions for Addressing Envimnmental Risks, 
5]. ECON. PERSP. 93, 93-94 (1991); Christopher H. Schroeder, Lost in the Tmnslation: vVhat 
Environmental Regulation Does that Tort Cannot Duplicate, 41 WASHBURN LJ. 583, 586 (2002); 
Andrew McFee Thompson, Comment, Free 1\!Iarket Envimnmentalism and the Common Law: 
Confusion, Nostalgia, and Inconsistency, 45 EMORY LJ. 1329, 1371-72 (1996). This author is 
sympathetic to those calling for greater reliance on state tort law principles but not fully 
convinced that such a transition is practicable. See Adler, mpra note II; Jonathan H. Adler, 
Stand or DeliveT: Citizen Suits, Standing and Environmental Protection, 12 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 
39, 69-82 (2001). 
524. States are responsible for over eighty-five percent of environmental enforcement 
action. The State of Texas alone performs twice as many inspections as the EPA, 41,803 to 
18,530, respectively, in 1997. Jonathan H. Adler, Bean Counting for a Better Earth: Environmental 
Enforcement at the EPA, REG., Spring I 998, at 40-48. 
525. As noted infra notes 589-621 and accompanying text, states often regulate well in 
advance of the federal government. 
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found beyond Congress's reach are those most likely to be regulated by state 
and local governments. Indeed, most such environmental concerns are so 
regulated already, albeit in cooperation with federal efforts.526 
While limiting federal regulatory authority will necessarily affect 
existing federal regulatory programs, it need not result in a significant 
decline in environmental quality. Indeed, if responded to properly, 
limitations on federal regulatory authmity could actually improve 
environmental performance insofar as it fosters greater reliance on more 
efficient and effective approaches to environmental protection.527 First, just 
as constitutional constraints on federal authority limit federal protection, 
such constraints also limit the federal government's ability to impose 
environmental harm. Second, in many instances alternatives to federal 
environmental protection can be just as, if not more, protective of 
environmental values. Reducing the scope of federal environmental 
regulation produces greater opportumtJes for the adoption and 
implementation of such non-federal efforts. Third, direct regulation is not 
the federal government's only means of advancing environmental values. 
Even if the Supreme Court were to impo!le highly restrictive federalism 
constraints on federal regulatory power, including the use of conditional 
spending under Dole, the federal government would retain substantial 
authmity to advance environmental protection. 
A. LIMITING FEDERAL POWER LIMITS FEDERAL HARM 
Most discussions of the environmental impact of the Supreme Court's 
federalism jurisprudence focus on the extent to which judicially enforced 
constraints on federal regulatory power will limit the federal government's 
ability to address environmental concerns. This is a valid concern. At the 
same time, it must be remembered that expansive federal authority is not 
inherently protective of the environment. Rather it is a double-edged sword. 
Just as broad federal authority can be used to protect environmental 
concerns, a powerful federal government has the ability to cause substantial 
amounts of environmental harm. 
The nation's history is littered with examples of environmental 
degradation directed, funded, or otherwise encouraged by tl1e federal 
government. Many of our country's present environmental struggles are the 
legacy, at least in part, of ill-conceived (albeit sometimes well-intentioned) 
federal programs. Environmental harm brought about by federal 
environmental programs span the spectrum from pollution at federal 
526. In addition to state pollution control laws, many state and local growth management 
and land-use regulations can be used to advance specific environmental goals, such as pollution 
control, wetland conservation, or biocliversity protection. See generally Linda Breggin & Susan 
George, Planning j01· Biodiwrsit:y: Sources of Authority in State Land Use Laws, 22 VA. ENVTL. LJ. 81 
(2003) (noting the potential to use such statutes for biodiversity conservation). 
527. See Adler, supm note 48, at 264--70. 
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facilities and the mismanagement of federal lands to ecologically destructive 
public works projects and wasteful subsidies to farmers and businesses.528 
Subsidies to farmers have encouraged the draining of wetlands and waste of 
water resources;529 subsidies to ranchers have depleted populations of wild 
species;530 subsidies to corporations lower the costs of polluting fuel 
531 d b "d" fi h "b rfi I . 539 sources; an su sr res to rs errnen contrr ute to ove sung. -
The federal government's environmental record on federally owned 
properties is equally poor. The federal government chronically underfunds 
national park maintenance and restoration, while spending more money on 
land acquisition.533 The result is substantial pollution and ecological 
degradation. The sewer system in Yellowstone National Park, for example, is 
"3-! 
so degraded that it pollutes local trout streams and groundwater." The 
federal government loses money on timber sales in the national forests, and 
chronic mismanagement has led to ecosystem decline and a literally 
explosive threat of catastrophic wildfire. 535 The approximately 50,000 sites 
contaminated by the federal government will cost an estimated $235-389 
528. For examples of how federal policy has encouraged environmental harm, see generally 
David F. Gerard, Federal Flood Politics: 150 Yean of Environmental Jvfischiej in GOVERNMENT VERSUS 
ENVIRONMENT 59 (Donald R. Leal & Roger E. Meiners eds., 2002); see also Jonathan H. Adler, 
Free & Green: A. New Approach to Environmental Protection, 24 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 653, 677-81 
(2001). 
529. See PAUL SCODARI, MEASURING THE BENEFITS OF FEDERAL WETLANDS PROGRAMS 16 
(1997) (noting that federal flood-control projects encouraged the loss of forested wetlands in 
the lower Mississippi valley); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Peo-ple or Prairie Chickens: The Uncertain 
Search for Optimal Biodiversity, 51 STAN. L. REv. 1127, 1167-68 (1999). 
530. See KARL HESS, JR., THE THOREAU INST., SAVING THE BLACK-FOOTED FERRET: POUCY 
REFOIUvl AND PRIVATE SECTOR INCENTIVES, http:/ /www.ti.org/bffitess.html (last visited Dec. 6, 
2004) (on file with the Iowa I::aw Review). 
531. See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, FEDERAL FINANCIAL INTERVENTIONS 
AND SUBSIDIES IN ENERGY!VIARKETS 1999: PRIIvlARYENERGYapp. B, at 63-114 (1999). 
532. See Donald R. Leal, Fueling the Race to the Fish, in GOVERNMENT VERSUS ENVIRONMENT, 
supra note 528, at 39. 
533. See Holly Lippke Fretwell & Michael Podolsky, A Strategy for Restoring Americas National 
Parks, 13 DUKE ENVTL. L. & PoL'Y F. 143, 149 (2003). See generally AlsTON CHASE, PL·\\1NG GOD 
IN YELLOWSTONE: THE DESTRUCTION OF AMERICA'S FIRST NATIONAL PARK (1986); KARL HESS, JR., 
ROCI\YT!MES IN ROCKY MOUNTAIN NATIONAL PARI\: AN UNNATURAL HISTORY (1993). 
534. Fretwell & Podolsky, supra note 533, at 149; HOLLY L!PPKE FRETIVELL, PAYING TO PL\.Y: 
THE FEE DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM 3 (Prop. & Env't Research Ctr., PERC Policy Series No. PS-
17, 1997). 
535. See HOLLY LTPPlili FRETIVELL, PROP. & ENV'T RESEARCH CTR., FORESTS: DO WE GET 
WHAT WE PAY FOR?(l999), http://www.perc.org/publications/landreports/report2.php (on 
file with the Iowa Law Review); U.S. GAO, WESTERN NATIONAL FORESTS: A COHESIVE STRATEGY 
NEEDED TO ADDRESS CATASTROPHIC WILDFIRE THREATS 6 (1999) (noting an estimated 39 
million acres of federal lands are at risk of catastrophic wildtire). See genemlf)' ROBERT H. 
NELSON, A BURNING ISSUE: A CASE FOR ABOLISHING THE U.S. FOREST SERVICE (2000); DONALD 
LEAL, TURNING A PROFIT ON PUBLIC FORESTS (Prop. & Env't Research Ctr., PERC Policy Series 
No. PS-4, 1995). 
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billion to clean up, according to the General Accounting Office.536 The U.S. 
Department of Energy alone is responsible for environmental 
contamination at over 100 sites in thirty states, covering approximately two 
million acres.537 
Solid Waste AgenC)' undoubtedly restricted the federal government's 
ability to regulate activities that harm isolated wetlands. Ironically, tl1e 
federal government maintained an active policy of draining or otl1erwise 
destroying wetlands for well over a century.538 The Swamp Land Act of 1849, 
for example, provided for the transfer of government-owned "swamp" into 
private hands on tl1e condition that tl1ey were drained.539 In 1900, tl1e 
Supreme Court characterized wetlands as "the cause of malarial and 
malignant fevers" and declared that "[t]he police power is never more 
legitimately exercised than in removing such nuisances."5.J0 At the time, tl1e 
country "was draining everything in sight to make communities healthful."541 
Otl1er government policies, ranging from subsidized inigation projects and 
fann subsidies to flood control projects and subsidized disaster insurance, 
furtl1er contributed to wetland loss. 542 For example, it is estimated that as 
much as thirty percent of tl1e forested wetlandJoss in the lower Mississippi 
Valley was due to incentives created by federal flood-control projects.543 
Flood control projects and otl1er policies continued to encourage wetland 
loss well into tl1e 1970s. 544 
In addition to subsidizing the filling of wetlands and building 
ecologically disruptive water projects, the Arn1y Corps of Engineers helped 
despoil the waters it was entrusted to protect. For instance, the Cmps 
contributed substantially to tl1e pollution that rendered Lake Erie a "dead" 
water body, regularly depositing contaminated dredge from tl1e bottom of 
the Cuyahoga River into the lake.545 This activity continued through the 
1960s, even after Congress adopted legislation to force tl1e Corps to clean up 
536. U.S. GAO, FEDERAL FACILITIES: CONSISTENT RELEVANT RISK EVALUATIONS NEEDED FOR 
PRIORITIZING CLEANUPS 29 (1996). 
537. F.W. vVhicker et al., Avoiding Destntclive Remediation at DOE Sites, 303 SCI. 1615, 1615 
(2004). 
538. See geneml~v Gerard, supra note 528, at 59-77. 
539. Swamp Land Act, ch. 84, 9 Stat. 519 (1850). 
540. Leovy v. United States, 177 U.S. 621, 636 (1900). 
541. Robert Beck, The Movement in the United States to Restoration and CTeation of Wetlands, 34 
NAT. RESOURCES]. 781, 781 (1994). 
542. See RALPH E. HEIMLICH ET AL., WETLANDS AND AGRICULTURE: PRIVATE INTERESTS AND 
PUBLIC BENEFITS, Agriculture Economic Report No. 765, 24-25 (1998). 
543. Robert N. Stavins & Adam B. Jaffe, Unintended Impacts of Public Investments on Private 
Decisions: The Depletion of Forested Wetlands, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 337, 337 (1990). 
544. See Gerard, supra note 528, at 64. 
545. See Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Wastes, Watm; and Vl'isliful Thinking: The Battle of Lake ETie, 20 
CASE W. REs. L. REV. 5, 35 (1968) (noting that the Corps dumped over one million cubic yards 
per year from the Cuyahoga and Cleveland's outer harbor each year in the late 1960s). 
458 90 IOWA LAW REVIEW [2005] 
its act. To the Corps, defiling Lake Erie in this fashion was costjustified. 546 
Today the Corps has a lead role in helping to restore the Florida Everglades, 
yet it was the Corps's water projects in southern Florida that helped disrupt 
the Everglades ecosystem in the first place.547 Given its record of 
environmental harm, it is ironic that the Corps of Engineers, of all federal 
agencies, now has such a prominent role in environmental protection. 548 
Most of the environmental harm to be laid at the federal government's 
feet is the result of various spending programs, yet it is the federal 
government's 1·egulat01y authority that is most threatened by the Court's 
federalism jurisprudence, particularly in the Commerce Clause context. 
Therefore, it is possible that limits on the scope of federal authority will 
affect the federal government's ability to do environmental good far more 
than it will curtail the federal government's penchant for encouraging 
environmental harm. Yet it would be a mistake to assume that federal 
regulations, including federal envimnmental regulations, are not themselves 
responsible for some degree of environmental harm. 
Examples of federal regulations that have the potential to cause 
negative environmental effects are more common than one might expect. 
Technology-based emissions standards, such as those embodied in the CAA 
and CWA, "play a key role in discouraging innovation" that can lead to 
environmental improvements. 549 The federal Superfund program has 
discouraged the rapid and cost-effective cleanup of many unused or 
abandoned hazardous waste sites.550 The complexity and rigidity of federal 
hazardous waste regulations can discourage hazardous waste recycling, even 
though such recyclingjs officially considered environmentally preferable to 
the alternatives of incineration or land disposal.551 The claim here is not that 
environmental regulations necessarily do more good than harm, but that at 
least some environmental regulations have negative environmental 
546. Id. at 36. 
547. Michael Grunwald, In Everglades, a Chance for Redemption; Can Agenc} Reverse the Damage 
It Has Done?, WASH. POST, Sept 14. 2000, at AI. Other federal programs, including sugar 
subsidies, also played a substantial role in the degradation of the Everglades. 
548. See, e.g., Michael Grunwald, An Agency of Unchecked Clout: Water Projects Roll Post 
Economic, Environmental Concerns, WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 2000, at A1 (discussing the 
environmental legacy of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers). 
549. ENVTL. LAW lNST., BARRIERS TO ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION AND USE 
(1998) ("Technology-based emission limits and discharge standards, which are embedded in 
most of our pollution laws, play a key role in discouraging innovation."). 
550. See, e.g., Paul S. Kibei, The Urban Nexus: Open Space, Brownfields, and Justice, 25 B.C. 
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 589, 60().....05 (1998); Becky L.Jacobs, Basic Brownfields, 12]. NAT. RESOURCES 
& ENVTL. L. 265, 267-72 (1996-97). 
551. See Jonathan H. Adler, Wasted Lights, REG., Spring 1996, at 15-18 (citing regulatory 
disincentives for corporations to install more energy efficient lighting). 
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consequences and that in at least some instances environmental regulations 
are the source of net environmental harm. 552 
The Endangered Species Act ("ESA") is the federal regulatory statute 
most at risk under the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence, but it would 
be a mistake to assume a threat to the Endangered Species Act necessarily 
poses a threat to the survival of endangered species. Enacted in 1973 to save 
species from the brink of extinction, the ESA has hardly been a success. In 
over thirty years, fewer than forty of over 1,000 species have been delisted as 
endangered or threatened.553 In this time more species have been delisted 
because they went extinct or never should have been listed as endangered in 
the first place than have been legitimately "recovered" due to the Act.554 
Among the various factors that contribute to the ESA's ineffectiveness 
as a conservation tool are the very regulatory strictures most at risk to 
Commerce Clause challenge. Section 9 prohibits the "take" of endangered 
species, including significant modification of listed species' habitat. The 
presence of a listed species can freeze the use of private land, barring 
everything from timber cutting and ditch digging to plowing a field or 
building a home. In Riverside County, Califoifiia, the ESA even prevented 
private landowners from disking to clear firebreaks on their own land lest 
they disturb the habitat of the Stephens' kangaroo rat.555 Consequently, 
ptivate landowners are penalized for owning endangered species habitat. 556 
In this fashi.on, the ESA creates economic .incentives for ptivate 
landowners to engage in tl1e deliberate destruction of actual or potential 
wildlife habitat and to forego or prevent future habitat creation on privately 
552. See generally Frank B. Cross, Paradoxical Perils of the Precautionary Principle, 53 WASi-L & 
LEEL. REv. 851 (1996). 
553. See U.S. FISH & WILDUFE SERV., THREATENED AND ENDANGERED SPECIES SYSTEM, 
http:/ /ecos.fws.gov/tess_public/TESSWebpageDelisted?listings=O (last visited April 20, 2004) 
(on file with the Iowa Law Review). 
554. !d.; see also Robert E. Gordon,Jr. et al., Conservation Under the Endangered Species Act, 23 
ENVTL. INT'L 359, 359 ( 1997); Ike C. Sugg, Caught in the Act: Evaluating the Endangered Species Act, 
Its Effects on Man and Prospects for Reform, 24 CUMB. L. REv. 1, 42-44 ( 1993). It is worth noting that 
many of the alleged "successes" of the ESA are nothing of the kind and involve species that were 
either never in danger of extinction or were helped by exogenous factors. See id. (discussing the 
examples of the Palau dove, Palau fantail flycatcher, Palau owl, Rydberg milk-vetch, and 
American alligator). 
555. Seeike C. Sugg, California Fires-Losing Houses, Saving Rats, WALL ST.j., Nov. 10, 1993, 
at A20. While there is dispute whether disking firebreaks would have adequately protected 
homes ·in Riverside County from the fire threat, it is undisputed that landowners were 
threatened with prosecution under the ESA if they were to use the traditional method of 
disking to dear firebreaks on their own land. Id.; see also Ike C. Sugg, Editorial, Environmental 
Overprotection, WASH. POST, Aug. 9, 2004, at Al8. 
556. As explained by Sam Hamilton, former Fish and Wildlife Service administrator for the 
state of Texas: "The incentives are wrong here. If I have a rare metal on my property, its value goes 
up. But if a rare bird occupies the land, its value disappears." Betsy Carpenter, The Best-Laid Plans, 
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 4, 1993, at 89 (quoting Hamilton). 
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owned land.557 Professors Lueck and Michael report that forest owners 
respond to the likelihood of ESA regulation by harvesting timber and 
reducing the age at which timber is harvested.558 Such preemptive habitat 
destruction could well "cause a long-run reduction in the habitat and 
population" of endangered species.559 In some instances, it is likely that the 
economic incentives created by the Act result in the net loss of species 
habitat. That is, in some cases the ESA may be responsible for more habitat 
l th h b . . 560 oss an a 1tat protectiOn. 
Professors Lueck and Michael are not alone in their findings. A study in 
Conservation Biology further reports that just as many landowners responded 
to the listing of Preble's meadow jumping mouse by destroying potential 
habitat as undertook new conservation efforts.561 It also found a majority of 
landowners would not allow biologists on their land to assess mouse 
populations out of fear that land-use resnictions would follow the discovery 
of a mouse on their land. 552 The Fish and Wildlife Service also acknowledges 
that its own regulations can lead to habitat loss on private land. In the Pacific 
northwest, land-use resuictions imposed to protect the northern spotted owl 
made private landowners fear the lost use of their land and that "this concern 
or fear has accelerated harvest rotations in an effort to avoid the regrowth of 
habitat that is useable by owls."563 
Insofar as ESA regulation discourages private land conservation, it is 
undermining species conservation efforts. The majority of endangered and 
threatened species depend on private land for some portion of their habitat,564 
so by discouraging private land conservation, the ESA could well have a 
devastating impact on species conservation efforts. While there is no conclusive 
evidence as to .[:he net effect of the ESA on species conservation on private 
land, there is more than enough evidence to challenge the prevailing 
557. For a broader discussion of this, see Michael]. Bean, The Endangered Species A.ct and 
Pdvate Land: Four Lessons Lem'hed from the Past Qumter Centwy, 28 ENVTL L. REP. 10701 (1998). 
558. Dean Lueck & Jeffrey- A. Michael, Preemptive Habitat Destmction Under the Endange~·ed 
Species Act, 46 J.L. &. ECON. 27, 27 (2003). 
559. !d. at 30. 
560. Dr. Larry McKinney, Director of Resource Protection for the Texas Parks and Wildlife 
Department, concluded: "vVhile I have no hard evidence to prove it, I am convinced that more 
habitat for the black-capped vireo, and especially the golden-cheeked warbler, has been lost in those 
areas of Texas since the listing of these birds than would have been lost without the ESA at all.'" 
Larry McKinney, Reauthorizing the Endangered Species Act-Incentives joT Rural Landowners, m 
BUILDING ECONOMIC INCENTlVES INTO THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 71, 74 (Defenders of 
Wildlife ed., 1993). 
561 . See generally Amara Brook et al., Landowners' Responses to an Endangered Species Act Listing 
and Implications for Encouraging Conservation, 17 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1638 (2003). 
562. Id. 
563. 60 Fed. Reg. 9484, 9507-08 (proposed Feb. 17, 1995) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 
17). 
564. U.S. GAO, ENDANGERED SPEClES ACT: INFORMATION ON SPECIES PROTECTION ON 
NONFEDERAL L.-\NDS 4 (1994). 
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assumption that limitations on ESA regulation of private land will result in net 
harm to endangered species. If courts hold that the Commerce Clause limits 
federal regulation of private land, it may even prompt the federal government 
to adopt alternative approaches to species conservation that do not produce 
the same unintended consequences and conserve species in a more effective 
and equitable manner. 
The imposition of federal priorities on unconsenting states can also 
have negative environmental results. In many cases, the assertion of federal 
regulatory authority to advance environmental goals will safeguard 
important environmental concerns. But in other cases, federal authority can 
prevent states from adopting environmentally preferable alternatives. 
Federal preemption of more protective state environmental standards can 
inhibit more effective environmental protection, as well as experimentation 
with new approaches of addressing environmental concerns. 565 
Sovereign immunity will frustrate some environmentalist suits against 
recalcitrant states, but it will also limit corporate efforts to preempt local 
decisions about land-use and community character. In Federal Maritime 
Commission v. South Carolina State Ports Authority,555 f~r instance, a cruise ship 
operator sought to force South Carolina to allow the berthing of a gambling 
boat. Due to South Carolina's sovereign immunity, the private cruise ship 
operator could not force the port authority to allow its ship to berth at the 
port absent federal intervention.557 Opposition to the boat may have been 
driven by concerns about gambling or specific parochial interests in this 
case, but it illustrates how limitations on federal regulatory authority can 
limit the federal government's ability to impose development or other 
potentially environmentally harmful activity on unconsenting states. Coastal 
communities throughout the nation, including in South Carolina, are 
concerned with the negative environmental impacts of congested ports, 
which include air and water pollution, as well as harm to sensitive coastal 
lands.558 
Judicial reinvigoration of federalism limits on the spending power 
would have the greatest impact on the Clean Air Act ("CAA"). Here again, 
there is reason to question whether such limitations would result in net 
environmental harm. Under the CAA, the federal government uses the 
565. See, e.g., Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgrnt. Dist., 124 S. Ct. 1756, 1761-
64 (2004) (holding local low emission vehicles fleet purchase rules preempted by Clean Air 
Act); United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 115 (2000) (holding state oil spill regulations 
preempted by Ports and Waterways Safety Act); see also Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and 
Environmental Reg;ulation: A Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553, 577 (2001) ("[W]hen 
industry seeks preemption of state standards, less stringent regulatory standards in the affected 
states generally result."). 
566. 535 u.s. 743 (2002). 
567. ld. at 747-51. 
568. See Daniel Machalaba, U.S. Ports Hit a Stann, WALL ST.j., Mar. 10, 2004, at Bl. 
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threat of sanctions to impose federal air pollution control priorities on state 
governments. Specifically, the threatened loss of highway funds induces 
states to adopt that mix of air pollution control measures preferred by 
federal policymakers, even when an alternative rnix of pollution control measures 
rnay pmduce greater envimnrnental results. 
The adoption of one air pollution control measure may increase other 
forms of pollution or otherwise contribute to other environmental 
problems.569 The federal gasoline oxygenate requirement is a notorious 
example of how environmental regulation can cause environmental harm.570 
Under the CAA, oil companies are required to use fuel additives to increase 
the oxygen content of fuels in certain non-attainment areas.571 Although 
ostensibly designed to reduce automotive emissions, there is substantial 
scientific evidence that oxygenated fuels provide little environmental 
benefit. 572 The addition of one oxygenate, ethanol, can reduce some 
emissions at tl1e expense of increasing others.573 Another oxygenate in wide 
.use until recently, methyl tertiary butyl ether ("MTBE"), has been linked to 
widespread water pollution problems throughout the country. 57'1 
Several states sought relief from the various federal fuel mandates, 
preferring to adopt other measures to reduce auto-related air pollution, but 
were precluded from doing so under the CAA. 575 In these states, air 
pollution may be worse than it would otherwise be due to the assertion of 
federal regulatory authority. This is not the only instance in which CAA 
mandates may impede the achievement of optimal levels of environmental 
569. AB Justice Breyer, then Judge Breyer, observed, "[O]ne can find many examples of 
regulators' ignoring one program's safety or environmental effects upon another." STEPHEN 
BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 22 ( 1993). 
570. See generally Jonathan H. Adler, Clean Fuels, Dirty Air, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS: 
PUBLIC COSTS, PRIVATE ~WARDS (MichaelS. Greve & Fred L. Smith, Jr. eds., 1992). 
571. 42 U.S.C. § 7545'(k) (2) (B) (2000). 
572. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, OZONE-FORMING POTENTIAL OF REFOR/viULATED GASOLINE 
7 (1999) ("The use of commonly available oxygenates in RFG has little impact on improving 
ozone air quality and has some disadvantages."); id. at 4 (noting it is "not certain" whether any 
of the documented improvement in urban air quality is due to tl1e use of reformulated 
gasoline). See generally EPA, ACHIEVING CLEAN AIR AND CLEAN WATER: REPORT OF THE BLUE 
RIBBON PANEL ON OXYGENATES IN GASOLINE (1999). At times, tl1e EPA has also sought to use the 
federal oxygenate requirement as much to benefit etl1anol producers and other agricultural 
interests as much as to improve air quality. See Am. Petroleum Inst. V. EPA, 52 F.3d 1113, 1!19 
(D.C. Cir. 1995). 
573. See Davis v. EPA, 348 F.3d 772, 777 (9tl1 Cir. 2003) (noting that the federal oxygenate 
requirement increases emissions of nitrogen oxides); HAROLD M. HASKEW ET AL., CAL. ENVTL. 
PROT. AGENCY, FUEL PER!v!EATION FROM AUTOMOTIVE SYSTEMS 5 (2004) (documenting increased 
auto-related emissions from the use of etl1anol as an oxygenate), 
http:/ I www.arb.ca.gov I fuels/ gasoline/ permeation/ 090204finalrpt. pdf. 
574. See generally U.S. GAO, MTBE CONTAMINATION FROM UNDERGROUND STORAGE TANKS 
(2002) (reporting that a majority of states have found MTBE in groundwater); see also EPA, 
supra note 572. 
575. See Davis, 348 F.3d at 785. 
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protection. Because the formation of troposphe1ic ozone ("smog") is in pan 
dependent upon ratios of ozone precursors in the ambient air, measures 
that reduce ozone levels in some cities increase ozone levels somewhere 
else.576 Earlier air pollution control provisions adopted as part of the CAA 
Amendments of 1977 were tailored to advantage regional coal producers at 
the expense of their competitors, and air quality suffered as a result.577 
If the federal government's ability to condition the receipt of highway 
funds on state implementation of detailed pollution control requirements 
were more limited, it is likely that many states would adopt a different mix of 
air pollution control measures. vVhile some may fear that such state 
flexibility could result in less protective environmental regulations,578 the 
expe1ience with the CAA suggests that at least some states would adopt a mix 
of air pollution control measures that are more appropriate to their regions' 
specific air pollution concerns and would be more attentive to the potential 
negative consequences of specific federally-preft::,rred pollution control 
strategies. Without the ability to condition highway funding on all aspects of 
air pollution control policy, the federal government would retain substantial 
ability to influence state decision-making-conditional spending could still 
be used in a less "coercive" manner-but it would lack the ability to force 
states to adopt specific measures over state opposition. Insofar as the CAA 
discourages some states from adopting locally optimal air pollution control 
measures, this could be environmentally beneficial. 
It is important to note that the claim here is not that the extension of 
federal power always or inexorably results in net environmental harm. The 
federal govemment has encouraged substantial environmental progress, just 
as it has caused, or otherwise encouraged, much environmental 
despoliation. The impact of federal power on environmental protection is a 
function of what the federal government does. A more powerful federal 
government is no less prone to causing or subsidizing environmentally 
destructive activities than it is to effectively controlling environmental 
harms. An increase in federal power does not necessa1ily translate into 
increased environmental protection. By the same token, the curtailment of 
federal power will not necessa1ily lead to greater environmental harm. 
576. See, e.g., NAT'L ACAD. OF SCIENCES, RETHINKING THE OZONE PROBLEM IN URBAN AND 
REGIONAL AlR POLLUTION 11 (1991) ("[Nitrogen oxide (NOx)] reductions can have either a 
beneficial or detrimental effect on ozone concentrations, depending on the locations and 
emissions rates of [volatile organic compound] and NOx sources in a region."). 
577. See generally BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DJRIT AlR 
( 1981) (detailing the influence of regional and other economic interests on the 1997 Clean Air 
Act Amendments). 
578. See infra note 598 and sources cited therein. 
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B. NON-FEDERAL ENVIRONiviENTAL PROTECTION 
The federal government is not the only provider of environmental 
protection. Many of today's federal environmental programs were preceded 
by-if not modeled on-state efforts. 579 States regularly adopt environmental 
measures that are more protective than the federal "floor," and most 
innovative environmental reforms have their roots 'in state and local efforts. 
Yet existing federal programs often obstruct or discourage state reforms. 580 
In particular, the existing regulatory system is stultified and inhibits the 
evolution of policy measures to account for new information and knowledge 
or changing circumstances. 581 Even so-called "cooperative" efforts, under 
which the federal government funds approved state environmental 
programs, can distort state and local priorities, redirecting resources from 
more to less urgent environmental matters. Insofar as the Court's articulated 
federalism principles reduce the federal government's ability to dictate 
environmental policy from Washington, D.C., states will have greater 
opportunity to pick up the slack. 
Decentralized approaches to environmental protection have many 
potential advantages over centralized regulatory regimes. Decentralization 
can enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of environmental controls. 582 
No less important, decentralization can allow for experimentation with 
alternative approaches to environmental protection with which there is 
relatively little practical experience. 583 "By decentralizing environmental 
decision making, we may be able to obtain improved responsiveness to 
changing circums~ances and new information," notes Professor Farber.58.1 
There is no reasori;" a jJriori, to view the decentralization of environmental 
protection as a threat to environmental protection, as opposed to a way of 
making it "more effective."585 
The potential environmental benefits of decentralization are not merely 
theoretical. The history and current practice of state and local 
environmental protection provide ample reason to question the assumption 
that lessening federal environmental regulatory authority necessari('V results in 
579. Percival, sujJra note 9, at 1172. 
580. See DANIEL A. FARBER, ECO-PRAGtvlATISM: MAIUNG SENSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS 
IN AN UNCERTA.!NWORLD 181 (1999) ("Federal regulations tend to be insensitive to differences 
in technological and economic constraints and to variations in environmental problems."). 
581. !d. at 179 (noting that "the information base is itself subject lo rapid change"); see also 
HENRY N. BUTLER & JONATHAN R. l.VlACEY, USING FEDERALISM TO IMPROVE ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLICY 1 (1996) (noting that federal environmental regulations are a substantial source of 
"inflexibility and inertia"). 
582. See FARBER, supra note 580, at 179 ("One way to improve environmental learning is 
decentralization-moving decision making from large federal bureaucracies to the private 
sector or to smaller units of government."); Adler, supra note 48, at 265-70. 
583. See Adler, supra note 48, at 266-67. 
584. FARBER, supra note 580, at 180. 
585. Id. at 183. 
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lessened environmental protection. While the federal government is the 
most conspicuous actor on the environmental stage, state and local 
governments are the avant gaTde, developing innovative efforts to enhance 
the ecological and economic performance of environmental protection.586 
From brownfield redevelopment plans and audit privilege rules to property-
based water management and unified, multimedia permitting systems, states 
are trying to find ways of maximizing the return on investments in 
. tal 1. ss7 env1ronmen po Icy. 
The conventional wisdom holds that federal environmental regulation 
was necessary because states failed to adopt adequate environmental 
measures. This view ignores the substantial environmental progress in many 
areas due to state and local efforts adopted p1ior to the enactment of most 
major federal environmental laws.588 The EPA's first national water quality 
inventory, conducted just one year after adoption of the Clean Water Act 
("CWA"), found that there had been substantial improvement in water 
quality in major waterways over the preceding decade.589 vVhile water quality 
problems persisted, the evidence suggests that states began addressing those 
water quality problems that were clearly identified and understood well 
before the federal government. 
Several studies of air pollution similarly find evidence of significant 
environmental improvement p1ior to the adoption of federal environmental 
regulation. Historically, the first municipal smoke ordinances were adopted 
in the late nineteenth century, and the number of cities \'lith effective local 
controls increased dramatically in the post-World War II period.590 In a 
comprehensive study of air pollution trends, Indur Goklany documents that 
levels of key pollutants were in decline prior to adoption of the 1970 Clean 
586. See Revesz, supra note 565, at 636 (" [T]he states, not the federal government, 
produced the most innovation in pollution control legislation in the 1990s."). 
587. In the area of hazardous waste site cleanups and brownfield redevelopment, for 
example, states are responsible for "the bulk of the initiative," whereas the federal government's 
role "remains limited and largely reactive."/d. at 603. For additional examples of state-level 
experimentation, see ALEXANDER VOLOKH ET AL., NAT'L ENVTI.. POLIC\' INST. & REASON PUB. 
POLICY lNST., RACE TO THE TOP: THE INNOVATIVE FACE OF STATE ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT 
(1998). 
588. See Revesz, supra note 565, at 578-79 ("[T]he view widely held in the legal literature 
that the states ignored environmental problems before 1970 is simply not correct."). 
589. A. Myrick Freeman, Water Pollution Policy, in PUBLIC POLICIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION 169, 187 (Paul Portney & Robert N. Stm~ns eds., 2d. ed. 2000) (noting that the 
results of the EPA's first National Water Quality Inventory, conducted in 1973, "indicated 
significant improvements in most major waterways over the preceding decade, at least in regard 
to organic wastes and bacteria"). 
590. See Arthur C. Stern, Hisl01)' of Ai,- Pollution Legislation in the United States, 32 ]. AIR 
POLLUTION CONTROL Ass'N 44, 44 (1982). For details of one city's efforts to reduce air 
pollution prior to the adoption of federal environmental regulation, see ROY LUBOVE, 
TWENTIETH-CENTURY PITTSBURGH: GOVERNMENT, BUSINESS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE 106-
41 (1969). See also Cliff I. Da\~dson, Air Pollution in Pittsburgh: A Historical Perspective, 29]. AIR 
POLLUTION CONTROLAsS'N 1035 (1979). 
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Air Act Amendments.591 More significantly, the rate of improvement for 
some pollutants was greater prior to the adoption of federal controls than 
-g9 
after." - A study by Paul Portney of Resources for the Future also found that 
"at least some measures of air quality were improving at an impressive rate 
before 1970."593 Research by Robert Crandall of the Brookings Institution 
similarly concluded that pre-federal air pollution control efforts were more 
successful than is typically assumed: "Pollution reduction was more effective 
in the 1960s, before there was a serious federal policy dealing with stationary 
sources, than since tl1e 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments."594 These studies 
suggest that state and local governments had the ability and motivation to 
address identified environmental concerns, such as air pollution.595 
As with water pollution, once a given air pollution problem was clearly 
identified and understood, state and local governments began enacting 
measures to address these concerns before the federal government got into 
the act. Indeed, in some cases the early state efforts became the model for 
subsequent federal measures. In others, federal regulations were adopted, 
with the support of industry, to preempt more stringent or less uniform state 
regulatory standards.596 While it is common to suggest that federal 
intervention was necessary because state and local efforts "failed" to protect 
environmental quality, the historical record is more ambiguous. Prior to the 
1970s, the federal government failed to fulfill many of its preexisting 
environmental obligations. Yet, as discussed above, some state and local 
governments were beginning to make substantial progress in addressing 
local environme~'tal concerns. 597 
A common concern voiced in environmental policy debates is that 
lessening federal authority will lead to environmentally harmful 
interjurisdictional comp~.tition. Specifically, the lack of federal regulation 
will set off a "race to the bottom" in which state jurisdictions compete for 
corporate investment and economic development by reducing 
591. INDUR M. GOKLANY, CLEARING THE AIR: THE REAL STORY OF THE WAR ON AIR 
POLLUTION (1999). 
592. !d. at 54-57. 
593. Paul R. Portney, Air Pollution Policy, in PUBLIC POLIClES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION, supra note 589, at 77. 
594. ROBERT W. CRANDALL, CONTROLUNG INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION: THE ECONOMICS AND 
POUT!CSOFCLEANA1R19 (1983). 
595. As noted by Portney, "These data ... call into question one of the fundamental 
premises behind the [Clean Air Act]- that states and local governments would never impose 
the controls necessary to achieve healthful air." Portney, supra note 593, at 77. 
596. See Elliott eta!., supra note 18, at 330-33. 
597. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 11, at 133-38; GOIQANY, supra note 591; Adler, supra note 93, 
at 47-53 (documenting state wetland regulation prior to the adoption of federal wetlands 
regulations). 
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environmental safeguards.598 The theory is based upon the intuitive notion, 
supported by some empirical evidence,599 that firms are more likely to invest 
in states with less costly regulatory regimes. This concern is the "central 
underpinning" of federal environmental regulation600 and has been relied 
upon by courts to uphold federal environmental statutes against 
constitutional challenges.601 Yet on both theoretical and empirical grounds, 
concerns about an environmental race to the bottom seem overstated. 
Professor Revesz has demonstrated that the framework underlying tl1e 
race to the bottom theory has several analytical failings. 602 Firms base siting 
and relocation decisions on a wide range of criteria, of which environmental 
regulation is only one, and there is ample evidence that other factors 
typically play a greater role in such decisions. 603 Tax rates, infrastructure, 
availability, cost, skill of local labor, and other regulatory policies are also 
important considerations for businesses. If ilie race to the bottom operates 
in the environmental sphere, there is every reason to expect it to operate to 
tl1e same extent in tl1ese other contexts, suggesting iliat federal regulation 
would be necessary across the board. 604 In iliis way;'-the race to the bottom 
theory-if taken seriously-proves too much. In addition, the adoption of 
minimum federal environmental standards to prevent a race to the bottom 
in environmental policy would not eliminate the competitive pressures. 
Rather, it would shift them to oilier contexts, and the hypoiliesized welfare 
598. Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a "Race" and Is It "To the 
Bottom"?, 48 HASTINGS LJ. 271, 274 ( 1997); Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 
95 MICH. L. REv. 570,597-99 (1996); Stewart, suj;m note 46, at 1212; Peter P. S\\~re, The Race to 
Laxity and the Race to Undesimbility: Explaining Failures in Competition Among ]u1isdictions in 
Environmenta.l Law, 14 YALE]. ON REG. 67, 69 (1996). 
599. See, e.g., WAYNE B. GRAY, MANUFACTURING PLANT LOCATION: DOES STATE POLLUTION 
REGULATION MATTER? (Nat'! Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. W5880, 1997) 
(finding states with more stringent environmental regulation have fewer new manufacturing 
plants). 
600. CLiffORD RECHTSCHAFFEN & DAVID L. MARICELL, REINVENTING ENVIRONMENTAL 
ENFORCEMENT & THE STATE/FEDERAL RELATIONSHIP 22-25 (2003). 
601. See, e.g., Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps ofEng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 196-
97 (2001) (citing the desire to avoid destructive interstate competition as a basis for federal 
environmental regulation); Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 
281-82 (1981) (defening to Congress's finding that nationwide standards are "essential" to 
prevent "destructive interstate competition" that might undermine environmental standards); 
Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 501-02 (4th Cir. 2000); Nat'! Ass'n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 
130 F.3d 1041, 1054-56 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (Wald, J.) (stating that federal regulation removes 
incentives for states to adopt lower environmental standards in order to attract development, 
thereby preventing a destructive "race to the bottom"). 
602. See Richard Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the 'Race-to-the-Bottom' 
Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1210, 1233-44 (1992). 
603. Richard Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Normative Critique, in THE 
NEW FEDERALISM: CAN THE STATES BE TRUSTED? 105 (John Ferejohn & Barry R. Weingast eds., 
1997). 
604. !d. at 107. 
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losses would remain. 505 Professor Revesz also points out that the same 
dynamic that could theoretically produce systematic environmental 
underregulation could also produce overregulation. 605 If states are more 
aggressive at ·competing for industry through tax policy than through 
environmental policy, the likely result would be suboptimal tax rates but 
superoptimallevels of regulation. 507 
The theory persists, despite its flaws, because it is reasonable to assume 
that jurisdictions will seek to create a comparatively more attractive 
investment climate in order to better compete economically. Insofar as 
environmental regulations impose significant economic burdens on existing 
and prospective economic actors in a given area, it is also reasonable to 
expect jurisdictions to act so as to lessen such burdens. 608 Recent empirical 
work suggests that this is in fact the case as govemment officials 
acknowledge efforts to reduce the economic pinch of environmental 
regulation for economic purposes. 509 Yet for this to prove the race to the 
bottom hypothesis, it is necessary to further assume that reducing the 
economic cost of environmental regulation necessarily reduces the level of 
environmental protection. While such a conclusion may be justified m 
certain contexts, it cannot be assumed across the board. As not all 
environmental protection measures produce equivalent levels of 
environmental protection at equivalent costs, it should be possible for many 
jurisdictions to reduce the economic cost associated with environmental 
measures without sacrificing environmental quality.610 In addition, it is 
important to recognize that many states compete for citizens by seeking to 
improve their environmental performance. Because many people may be 
more likely to move to a state with high levels of environmental quality, this 
605. ld. at 106. 
606. Richard Revesz, The Race to the Bottom and Federal Environmental Regulation: A Response to 
Critics, 82 MINN. L. REv. 535, 539 (1997); Revesz, supra note 602, at 1241-42. 
607. Revesz, wpm note 603, at 104-05. 
608. It is important to note here that a premise of the race to the bottom argument is that 
environmental regulations impose substantial costs on business activity. If this were not the case 
there would be no reason to reduce environmental regulation in order to attract economic 
investment. This premise contradicts common claims that environmental regulations do not 
reduce job growth or otherwise harm economic development. 
609. See generally Scott R. Saleska & Kirsten H. Engel, "Facts Are Stubborn Things": An 
Empi1ical Reality Check in the The01'Btical Debate Over the Race-to-the-Bottom in State Environuumtal 
Standard Setting, 8 CORNELLJ.L. & PUB. POL'Y 55 (1998) (citing empirical evidence purporting to 
support race-to-the-bottom claims); Engel, supm note 598 (same). 
610. For example, if the use of tradable emission credits can reduce the cost of achieving a 
given level of pollution reduction at less cost than a similarly protective technology standard, it 
should be possible for a state to reduce the economic burdens of environmental regulation 
without lessening the level of health and environmental protection. Indeed, it could be possible 
to both reduce the cost of regulatory compliance and increase the level of em~ronmental 
protection simultaneously. See Jonathan H. Adler, The Ducks Stop Here? The Environmental 
Challenge to Federalism, 9 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 205, 226 (2001). 
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creates pressure for states to adopt more protective environmental policies. 
611 
In practice, the race to the bottom has not been obsen,ed in 
environmental policy.612 As already noted, state and local governments often 
regulated well before the federal government became involved. While this 
fact alone does not disprove the race to the bottom thesis-such state 
regulations could still have been suboptimal when compared to the federal 
alternative or some theoretical ideal-they demonstrate that competitive 
pressures do not preclude effective state regulation. More significantly, 
where the race to the bottom thesis has been directly tested in the context of 
wetlands, the pattern of 3tate regulation has been pTecisely the opposite of what 
the tl1eory would predict. 
Were there a race to the bottom in the context of wetlands regulation, 
those states with the most wetlands should be least likely to regulate 
development of such areas. As explained by Professors Houck and Rolland, 
"[T]he larger a state's wetland inventory, the more important it is to the 
nation, but the less important saving it may appear to the state itself-
indeed the more onerous the burden of protecting it will appear." 613 
Imposition of wetland regulations in a state in which there is a g1·eater 
proportion of wetlands as a percentage of the state's total land area will 
impose greater costs than the imposition of similar regulations in a state in 
which wetlands represent a smaller proportion of its lana area. Thus, one 
would expect such states with more wetlands to begin regulating after those 
states with fewer wetlands, if they were to ever regulate at all. 
The pattern of state wetland regulation prior to 1975-when the federal 
government was ordered by a federal court to regulate wetlands under§ 404 
of the CWA614-is precisely tl1e opposite of what the race to the bottom 
611. See Merritt, supra note 93, at 706 ("Residents have flocked to some western states that 
use aggressive measures to protect the environment-despite the fact that these laws impose 
significant costs on business and taxpayers."). 
612. Several economic studies have failed to find empirical evidence of any race to the 
bottom in environmental policy. See generally John A List & Shelby Gerking, Regulatmy Federalism 
and Environmental Protection in !he United States, 40 ]. REGIONAL SCI. 453 (2000) (prm~ding 
empirical e\~dence); Daniel L. Millimet, Assessing the Empirical Impact of Envimnmental Federalism, 
43]. REGIONAL SCI. 711 (2003) (same); DanielL. Millimet &John A List, A Natural Experiment 
on the 'Race to the Bottom' Hypothesis: Testing for Stochastic Dominance in Tempoml Pollution Trends, 65 
OXFORD BULL. ECON. & STAT. 395 (2003) {same); HIU\RY SIGMAN, LETTING STATES DO THE 
DIRTY WORK: STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION {Nat'] Bureau 
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9451, 2003) (suggesting that decentralization of 
environmental decision-making "allows welfare-based heterogeneity in stringency"). 
613. Oliver A. Houck & Michael Rolland, Federalism in Wetlands Regulation: A Consideration of 
Delegation of Clean Water Act Section 404 and Related Programs to the States, 54 MD. L. REV. 1242, 
1253 (1995). 
614. Natural Res. Def. Council v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685, (D.D.C. 1975); see also United 
States v. Holland, 373 F. Supp. 665, (M.D. Fla. 1974) (upholding Corps's jurisdiction over 
nonnavigable waters and intertidal wetlands connected to na,~gable waters). 
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theory would predict.515 According to the National Wetland Inventory, all 
fifteen states in the continental United States with more than ten percent of 
their land area in wetlands adopted wetland protection measures prior to 
1975.616 As one review of state wetland regulations noted, "[M] ost of the 
states with the largest wetland acreages have adopted wetland regulatory 
efforts for all or a portion of their wetlands."617 Although the adoption of 
such measures can entail significant costs, the states with the most wetlands 
clearly determined that the value of protecting wetlands was greater than the 
attendant costs of regulating them-interstate competitive pressures 
notwithstanding. 
There is also no evidence that interstate competition has resulted in any 
erosion of state wetland protection efforts, as "no state has repealed or 
substantially undercut its wetland statutes once adopted."618 To the contrary, 
when the Supreme Court narrowed the jurisdictional scope of CWA, 
including the protection of wetlands under § 404, some states quickly 
adopted additional regulatory measures to fill the gap. 619 In fact, after the 
Supreme Court found that the proposed balefill site at issue in Solid Waste 
Agency was beyond the scope of federal jurisdiction, local government 
agencies that previously had supported the project quickly acted to preserve 
the land at issue.620 While not every state has adopted post-Solid Waste Agency 
measures to address isolated wetlands, one reason for this might be the 
continuing uncertainty as to the precise scope of the federal government's 
regulatory authority post-Solid Waste Agency-and therefore continuing 
615. See Adler, supra ~ate 93, at 47-54. 
616. JON A. KUSLER ET AL., Ass'N OF STATE WETLAND MANAGERS, STATE WETLAND 
REGULATION: STATUS OF PROGRAMS AND EMERGING TRENDS 5-8 tbl.l. The states in question are 
Alabama, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Mississippi, New Jersey, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Wisconsin. 
617. Id. at 3. 
618. Id. at 20. 
619. The state of Ohio, for example, enacted an "emergency measure" to extend state 
regulations to isolated wetlands in July 2001. 2001 Ohio H.B. 231. More broadly, Michael 
Gerhardt reports that many states responded to the decision by considering, if not adopting, 
additional protections for isolated wetlands: 
[A] t least 19 states have responded to the decision by either enacting or 
recommending the enactment of laws to fill the void left as a result of the Court's 
decision. These states include, inter alia, California, Connecticut, Illinois, New 
Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, Virginia, and vVisconsin. 
These reactions are a clear illustration of environmental federalism in action. 
Michael]. Gerhardt, The Curious Flight of the j\,;figratoTy Bird Rule, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 11,079, 11,085 
(2001). 
620. See Michael Higgins, Brzlefill Battle Winds Down: State Offer To Buy Bmtlett Site LVIa_~ End 16-
year Feud, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 10, 2001, at Metro 1; Sue Ter Maat, With Balefill Out of Game, Developers 
Have Whole New Playing Field, CHI. DAILY HERALD,Jan. 12, 2003, at 1. 
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uncertainty about the need for state interventions. 621 It is possible that once 
the precise scope of the federal government's CWA auth01ity is clarified, 
more states will follow suit, much as local agencies acted to be protected 
from the Solid Waste Agency decision only after it was clear the federal 
government would not. 
Limiting federal regulatory authority would certainly create room for 
the expansion of state and local regulatory efforts. At the same time, such 
contraction is likely to create niches filled by non-governmental efforts. The 
United States has a long and proud tradition of private conservation efforts, 
ranging from the earliest hunting assoCiatiOns and conservation 
organizations to modern land trusts and "enviro-capitalists." To return to the 
wetlands context, groups ranging from Ducks Unlimited at the national level 
to Chesapeake Wildlife Heritage at the local level engage in substantial 
wetland restoration and conservation efforts, both independently and in 
conjunction 1vith government agencies.622 Other groups, such as the 
Peregrine Fund, National Wild Turkey Federation, and Oregon Water Trust, 
to name but a few, focus their efforts on particular .~pecies, habitats, or areas 
of environmental concern. Insofar as there is ev{aence that government 
efforts to support public goods may crowd out private investments in such 
goods,623 it is possible tl1at the curtailment of federal regulatory efforts would 
provide more room for p1ivate efforts. By the same token, ipsofar as existing 
federal regulations discourage private conservation efforts, as has been 
documented in the context of endangered species,624 the curtailment of 
federal regulat011' authority could remove significant barriers to greater 
private conservation efforts. 
C. A CONTINUING FEDERAL ROLE 
This Article's focus on the extent to which federalism doctrines could, 
and perhaps should, curtail federal regulatory auth01ity in the 
environmental context should not obscure the fact that federal regulatory 
power is likely to remain substantial for the foreseeable future. Federalism 
limits the regulatory power of tl1e federal government, but it does not 
eviscerate federal efforts. ·where federalism's pinch is most severe, it is 
621. Regarding Implications of the Supreme Cowt's SWANCC Decision: Hearing Before Comm. on 
House Gov't Reform, Subcomm. On Energy Policy, Natu.ml Res. and Regulatory Affairs, 107th Cong. 
(2002) (statement of Patrick Parenteau, Professor of Law, Vt. Law School) (stating that Solid 
Waste Agenry "has created substantial uncertainty regarding the geographic jurisdiction of the 
Clean Water Act"); see also Editorial, Saving Wetlands, WASH. POST,] an. 18, 2003, at A22 (noting 
"confusion" in the lower courts and regulatory agencies over the scope of federal regulatory 
authority under the CvVA after Solid Waste AgenC)•). 
622. See Adler, supra note 93, at 59-62. 
623. See, e.g., James Andreoni & A. Abigail Payne, Do Govemment Grants to Private Chmities 
Crowd Out Giving or Fund-Raising?, 93 AM. EcoN. REv. 792 (2003) (finding government grants to 
private charities reduce fund-raising by such groups). 
624. See supm notes 554-63 and accornpanyjng text. 
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reasonable to expect one or more justices to blink before applying the logic 
of existing precedents. Yet even if the Court applies the federalism 
principles in an unflinching manner, it will still be possible to protect 
environmental values. 
Under strict application of Lopez and Morrison, the federal government 
will retain the ability to regulate economic activity and truly interstate 
environmental problems. 625 Industrial operations will remain within the 
federal government's regulatory ambit, as would activities that produce 
interstate spillovers. Precedents such as Hodel would not be threatened by 
such an approach to the Commerce Clause, nor would lower court decisions 
upholding federal regulatory statutes that focus on indusuial enterprises 
and other economic activity. Adding a jurisdictional element to even the 
most ambitious federal environmental statutes would preserve their 
constitutionality, albeit at the expense of each statute's 
comprehensiveness. 625 A requirement that Congress include jurisdictional 
elements in environmental statutes that criminalize or otherwise regulate 
non-commercial activity would still cover the vast majority of 
environmentally destructive behavior. Commercial real estate developments 
of the sort at issue in Rancho Viejo and GDF Realty would satisfy even fairly 
narrow readings of such requirements, whereas non-commercial activities by 
individual landowners would not.627 
The greatest environmental impact on federal regulatory power would 
not be the result of an affirmative limitation on congressional power, but 
rather from the inherent inertia of the legislative process. Were the 
Supreme Court to find § 9 of the Endangered Species Act to extend beyond 
the scope of'Congress's enumerated powers, it could take some time before 
Congress amends the statute. The degree of inertia in the legislative process 
is substantial, and it is far easier to block legislation than to enact it. Still, 
there is some rea&on to believe that an urgent need for a new species 
protection statute could tligger political action.(i28 Assuming widespread 
public support for strong federal environmental measures, such legislation 
would be adopted in relatively short order. 
The federal government lacks the power to commandeer state 
governments for the purposes of implementing federal programs, but state 
625. See supra Part III.A. 
626. See, e.g., Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F. 3d 483, 508 (4th Cir. 2000) (Luttig, J., dissenting) 
(noting that "an express interstate commerce jurisdictional requirement" in the ESA "would all 
but ensure constitutional validity"). 
627. See Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000) (applying the jurisdictional 
requirement of a federal arson statute). 
628. See Daniel A. Farber, Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law, 8J.L. ECON. & ORG. 59, 
66-67 (1992) (suggesting federal em~ronmental laws adopted during a "republican moment"); 
see also Christopher H. Schroeder, Rational Choice Ve1:>1ts Republican Moment-Explanations for 
Environmental Laws, 1969-73, DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'YF. 29, 43 (1998). 
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entities are still subject to general federal environmental requirements.529 A 
state-run facility is still required to meet applicable federal environmental 
laws. State sovereign immunity limits Congress's ability to authmize citizen 
suits and contribution actions against state governments, but the federal 
government retains several means of inducing state compliance with federal 
law. Sovereign immunity does not prevent the federal government from 
directly suing state governments, nor does it limit other avenues of relief. 
The extent to which the Supreme Court enforces constitutional 
limitations on the use of conditional spending could have the greatest 
impact on tl1e federal government's ability to direct environmental policy at 
the state and locallevel.530 Yet here too it would be easy to overestimate the 
likely impact of such rulings. Applying tl1e Dole formulation to 
environmental statutes would curtail federal efforts to coerce state 
cooperation with tl1e Clean Air Act, but it is unlikely that it would affect 
other environmental laws. A more stringent spending power doctrine, while 
unlikely, would certainly constrain federal environmental authority to a 
greater degree, but the federal government would retain the ability to spend 
federal funds for environmental purposes. To the extent this compromises 
environmental protection-, more precisely, to the extent it limits 
expenditures on environmental measures because environ,?lental programs 
have difficulty competing against other p1iorities for a share of the public 
fisc-this would simply reflect political priorities. 
CONCLUSI01~ 
The Supreme Court's federalism jurisprudence appears to be on a 
collision course with large swaths of federal environmental law. While 
federal courts have yet to curtail federal environmental regulatory authmity, 
the underlying p1inciples of limited and enumerated powers and residual 
state sovereignty would seem to constraint the federal government's 
authmity in this area. Judicially enforced limits on federal power could well 
limit federal environmental regulation. Yet, this Article suggests such limits 
need not come at the expense of environmental protection. 
Professor Robert Percival argues that "[t]he Constitution need not 
stand as an obstacle to environmental progress."631 To ensure this result, he 
suggests a broad reading of the Constitution to incorporate em~ronmental 
values. But such an approach is not necessary to advance those 
environmental values held dear by the majority of Americans. Limits on the 
scope of federal regulatory authority need not be an obstacle to continued 
environmental progress eitl1er. There is more tl1an one way to advance 
629. See supm Part III. B. 
630. See supra. Part IV. 
631. Percival, supra note 4, at 870. 
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environmental values, and not every environmental end-indeed, perhaps 
not many environmental ends-necessitate a federal solution. 
Constitutional limits can often make it more difficult or costly to 
achieve desired public ends. Presently, there is a vigorous debate about the 
extent to which the Constitution limits federal efforts to combat terrorism 
and ensure domestic security. These are unassailable goals, yet it is generally 
accepted that the Constitution does-and should-constrain the manner in 
which these goals are pursued. To insist on such limits is not to question the 
underlying policy goal. This is what it means to have a constitutional 
government, and it need not result in the sacrifice of important public goals. 
The federal government can seek effective ways to prevent terrorism 
and ensure domestic security while operating within constitutional limits. By 
the same token, the federal government can seek to ensure continued 
environmental progress while operating within the constraints imposed by 
the Constitution. Like domestic security, the goal of environmental 
protection is unassailable in itself, but the import&nce of the goal does not 
justify jettisoning the constitutional baseline. The challenge for the future is 
to pursue effective environmental protection within constitutional limits. 
